siH^ 


^4 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF 
THE  SOUTH  AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 


888 


Other  Books  by  the  Same  Author  : 

The  Last 

American    Frontier 

(1910) 

The  Civil 

War   (191 1 ) 

The  New 

Nation   (1915) 

Guide    to 

the    Materials    in 

London 

Archives  for  the  History 

OF  the 

United 

States  since    1783 

(19H. 

with  C 

0.  Paullin) 

The  Independence  of 
fhe  South  American  RepubHcs 


A  STUDY  IN 
RECOGNITION  AND  FOREIGN  POLICY 


Second  Edition 


Br 


Frederic   L.  Paxson 

Professor  of  American  History  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin  and  sometiine 
Harrison  Fellow  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 


FERRIS  &   LEACH 

29  South  Seventh  Street 

I  9  I  6 


Copyright,  1903,  by 
Frederic  L    Paxson 


PKEFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION 

In  the  twelve  years  that  have  elapsed  since  this 
book  appeared,  it  has  been  in  demand  so  contin- 
uously that  a  revision  and  reprinting  are  necessary. 
New  materials  on  recognition  have  appeared,  while 
guides  prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  Carnegie 
Institution  'have  opened  up  the  archives  of  London, 
Madrid,  Mexico  and  Washington  as  never  before. 
I  have  not  re-written  the  text,  but  I  have  revised 
and  re-arranged  the  notes  for  this  edition,  and  I 
have  added  to  the  notes  references  to  the  more  im- 
portant new  materials.  Both  recognition  and  neu- 
trality, its  parent,  have  acquired  new  precedents 
since  1903;  and  in  the  cases  of  the  Panama  Repub- 
lic and  the  "War  of  1914  it  has  again  been  made 
clear  that  international  law  advances  most  rapidly  in 
the  hands  of  disinterested  nations. 

Frederic  L.  Paxson. 

Madison,  Wis.,  February,  1916. 

PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION 

The  great  subject  of  South  American  history  has 
been  so  little  exploited  that  it  must  be  approached 
with  modesty  and  care,  for  it  is  not  to  be  expected 
that  initial  studies  will,  either  in  breadth  or  in  in- 
tensity, reach  its  confines.  Its  bibliography  has  not 
been  worked  out.    Facts  of  biography  are  difficult  to 


6  South  American  Independence 

obtain,  and  materials  relating  to  it  have  not  yet  been 
systematically  collected  or  sifted. 

Yet,  if  the  character  of  the  South  American  re- 
publics is  to  be  understood,  and  if  they  are  to  be 
dealt  with  by  the  other  nations  of  the  world  in  a 
rational  and  honest  manner,  it  is  necessary  that  their 
history  be  narrated  and  considered.  With  their 
antecedents  before  us,  certain  conditions  now 
prevalent  in  the  Latin  republics  are,  if  not  justified, 
at  least  explained.  From  a  careful  examination  of 
these  antecedents  it  may  not  be  impossible  to  arrive 
at  the  causes  of  the  evil  conditions,  which  will  be 
the  first  step  towards  correcting  them. 

This  little  book  is  a  study  in  a  single  period  and  a 
single  phase.  For  the  greater  part  it  is  based  upon 
unpublished  original  manuscript;  while  none  of  its 
material,  printed  or  not,  has  hitherto  been  used  to 
any  considerable  extent.  Some  care  has  been  taken 
to  make  the  sources  here  used  more  available  for 
future  students. 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  my  great  indebt- 
edness to  my  masters,  Albert  Bushnell  Hart  and 
Jolm  Bach  McMaster,  and  to  Hubert  Hall,  Pendle- 
ton King  and  Charles  Francis  Adams,  who  gave  me 
their  time  and  care  that  I  might  reach  the  archives 
in  their  charge.  Frederic  L.  Paxson. 

Philadelphia,  June,  1903. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Introduction 

Doctrine  of  recognition   i-^n 

Neutrality  in   seventeenth   century    18 

Theory  of  classical  writers   19 

Neutrality  in  American  revolution   20 

Silas  Deane  and  France   20 

Instructions  of  Deane   21 

American  theory  of  recognition   22 

Policy  of  France   23 

Motive  of  Louis  XVI,  in  recognition   24 

The  French  treaties   25 

French  intervention,  not  recognition   26 

The  Dutch   recognition    27 

Mission   of   William   Lee  • 28 

Holland  declares  war  on  England   29 

Value  of  French  and  Dutch  precedents   30 

The   Swedish   recognition    32 

Recognition   by   Spain    2^ 

Recognition  by  Prussia   3^ 

The  French  revolution    35 

Conduct  of  Gouverneur  Morris   36 

Attitude  of  British  minister  in  Paris   36 

Morris  remains  in   Paris    38 

New  French  government  and  Morris   39 

Distinterested  situation  of  United  States   40 


8  South  American  Independence 


Washington  recognizes  the  French  government   41 

War  between  England  and  France   41 

The  proclamation  of  neutrality,  April  22nd,   1793 i"  42 

Influence  of  American  precedents    \  43 


Chapter  I 

The  South  American  Wars  of  Liberation 

Spanish  colonial  system    44 

Colonial  population    45 

San  Martin,  Bolivar  and  Miranda    46 

Miranda's  filibustering  expedition    47 

Popham's  attack  on  Buenos  Ayres   ; 48 

Whitelocke   expedition   fails.    49 

Spanish-American   revolts,  Buenos  Ayres 50 

Chile,  New  Granada  and  Venezuela   51 

Growth  of  English  trade    52 

V'Effect  of  foreign  commerce  on  South  America  53 

Situation  of  Buenos  Ayres  54 

Turbulence  in   Buenos  Ayres    55 

Declaration  of  independence    57 

San  Martin  at  Mendoza  58 

Chile  and  the  brothers  Carrera   59 

Growth  of  San  Martin's  army    60 

He  moves  across  at  Uspallata  61 

Chacabuca  and  Talca    62 

Maypu  and  the  independence  of  Chile   63 

Preparations  to  invade  Peru  63 

Arrival  of   Lord   Cochrane    64 

Capture  of   Valdavia    66 

Liberating  squadron  leaves  Chile   67 


Table  of  Contents  9 

Pledges  of  San  Martin    68 

The  Work  of  Arenales  68 

La  Serna  replaces  Pezuela  as  viceroy  69 

Spanish   forces  evacuate  Lima    70 

Independence  of   Peru   declared    71 

San  Martin  assumes  Protectorship    71 

His   disputes   with   Cochrane    72 

Reinforcement  and  evacuation  of  Callao   74 

San  Martin  goes  to  Guayaquil   75 

Torre  Tagle  and  Monteagudo    75 

Meeting  of  Bolivar  and  San  Martin   76 

San  Martin  abdicates  and  retires   77 

Beginning  of  career  of  Bolivar    78 

Surrender  of  Miranda  to  Spain  79 

Geography  of  Venezuela  and  New  Granada   79 

Bolivar  in  New  Granada    80 

The   "  War  to  the   Death  " 80 

Bolivar   becomes    Dictator    81 

Spain  sends  out  Morillo  in  1815   82 

He  re-takes  New  Granada   83 

Bolivar  erects  capital  at  Angostura   84 

The  Foreign   Legions    85 

Campaign  of  1819    85 

Tunja  and  Boyaca    86 

Union  of  Venezuela  and  New  Granada   87 

Armistice  of  1820   88 

Bolivar  ends  armistice  of  Truxillo    89 

Constituent  congress  at  Cucuta   89 

Battle  of  Carabobo,  June  24th,  1821    90 

Capital  moved  to  Santa  Fe  de  Bogota 91 

Meeting  of  liberating  armies  in  Ecuador   92 

Sucre  wins  at  Bompono  and  Pichincha   92 


10  South  American  Independence 

The  meeting  at  Guayaquil   93 

Ecuador  annexed  to  Ckilombia   94 

Spanish  victory  at  lea 95 

Revolt    at   Lima    96 

Bolivar  summoned  to  Peru   97 

Rive-Aguero   deposed    97 

Bolivar  enters  Lima,  September  1st,  1823  97 

Spanish  strength  in  Upper  Peru   98 

Quarrels  between  Olaneta  and  Canterac   99 

Bolivar  becomes  Dictator  of  Peru  99 

He  marches  inland  100 

Spanish  forces  defeated  at  Junin    101 

And   at   Ayacucho    102 

Miller  finishes  work  at  Potosi   103 

Independence   of   Bolivia    103 

Bolivar  returns  to  Colombia  104 


Chapter  II 

South  American  Policy  of  the  United  States 

Traditional  attitude  of  the  United  States  105 

Sympathy   with    filibusters    106 

Petition  of  the  Miranda  men  107 

Randolph's  theory  of  recognition    108 

The  Poinsett  mission    109 

Instructions   of   Poinsett    110 

Other  agents  in  South  America 113 

Status  of  the  agents  in  South  America  114 

Nature  of  their  reports  115. 

Mendez  and  Thompson  in  United  States  116 

Protests  of  de  Onis    117 


Table  of  Contents  11 

Flaws  in  United  States  neutrality  laws  118 

South  American  privateers   ; 119 

Public  opinion  in  1816 120 

Forsyth  introduces  new  neutrality  act   121 

Fiu-ther  news  from  South  America 122 

Poinsett  offered  a  second  mission    123 

The  three  commissioners  sail   124 

Their    instructions    124 

Beginning  of  factious  opposition   127. 

Newspaper  rumors  in  summer  of  1817   128 

Letters   of   "  Lautaro "    128 

Reply  of  "  Phocion "   129 

Attitude  of  Monroe  and  Adams   129 

Nature  of  the  opposition   130 

Monroe   transmits    correspondence    1^1 

Clay's  great  speech   132 

Debate  on  his  motion   134 

Reply  of  Forsyth   134 

Reports  of  South  American  commissioners 135 

Superficial  and  discordant  character   136 

Their  evidence  as  to  political  instability  1_3^6 

Clay's  attitude  in  session  of  1818-1819  137 

Delicate  relations  with  Spain  138 

Message  of  May  9th,  1820  139 

Clay  brings  up  his  motion  141 

It  passes  in  the  House  141 

Session  of  1820-1821   142 

Triumph  of  Clay  144 

Its   barren   nature    146 

Position  of  Adams  in  the  cabinet  146 

His  letter  to  Alex.  H.  Everett  146 

Jealousy  of  Spain   149 


\ 


12  South  American  Independence 

Adams  and  the  European  powers   150 

Adams'  theory  of  neutrality    151 

He  foresees  the  British  policy   152 

Embarrassments  caused  by  agents    153 

Aguirre  and  the  privateers    154 

Devereux,  Worthington  and  Halsey   155 

Yielding  policy  of  Monroe   156 

Courts  of  Europe  sounded   156 

Action   at   Aix-la-Chapelle    15J 

American  policy  of  inaction    \58 

Question  of  the  exequaturs   159 

Instructions  of  January  1st,  1819   160 

Influence  of  the  Florida  negotiations   161 

Recognition  postponed  for  two  years   162 

Difficulties  of  Adams's  position   162 

Forbes's  mission  to  Buenos  Ayres   i. 164 

His    instructions    164 

Buenos  Ayres  in  1820   165 

His  treatment  and  attitude 166 

Rivadavia,  Garcia  and  reform    168 

Victories  of  San  Martin  and  Bolivar 169 

Successes  of  1821    169 

De  facto  independence  achieved   170 

Adams  prepares   for  recognition    iTl 

Message  of  March  8th,  1822   172 

Its  calm  reception    174 

Attitude  of  the  newspapers    174 

Comment  of  the  Journal  des  Debats  176 

Recognition     178^ 


Table  of  Contents  13 

Chapter  III 

British  Relations  with  fiouth  America 

Two  phases  of  British  attitude 180 

Policy  after   1811    181 

Liverpool  ministry  and  commercial  demands   182 

Popular  sympathy  in  Great  Britain   184 

Agitation  for  recognition  begins   184 

Weapons  of  the  opposition    185 

Services  of  British  officers  in  South  America   186 

Proclamations  by  the  Prince  Regent   187 

Inadequacy  of  neutrality  laws   188 

New  foreign  enlistment  act  188 

Tierney  and  Mackintosh  oppose  190 

Attitude  of  ministry    190 

Petitions   from   merchants    191 

Effect  of  the  new  act  192 

Spain  seeks  intervention    193 

Interests  of  the  allied  powers    193 

Aix-la-Qiapelle 194  ' 

The  Spanish  expedition  of  1818-1819 195  '>-- 

Revolution  of  1820   196 

Invasion  of  Spain  by  France   196 

British  policy  at  Congress  of  Verona   197 

Lushington  and  the  commercial  demands   .w 198 

Reports  of  the  American  commissioners   199 

England  and  the  American  recognition  200 

Growing  importance  of  question  with  Canning  201 

Zea  circular    202 

Renewed  demands  by  merchants   .  .i. 203 

And  by  Commons  203 

Canning  opposes  French  intervention  in  Spain   204 


14  South  American  Independence 

He  determines  to  keep  France  out  of  America  205 

Mission  of  Mackie  to  Mexico   206 

Fall  of  Cadiz  and  action  by  Canning  207 

Polignac-Canning  conference,  October  9th,  1823   208 

Instructions  to  new  consuls  and  commissioners  209 

Special  instructions  for  Mexico  213 

Motive  of  Canning  in  sending  consuls  216 

Allies  fail  to  act  on  South  America  217 

Canning's  move  wins  217 

Speech  from  the  Throne,  February  3d,  1824   218 

Sources  of  information  on  South  America  219 

Difficulties  with  Mackie  in  Mexico   220 

Difficulties  with  Hervey,  O'Gorman  and  Ward  221 

The  treaty  of  Morier  and  Ward   222 

Hamilton  and  the  Colombian  Commission   223 

Ordered  to  re-peruse  his  instructions   224 

Campbell's    reports    225 

Parish  and  Buenos  Ayres  225 

Debate  in  Parliament,  February,  1824  226 

Polignac  memorandum  revealed  226 

Lansdowne  moves   for  recognition    _g^-7 

Great  Speech  of  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  June  15th,  1824. .  228 

His  analysis  of  theory  of  recognition   229 

Reception  of  Parish  at  Buenos  Ayres  232 

His  work  satisfies  Canning   233 

His  report  of  June  25th,  1824  234 

Canning's  instructions  to  Parish,  August  23d,  1824  235 

Parish  acts  slowly  upon  them    237 

Address  of  the  Government  of  Buenos  Ayres  to  the  Con- 
gress    239 

New  Fundamental  Law  for  Buenos  Ayres  241 

Parish  signs  a  treaty,  February  2nd,  1825  241 


Table  of  Contents  15 

Canning  determines  to  recognize  tlie  republics  242 

Spain  once  more  refuses  mediation  243 

Canning  announces  recognition  to  Spain   244 

Reply  of  Spain    245 

Reception  of  British  recognition  by  Europe    247_ 

Protest  of  Esterhazy,  for  Vienna 248 

Protest  of  Lieven,  for  St.  Petersburg  249 

Protest  of  Maltzahn,  for  Berlin    250 

Summary  of  British  policy   . .  t 251 

Opening  of  diplomatic  relations    .  .^ 252 


INTRODUCTION 

Among  the  doctrines  of  international  law  which 
can  hardly  be  said  to  have  existed  previous  to  the 
war  of  the  American  revolution,  is  that  of  recogni- 
tion/ It  is  true  that  in  some  few  cases  before  1776 
a  new  State  had  come  into  existence.  Thus  the 
United  Netherlands  had  won  their  independence  of 
Spain  in  the  sixteenth  century,  to  have  it  recognized 
by  the  powers  of  Europe  in  the  seventeenth;  thus 
Switzerland  had  broken  off  from  the  dominions  of 
the  Hapsburgs  and  maintained  her  separate  exist- 
ence ;  thus  Portugal  had  established  itself  as  an  inde- 
pendent monarchy  at  the  expense  of  Spain.  It  is 
true  also  that  in  some  cases  a  successful  revolution 

*  Neither  recognition  nor  the  recognition  of  the  South  American 
Republics  had  been  discussed  in  detail  prior  to  the  appearance  of  the 
first  edition  of  this  work  in  1903,  although  a  few  paragraphs  on  both 
subjects  were  to  be  found  in  the  standard  works  on  international  law. 
There  had  been  considerable  contentious  writing  upon  the  recognition 
of  the  belligerency  of  the  Confederate  States  and  upon  the  power  and 
expediency  of  acknowledging  the  independence  of  Cuba.  But  no  one 
seema  to  have  connected  the  theory  of  recognition  with  the  doctrine  of 
neutrality,  or  to  have  dissociated  it  from  the  idea  of  intervention,  as  is 
done  here.  Recently  these  ideas  have  been  made  the  basis  of  a  general 
treatise  upon  the  subject,  drawn  exclusively  from  printed  sources  and 
covering  comprehensively  the  experiences  of  the  United  States.  Julius 
Goebel,  Jr.,  The  Recognition  Policy  of  the  United  States  (Columbia 
University  Studies,  Vol.  LXVI.  1915). 


18  South  American  Independence 

had  erected  a  new  and  illegitimate  government.  In 
the  most  notable  of  these  Cromwell  had  established 
the  principle  that  internal  changes  do  not  affect  the 
identity  of  a  State,  and  had  compelled  his  royal  neigh- 
bors to  extend  to  him  every  courtesy  that  the  ex- 
pelled Stuarts  could  have  demanded.  But  in  none 
of  these  cases  was  there  a  discussion  of  a  theory  of 
recognition  by  which  a  community  of  people,  upon 
attaining  a  defined  territory,  together  with  an  inde- 
pendent government,  permanently  organized,  has  a 
right  to  demand  treatment  as  a  State  by  the  pre- 
existent  nations  of  the  world. 

The  absence  of  any  well-developed  theory  of  neu- 
trality until  the  United  States  came  into  existence 
to  create  one,  prevented  the  establishment  of  a 
theory  of  recognition,  for  this  latter  is  strictly  de- 
pendent upon  the  former.  The  wars  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries  were  generally  Euro- 
pean in  their  scope.  No  nation  strong  enough  to 
make  its  impartiality  respected  had  been  able  to  re- 
main neutral;  while  the  petty  States,  if  only  for  the 
sake  of  protection,  were  forced  to  seek  alliance  with 
one  side  or  another.  So  it  happened  that  when  new 
States  came  into  existence  their  recognition  de- 
pended solely  on  the  physical  strength  of  their 
friends.  Recognition  by  general  European  treaty 
at  the  end  of  a  general  European  war  could  have  no 


Introduction  19 

authority  as  a  precedent  in  developing  an  abstract 
theory  upon  the  subject. 

Before  a  doctrine  of  recognition  could  be  evolved 
there  must  be  created  a  background  of  neutrality. 
The  right  of  a  State  to  participate  in  or  abstain 
from  a  war  must  be  freely  admitted.  Upon  this 
condition  alone  could  a  newly-born  State  receive  the 
theoretical  treatment  that  would  help  to  establish 
the  conditions  upon  which  such  an  organism  has  a 
right  to  be  acknowledged,  and  would  have  a  tendency 
to  remove  recognition  from  the  opportunist  realm  of 
international  politics  to  set  it  up  as  a  permanent 
doctrine  of  international  law. 

Previous  to  the  American  revolution  there  were 
no  neutrals,  although  there  existed  the  foundations 
for  a  superstructure  of  neutrality.  The  classical 
writers  on  international  law,  from  Grotius,  with  his 
idea  that  neutrality  consists  in  not  denying  to  one 
belligerent  a  right  conceded  to  the  other,  to  Vattel, 
who  would  not  allow  the  neutral  State  to  render  aid 
to  either  party,  all  fail  to  understand  the  doctrine 
as  it  is  understood  to-day.  The  series  of  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  century  treaties,  specifying  that  the 
contracting  States  shall  not  aid  the  enemy  of  each 
other  in  time  of  war,  shows  how  far  neutrality  was 
from  being  looked  upon  as  a  regular  and  probable 
condition.    Usage  of  nations  as  revealed  by  the  wars 


20  South  American  Independence 

of  the  eighteenth  century  shows  a  general  disregard 
of  what  are  the  commonplaces  of  neutral  obligation 
to-day. 

As  there  had  been  no  neutrals  before  1776,  so  in 
the  wars  of  the  American  revolution  no  neutrals 
were  created.  France  and  Spain,  during  the  period 
of  their  professed  neutrality,  were  systematically  ren- 
dering aid  to  one  of  the  contestants.  The  far-famed 
Armed  Neutrality  of  1780  was  nothing  more  than 
an  alliance  that  introduced  another  party  into  the 
general  war.  The  recognition  of  the  independence 
of  the  United  States  by  France  was  only  the  step 
that  marked  the  advance  of  Louis  XVI.  from  a  state 
of  overt  hostility  to  one  of  open  war. 

The  great  aim  of  American  diplomacy  during  the 
early  years  of  the  revolution  was  to  secure  suflScient 
aid  from  Europe  to  bring  the  war  to  a  successful  ter- 
mination. France,  as  the  hereditary  enemy  of  Eng- 
land, was  the  first  resort.  Thither  in  the  spring  of 
1776  Silas  Deane  was  sent,  ostensibly  as  an  India 
merchant  to  gratify  his  curiosity,  actually  to  beg 
Vergennes  to  supply  arms  to  his  country  and  to 
pledge  her  commerce  in  return.  Already  France  was 
hinting  that  no  aid  could  be  expected  of  her  while 
the  colonies  remained  colonies,  and  assuring  the 
Americans  that  they  had  "the  same  protection  and 
liberty  as  all  other  English  to  resort  to  France  to  ex- 


Introduction  21 

port  thence  merchandise,  arras  and  munitions  of 
war."  ^  "  That  as  to  independency,"  wrote  Deane  to 
the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  describing 
an  interview  with  the  French  Minister  and  the  words 
of  the  latter,  "  it  was  an  event  in  the  womb  of  time, 
and  it  would  be  highly  improper  from  him  to  say 
anything  on  that  subject  until  it  had  actually  taken 
place."  ^  Great  Britain  feared,  as  the  United  States 
hoped  for,  a  French  intervention  in  the  war,  and  as- 
sisted Lord  Stormont  in  his  protests  against  the  un- 
friendly acts  of  the  French  Government. 

In  the  mind  of  the  Americans,  recognition  was  far 
from  being  an  act  of  neutrality.  Between  it  and  par- 
ticipation on  the  side  of  England  was  a  condition  to 
which  their  commissioners  were  instructed  to  lead  the 
powers  of  Europe  if  the  latter  coulc.  not  be  prevailed 
upon  to  take  up  the  American  cause.  "'  You  shall  en- 
deavor ...  to  obtain  from  them  a  recognition  of 
our  independency  and  sovereignty,  and  to  conclude 
treaties  of  peace,  amity  and  commerce.  ...  If  that 
cannot  be  effected,  you  shall  to  the  utmost  of  your 
power  prevent  their  taking  part  with  Great  Britain 
in  the  war  which  his  Britannic  majesty  prosecutes 

*  Dumas  to  Com,  of  Secret  Correspondence.  Francis  Wharton, 
The  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  United  States 
(6  vols.,  Washington,  1889),  II :  91. 

•DeanetoCommittee,  August  18, 1776.    Wharton,  II:    112. 


22  South  American  Independence 

"  against  us,  or  entering  into  offensive  alliances  with 
that  king."  " 

The  value  of  an  instance  of  recognition  as  a  pre- 
cedent depends  upon  its  non-partisan  character.  It 
"  is  a  matter,  which,  from  its  nature  precludes  any- 
equivalent  whatsoever; — either  there  is  a  reason  for 
it,  and  it  ought  to  be  demanded  as  a  right,  or  it  can- 
not be  asked  for,  and  to  grant  extraordinary  conces- 
sions as  the  price  of  obtaining  it,  is  to  give  them 
merely  in  return  for  the  name,  and  to  change  the 
substance  for  the  shadow."  °  But  this  view  of  the 
subject  had  not  been  taken  in  1776.  The  United 
States  had  no  hesitation  in  offering  a  price  for  what 
they  truly  considered  an  effective  service,  though  it 
was  concealed  under  the  name  of  recognition. 

"  As  the  other  princes  of  Europe,"  ran  the  note 
of  the  three  commissioners  making  their  seductive 
offer  to  Vergennes,  "  are  lending  or  hiring  their 
troops  to  Britain  against  America,  it  is  apprehended 
that  France  may,  if  she  thinks  fit,  afford  our  inde- 
pendent States  the  same  kind  of  aid,  without  giving 
England  any  first  cause  of  complaint.  .  .  . 

"  Korth  America  now  offers  to  France  and  Spain 
her  amity  and  commerce.     She  is  also  ready  to  guar- 

*  Committee  to  Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee,  October  16,  1776 
Wharton,  II :    172. 

5  Forbes  to  Garcia,  December  6, 1824 ;  enclosed  in  Parish  to  Planta, 
February  18,  1825.    Foreign  Office  Mss. 


Introduction  23 

"  anty  in  the  firmest  manner  to  those  nations  all  her 
present  possessions  in  the  West  Indies,  as  well  as 
those  they  shall  acquire  from  the  enemy  in  a  war 
that  may  be  consequential  of  such  assistance  as  she 
requests.  The  interests  of  the  three  nations  are  the 
same.  The  opportunity  of  cementing  them  and  of 
securing  all  the  advantages  of  that  commerce,  which 
in  time  will  be  immense,  now  presents  itself.  If 
neglected,  it  may  never  again  return;  and  we  can- 
not help  suggesting  that  a  considerable  delay  may  be 
attended  with  fatal  consequences."  ^ 

The  interest  of  the  French  government  in  the 
prosperity  of  the  American  cause  was  slight.  There 
was  in  France  a  popular  feeling  that  wished  the  in- 
surgents well,  but  the  motive  inspiring  the  ministry 
to  action  was  that  of  hostility  to  England  rather 
than  anxiety  for  a  republican  member  of  the  family 
of  nations.  Accordingly  the  French  court  resisted 
the  popularity  of  Franklin  and  confined  itself  to  ren- 
dering a  surreptitious  assistance  to  the  rebels  until 
the  progress  of  the  war  forced  upon  it  a  change  of 
policy.  The  surrender  of  Burgoyne  was  the  deter- 
mining event  in  this  change. 

Both  Vergennes  and  Franklin  realized  the  prob- 
ability of  British  overtures  for  peace  when  the  news 
of  the  surrender  reached  Paris  on  4th  December, 

«  January  5,  1777.    Wharton,  II :    245. 


24  South  American  Independence 

1111.  The  commissioners  at  once  addressed  a  new 
demand  for  recognition  to  the  French  court  and 
were  accorded  a  meeting  on  12th  December.  "  On 
signifying  to  the  ministry,"  they  described  the  con- 
ference, "  the  importance  it  might  be  of  at  this  junc- 
ture— when  probably  Britain  would  be  making  some 
propositions  of  accommodation — that  the  Congress 
should  be  informed  explicitly  what  might  be  ex- 
pected from  France  and  Spain,  M.  Gerard,  one  of 
the  secretaries,  came  yesterday  to  inform  us,  by  order 
of  the  king,  that  after  long  and  full  consideration  of 
our  affairs  and  propositions  in  council  it  was  decided, 
and  his  majesty  was  determined,  to  acknowledge  our 
independence,  and  make  a  treaty  with  us  of  amity 
and  commerce." ''  Louis  XVI.  himself  recorded 
the  motive  that  inspired  this  step.  He  wrote  to 
Charles  III.  of  Spain  on  the  8th  of  January,  1778," 
of  the  policy  he  had  followed  during  the  three  pre- 
ceding years :  "  The  destruction  of  the  army  of  Bur- 
goyne  and  the  straitened  condition  of  Howe  have 
totally  changed  the  face  of  things.  America  is  tri- 
umphant, and  England  cast  down,  but  the  latter  has 
still  a  great  unbroken  maritime  force,  and  the  hope 
of  forming  a  beneficial  alliance  with  her  Colonies, 
the  impossibility  of  their  being  subdued  by  arms 

'  December  18,  1777.    Wharton,  II:    452. 
« Wharton,  II:    467. 


Introduction  25 

"  being  now  demonstrated.  All  the  English  parties 
agree  on  this  point.  Lord  North  has  himself  an- 
nounced, in  full  Parliament,  a  plan  of  pacification 
for  the  first  session,  and  all  sides  are  assiduously 
employed  upon  it."  Even  King  Louis  did  not  yet 
know  the  extent  of  the  "  political  somersault "  which 
Lord  North  would  turn  when  he  introduced  his  meas- 
ure in  February.  "  Thus,"  his  letter  continued,  "  it 
is  the  same  to  us  whether  this  minister,  or  any  other, 
be  in  power.  From  different  motives  they  join 
against  us,  and  do  not  forget  our  bad  offices.  They 
will  fall  upon  us  in  as  great  strength  as  if  the  war 
had  not  existed.  This  being  understood,  and  our 
grievances  against  England  notorious,  I  have  thought, 
after  taking  the  advice  of  my  council  .  ,  .  and  having 
consulted  upon  the  propositions  which  the  insurgents 
make,  that  it  was  just  and  necessary  to  begin  to  treat 
with  them  to  prevent  their  reunion  with  the  mother 
country." 

According  to  the  resolution  of  the  king  "  to  pre- 
vent their  reunion  with  the  mother  country,"  treaties 
of  alliance  and  commerce  were  signed  at  Paris  on 
6th  February,  1Y78.  In  these  is  found  the  first 
recognition  of  the  United  States  as  independent.  In 
the  words  of  the  French  ambassador,  as  he  announced 
these  treaties  to  the  Court  of  St.  James,  there  is  an 
insolence  so  colossal  as  to  be  almost  admirable.    "  In 


26  South  American  Independence 

"  making  this  communication  to  the  Court  of  London, 
the  King  is  firmly  persuaded,  that  it  will  find  in  it 
fresh  Proofs  of  His  Majesty's  constant  and  sincere 
Dispositions  for  Peace;  and  that  His  Britannic  Ma- 
jesty, animated  by  the  same  Sentiments,  will  equally 
avoid  every  Thing  that  may  interrupt  their  Har- 
mony; and  that  He  will  take,  in  particular,  effectual 
Measures  to  hinder  the  Commerce  of  His  Majesty's 
Subjects  with  the  United  States  of  North  America 
from  being  disturbed,  and  to  cause  to  be  observed  in 
this  Respect,  the  Usages  received  between  trading 
ISTations,  and  the  Rules  that  may  be  deemed  subsist- 
ing between  the  Crowns  of  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain.'^ ^  But  nothing  was  clearer  in  the  minds,  of  all 
concerned  than  that  this  recognition  was  an  act  of 
war,  that  the  colonies,  in  spite  of  their  declaration, 
were  not  in  fact  independent,  and  that  it  was  the 
interest  of  France  rather  than  regard  for  any  rights 
of  the  insurgents  that  inspired  the  act.  "  I  knew 
very  well,"  wrote  a  French  ambassador  from  Madrid, 
a  few  years  later,  "  that  one  could  not  count  on  the 
gratitude  of  the  United  States,  but  that,  however, 
repeated  and  recent  favors  formed  ties  which  it 
would  be  at  least  difficult  to  break  suddenly,  and 
especially  at  the  very  period  of  their  enjoyment."  ^'^ 

»  Commons'  Journals,  XXXVI :    832. 

**  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  30,  1782.    He  was  writing  of 
later  efforts  to  prevent  a  peace.    Wharton,  V :    287. 


Introduction  27 

The  second  formal  recognition  of  the  United 
States  came  from  Holland,  and  is  to  be  viewed  less 
as  an  intervention  like  that  of  France  than  as  an 
effort  to  get  in  ahead  of  England  and  secure  a  share 
of  American  commerce.  News  of  the  successful  ter- 
mination of  the  Yorktown  campaign  and  of  the 
imminence  of  peace  negotiations  had  reached  Hol- 
land before  she  could  induce  herself  to  act. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Dutch  had 
watched  with  envious  eyes  the  breakup  of  the  Brit- 
ish Empire.  Neutrality  was  their  policy,  enjoined 
upon  them  by  many  treaties  with  England,  but  an 
opportunity  for  the  extension  of  commerce  was  not 
to  be  lightly  disregarded.  "  I  find  they  have  the 
greatest  inclination  to  serve  us,"  wrote  William  Car- 
michael  from  Amsterdam,  "  and  at  the  same  time 
themselves,  for  no  people  see  their  interests 
clearer."  But  the  events  of  the  early  years  of  the 
war  were  not  such  as  to  tempt  a  peace-loving  nation 
to  take  up  the  cause  of  the  Americans.  Guided  by 
"  their  fears  that  we  shall  be  subdued,"  the  Dutch 
avoided  giving  Great  Britain  cause  for  offense.^^ 

Among  the  peripatetic  agents  appointed  by  Con- 
gress to  the  courts  of  Europe  was  William  Lee,  who 
was  commissioned  in  the  summer  of  17Y7  to  Vienna 

"Carmichael  to  Committee,  November  2, 1776.  Wharton,  II:    185. 


28  South  American  Independence 

and  Berlin."  Proceeding  to  the  latter  post,  in  spite 
of  the  protests  of  the  Prussian  minister  in  the  fall  of 
1778,  he  was  stopped  by  the  outbreak  of  war  be- 
tween Prussia  and  Austria.  He  retired  to  Frank- 
fort to  await  its  outcome,  and  there  amused  himself 
by  negotiating  a  treaty,  unauthorized  on  his  side  and 
unconstitutional  on  theirs,  with  the  pensionary  and 
burgomasters  of  Amsterdam.^'  It  was  an  unfortu- 
nate transaction.  His  fellow  commissioners  at  Paris 
snubbed  him  well  for  the  assumption  of  authority;^* 
and  the  draft  of  the  treaty  captured  at  a  later  time 
among  the  papers  of  Henry  Laurens  ^^  was  made  a 
casus  belli  by  the  English,  notwithstanding  every 
effort  by  the  Dutch  to  disavow  *"  it.  Holland,  in 
spite  of  herself,  was  driven  into  the  war. 

"  You  say  the  Dutch  are  disturbed,"  commented 
John  Adams  upon  the  blustering  tactics  of  Sir  Jo- 
seph Yorke,  the  British  Minister  at  Amsterdam. 
"  Do  you  wonder  at  it  ?  They  have  been  kicked  by 
the  English  as  no  reasonable  man  would  kick  a  dog. 
They  have  been  whipped  by  them  as  no  sober  postilion 
would  whip  a  hackney-coach  horse."  " 

"  President  of  Congress  to  William  Lee,  July  1, 1777.  Wharton, 
II:    359. 

"W.  Lee  to  Com.  For.  Off.,  September  12, 1778.  Wharton,  II:  715. 
"  Commissioners  to  W.  Lee,  September  26, 1778.  Wharton,  II :  744. 
"  Dana  to  Jonathan  Jackson ,  November  1 1 ,1780.  Wharton ,  IV :  151. 
"  Manifesto  of  States  General,  November  27,1780.  Wharton,  IV:  310. 
"Adams  to  W.  Lee,  March  21,  1780.    Wharton,  III :    564. 


Inirodttction  29 

On  12th  March,  1781,  the  Dutch  declared  war  on 
England,  but  even  yet  they  refused  to  receive  a  let- 
ter from  John  Adams  in  his  new  oflScial  character  of 
Minister  Plenipotentiary."  It  was  not  until  the  end 
of  the  year,  when  the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Com- 
wallis  had  reached  them,  that  the  provinces  began  to 
instruct  their  delegates  in  favor  of  a  recognition. 
Then,  in  one  day,  five  million  guilders  were  sub- 
scribed to  be  lent  to  France  for  the  use  of  the  United 
States,^®  and  the  cumbrous  diplomatic  machinery  of 
the  States  General  was  put  in  motion.  "If  it  was 
in  any  other  country,"  wrote  Adams,  on  14:th  Janu- 
ary, 1782,  "  I  should  conclude  from  all  appearances 
that  an  alliance  with  America  and  France  at  least 
would  be  finished  in  a  few  weeks;  but  I  have  been 
here  long  enough  to  know  the  nation  better.  The 
constitution  of  government  is  so  complicated  and  so 
whimsical  a  thing,  and  the  temper  and  character  of 
the  nation  so  peculiar,  that  this  is  considered  every- 
where as  the  most  difficult  embassy  in  Europe.  But 
at  present  it  is  more  so  than  ever;  the  nation  is  more 
divided  than  usual,  and  they  are  afraid  of  every- 
body."*" And  so  he  might  well  be  content  to  be 
accorded    his    formal    reception   by   the    Prince    of 

»8  Adams  to  Pres.  Cong.,  May  7,  1781.    Wharton,  IV  :    401. 
"DumastoPres.  Cong.,  January  7,'1782.    Wharton,  V:    86. 
*>  Adams  to  Pres.  Cong.,  January  14,  1782.    Wharton,  V :    100. 


30  South  American  Independence 

Orange  on  22d  April.  ^^  On  the  twenty-third  the 
French  minister  at  Amsterdam  gave  a  banquet  to  the 
diplomatic  corps  in  honor  of  their  new  member.  The 
treaty  was  concluded  on  October  8th.  But  the 
ministry  of  North  had  fallen,  and  British  agents 
were  at  Paris  discussing  with  Franklin  the  terms  of 
peace  before  Holland  had  ventured  upon  her  recog- 
nition. 

The  value  of  a  precedent  in  recognition,  it  has 
been  said,  depends  on  its  non-partisan  character.  It 
also  depends  to  a  considerable  degree  upon  the  atti- 
tude of  the  mother  country.  For  it  is  only  before 
the  mother  country  has  brought  herself  to  acknowl- 
edge the  independence  of  her  former  territory  that 
there  can  be  any  question  as  to  the  propriety  of  the 
recognition.  Between  the  time  of  the  declaration  of 
independence,  which  in  the  case  of  the  United  States 
was  4th  July,  1776,  and  the  recognition  of  the  same 
by  the  parent  State,  which  in  the  same  case  occurred 
at  the  signature  of  the  preliminary  articles  on  30th 
November,  1782,  the  third  power  in  granting  recog- 
nition must  consider  two  things;  the  fact  of  inde- 
pendence and  the  nature  of  its  relations  with  the 
belligerents.  If  the  former  of  these  does  not  mani- 
festly exist,  and  in  the  case  under  discussion  it  did 
not,  none  can  question  the  right,  in  a  moral  way,  of 

»i  Adams  to  Livingston,  April  22,  1782.    Wharton,  V :    320. 


Introduction  31 

the  mother  country  to  consider  the  recognition  as 
premature  and  an  act  of  war.  Thus  thp  recognition 
bj  France  and  in^a,  less  degree  that  by  Holland,  for 
she  refrained  from  acting  imtil  Britain  had  shown 
her  own  hand,  were  interventions  dictated  by  self- 
interest  of  one  form  oi'  another.  If  the  interests  of 
the  third  power  are  of  such  a  nature  as  not  to  be 
affected  by  the  struggle,  she  is  not  likely  to  be  led 
into  a  premature  recognition,  or  into  any  recogni- 
tion, until  the  mother  country  by  her  own  action  has 
renounced  her  pretension  to  sovereignty  over  the 
new  State  by  acknowledging  its  independence. 

Cases  of  recognition  will  have  great  value  in  estab- 
lishing the  international  law  upon  the  subject  only 
when  the  mother  country  delays  this  renunciation 
beyond  a  reasonable  time,  so  that  third  powers  feel 
that  they  must  recognize  the  fact  of  independence  in 
justice  to  themselves  and  to  the  new  State. 

No  valuable  precedent  in  recognition  occurred  dur- 
ing the  American  revolution,  or  could  have  occurred, 
for  Great  Britain  acted  promptly  herself  and 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  her  former 
colonies  at  a  time  when  the  fact  of  their  independ- 
ence was  not  a  matter  beyond  dispute,  and  when  her 
own  hopes  were  in  no  means  destroyed,  in  spite  of 
her  loss  of  a  considerable  army.  No  recognition 
before  30th  November,  1782,  could  have  been  other 


32  South  American  Independence 

than  an  intervention;  none  after  that  time  can  be 
considered  as  of  importance  save  as  an  indication  of 
European  policy  and  commercial  necessity.  Before 
the  administration  of  Washington  began,  only  three 
other  European  States  had  seen  fit  to  open  formal 
and  regular  relations  with  the  United  States,  and 
only  two  of  them  concluded  treaties. 

Sweden  made  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  with 
the  United  States  on  the  3d  of  April,  1783.  It  was 
the  first  time,  so  the  King  took  credit  to  himself, 
that  an  European  power  had  solicited  the  friendship 
of  the  United  States.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that 
the  enormous  prestige  of  Dr.  Franklin  was  an  in- 
spiration that  accentuated  his  majesty's  desire  for 
commercial  relations.  Upon  his  general  instructions 
Franklin  entered  readily  upon  the  negotiations  pro- 
posed by  the  Swedish  ambassador,  and  before  he  had 
concluded  them  his  special  instructions  for  this 
treaty  had  arrived.  He  signed  the  final  draft  in 
almost  the  very  words  of  the  project,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  proceedings  was  complimented  by  a  request 
for  "  young  Mr.  Franklin  "  as  ambassador.^^ 

The  Spanish  negotiations,  long  and  tedious  in  their 
course,  failed  to  terminate  in  a  treaty  within  the 
period  under  consideration,  although  the  opening  of 
diplomatic  relations  was  not  deferred  long  after  the 

»« Wharton,  V:    512,    VI:     133,163,276,483. 


Introduction  33 

recognition  by  England.  Arthur  Lee,  Franklin  and 
Jay  were  at  various  times  during  the  war  commis- 
sioned to  the  court  of  Spain,  but  they  could  accom- 
plish no  open  result.  Spain  advanced  more  or  less 
material  assistance  to  the  colonies,  but  two  reasons 
seem  to  have  kept  her  from  a  formal  recognition. 
The  principle  of  independence  was  none  too  popular 
in  a  country  with  enormous  colonial  possessions  of 
her  own,  while  the  demand  of  the  United  States  for 
free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  to  its  mouth  was 
not  to  be  admitted  by  a  king  who  needed  the  whole 
Gulf  of  Mexico  for  himself.  Even  the  offer  made 
near  the  end  of  the  war,  to  relinquish  the  demand 
for  the  free  navigation,  failed  to  induce  Spain  to 
treat.  It  was  not  until  after  the  peace  preliminaries 
with  England  had  been  signed  that  the  Spanish  minis- 
ter in  Paris  told  Jay  that  Spain  was  ready  to  receive 
the  latter  in  form.  Even  then  a  treaty  was  not  to  be 
had  for  more  than  a  decade. 

Frederick  the  Great,  ruling  in  Prussia  during  the 
revolution,  showed  some  solicitude  for  American 
commerce  at  an  early  period  in  the  war,  and  amused 
himself  with  the  American  envoys  throughout  its 
length.  But  there  was  too  little  to  be  gained  for  him 
to  compromise  his  country  by  a  recognition,  so  he 
fought  off  the  persistent  attacks  of  the  Lees  until 
the  war  was  over.     Then,  on  the  model  of  the  Swe- 


34  South  American  Independence 

dish  treaty,  he  allowed  John  Adams  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  with  Prussia.  Many  of  its  articles  revealed 
a  "  platonic  philosophy  "  ^^  that  would  scarcely  have 
been  admitted  between  two  countries  having  any 
considerable  intercourse. 

Thus,  by  the  end  of  1785,  the  tJnited  States  had 
formal  diplomatic  relations  with  six  States  of  Eu- 
rope, France,  Holland,  Great  Britain,  Sweden,  Spain 
and  Prussia.  In  one  case  the  recognition  had  marked 
a  renunciation  of  sovereignty.  In  three  more,  subse- 
quent to  this  renunciation,  it  had  indicated  only  a 
general  friendly  feeling  now  free  to  act.  And,  in  two 
cases,  it  had  come  as  an  intervention,  with  differing 
degrees  of  flagrancy.  In  no  case  had  there  been  any 
consideration  of  the  question  already  asked, — 
whether  there  is  a  time  in  a  revolution  when  the 
revolting  people  have  a  right  to  demand,  or  a  neutral 
a  right  to  accord,  a  recognition  in  spite  of  the  hostile 
attitude  of  the  mother  country.  As  has  been  seen, 
the  nature  of  the  American  revolution  was  such  that 
that  question  could  not  have  arisen.  Some  light  was 
destined  to  be  thrown  upon  the  question,  however, 
by  the  policy  of  the  new  republic  whose  own  recog- 
nition has  now  been  considered. 

The  most  serious  diplomatic  problem  that  had  yet 

"  Adams  to  Thulemeier,  February  13,  1785.  John  Adams,  Works 
(10  vols.,  Boston,  1853),    VIII:     225. 


Introduction  36 

presented  itself  to  the  administration  of  George 
Washington  arose  when  the  French  revolution  passed 
from  the  municipal  stage  into  the  international.  The 
events  of  1792,  bringing  down  upon  France  the 
wrath  of  Europe,  aroused  in  the  United  States  a 
feeling  of  sympathy  that  might  well  have  influenced 
a  government  to  make  more  of  its  treaty  obligations 
to  the  distressed  country  than  the  Washington 
government  showed  itself  disposed  to  do.  But 
Washington  was  profoundly  impressed  with  the  need 
of  the  United  States  for  a  long  period  of  uneventful 
development.  As  the  wars  broke  out  he  saw  clearly 
how  little  they  had  to  offer  the  United  States  and 
how  greatly  they  would  check  her  growth  if  she 
allowed  herself  to  become  involved  in  them. 
Realizing  these  dangers,  he  had  little  difficulty  in 
convincing  himself  that  the  obligations  of  the  treaty 
of  1778,  with  France,  did  not  apply  to  the  conditions 
of  1792,  and  that  the  duties  of  the  United  States 
coincided  with  her  interests  in  prescribing  a  policy 
of  strict  neutrality. 

While  the  French  republic  was  coming  into  exist- 
ence, in  the  autumn  of  1792,  diplomats  were  decid- 
ing, as  their  interests  prompted  them,  how  it  should 
be  greeted.  Upon  Gouverneur  Morris,  minister  pleni- 
potentiary from  the  United  States,  more  than  his 
share  of  the  responsibility  fell,  for  his  distance  from 


36  South  American  Independence 

Philadelphia  and  his  lack  of  specific  instructions 
applicable  to  the  events  of  the  tenth  of  August  forced 
him  to  frame  his  policy  for  himself.  "  You  will 
observe,  sir,"  he  commented  upon  those  events, 
"  that  matters  are  now  brought  to  a  simple  question 
between  an  absolute  monarchy  and  a  republic:  for 
all  middle  terms  are  done  away."  ^* 

As  representing  a  republican  government,  Morris 
could  not  well  take  offense  at  the  adoption  of  a  simi- 
lar government  by  France;  nor  could  be  proclaim  a 
neutrality  similar  to  that  of  Britain.  The  minister 
of  the  latter  power  demanded  his  passports  on  20th 
August,  presenting  at  the  same  time  a  threatening 
note  to  the  effect  "  that  Britain  has  determined  on  a 
strict  neutrality,  that  she  means  to  preserve  it,  and 
therefore  as  his  letters  of  credence  are  to  the  king, 
now  dethroned,  he  had  best  come  away.  To  this  is 
subjoined  a  hope  that  nothing  will  happen  to  the 
King  or  his  family,  because  that  would  excite  the 
indignation  of  all  Europe.  This  despatch  turned 
into  plain  English,  is,  shortly,  that  the  British  court 
resent  what  is  already  done,  and  will  make  war 
immediately,  if  the  treatment  of  the  King  be  such 
as  to  call  for,  or  to  justify,  measures  of  extremity."  ^^ 

"Morris  to  Jefferson,  August  16,  1792.  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign  Relations,  1 :  333.  The  folio  State  Papers  are  hereafter  to 
be  cited  a&  A.  S.  P.  F.  P. 

»*  Morris  to  Jeiferson.  August  22,  1792.    A.  S.  P.  F.  P.,  I:    336. 


Introduction  37 

The  other  courts  of  Europe,  fearful  with  England  of 
the  effect  of  French  pronunciamentos  in  the  name  of 
liberty,  also  withdrew  their  ministers  from  Paris, 
leaving  Morris  to  constitute  the  whole  diplomatic 
corps.  On  the  last  day  of  the  year  Lord  Grenville 
formally  refused  to  accredit  the  minister  of  the 
French  republic.  "  You  are  not  ignorant,"  he  wrote 
to  Chauvelin,  "  that  since  the  unhappy  events  of  the 
10th  of  August,  the  king  has  thought  proper  to  sus- 
pend all  official  communication  with  France.  You 
are  yourself  no  otherwise  accredited  to  the  king, 
than  in  the  name  of  his  most  christian  majesty.  The 
proposition  of  receiving  a  minister  accredited  by  any 
other  authority  or  power  in  France,  would  be  a  new 
question,  which,  whenever  it  should  occur,  the  king 
would  have  the  right  to  decide  according  to  the  inter- 
ests of  his  subjects,  his  own  dignity,  and  the  regard 
which  he  owes  to  his  allies,  and  the  general  system 
of  Europe.  I  am  therefore  to  inform  you,  sir,  that 
I  acknowledge  you  in  no  other  pubKc  character  than 
that  of  minister  from  his  most  christian  majesty,  and 
that  consequently  you  cannot  be  admitted  to  treat 
with  the  king's  ministers  in  the  quality,  and  under 
the  form  stated  in  your  note."  ^® 

The  attitude  which  Morris  determined  to  take  was 

'^Grenville  to  Chauvelin,  December  31,  1792.     Annual  BegiateVf 
1793,  116. 


To-. 


38  South  American  Independence 

the  opposite  of  this  of  England.  He  remained  in 
Paris,  and  continued  his  relations  with  the  ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  with  as  little  interruption  as  the 
course  of  events  would  allow.  He  remained,  as  he 
wrote  home,  "  because,  in  the  admitted  case  that  my 
letters  of  credence  are  to  the  monarchy,  and  not  to 
the  republic  of  France,  it  becomes  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference whether  I  remain  in  this  country,  or  go  to 
England,  during  the  time  which  may  be  needful  to 
obtain  your  orders,  or  to  produce  a  settlement  of 
affairs  here.  Going  hence,  however,  would  look  like 
taking  part  against  the  late  revolution,  and  I  am  not 
only  unauthorized  in  this  respect,  but  I  am  bound  to 
suppose  that,  if  the  great  majority  of  the  nation 
adhere  to  the  new  form,  the  United  States  will 
approve  thereof,  because,  in  the  first  place,  we  have 
no  right  to  prescribe  to  this  country  the  government 
they  shall  adopt,  and  next,  because  the  basis  of  our 
own  constitution  is  the  indefeasible  right  of  the  peo- 
ple to  establish  it."  *^ 

The  new  French  Government  itself  almost  drove 
Morris  to  leave  Paris.  Without  specific  instructions 
he  declined  to  pay  the  instalments  on  the  American 
debt  to  the  republic  as  they  came  due,  and  a  letter  of 
Le  Brun,  insisting  strongly  on  the  identity  of  France, 
whatever  her  domestic  form,  induced  him  to  demand 

"  Morris  to  Jefferson,  August  22,  1792.    A.  8.  P.  F.  S.,  1 :    336. 


Introduction  39 

his  passports.  This  action  evoked  an  explanatory 
note  from  the  French  minister,  so  that  the  demand 
was  withdrawn.  "As  to  my  personal  opinions," 
wrote  Morris,  consenting  to  remain,  "  they  are  unim- 
portant in  an  affair  so  serious,  but  you  may  be  per- 
suaded that  I  have  never  doubted  the  right  which 
every  people  have  of  forming,  to  themselves,  such 
government  as  they  please."  ^*  He  was  much  re- 
lieved when  Jefferson,  on  learning  of  the  suspension 
of  the  French  constitution,  wrote  him  instructions 
that  approved  his  actions.  "  During  the  time  of  this 
suspension,  and  while  no  legitimate  government 
exists,  we  apprehend  that  we  cannot  continue  the 
payments  of  our  debt  to  France,  because  there  is  no 
one  authorized  to  receive  it  and  to  give  us  an  unob- 
jectionable acqmttal."  Until  further  orders  Morris 
was  directed  to  suspend  payments,  with  the  under- 
standing that  "  this  suspension  [shall  not]  be  con- 
tinued one  moment  after  we  can  see  our  way  clear 
out  of  the  difficulty  into  which  their  situation  has 
thrown  us."  "® 

The  situation  and  interests  of  the  United  States 
were  such  that  in  this  crisis  she  was  enabled  to  fulfil 
in  their  strictness  both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of 

»8Morris  to  LeBrun,  September  17,  1792.    A.  S.  P.  F.  R.,  1 :    340. 
» Jeflferson  to  Morris,  October  15,  1792.    P.  L.  Ford,  Writingt  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  VI:     120. 


f 


40  South  American  Independence 

the  law.  And  where  the  indistinct  law  of  neutrality 
was  silent,  she  guided  her  actions  by  logical  reason- 
ing, based  upon  the  broad  principles  of  honest  impar- 
tiality and  the  consent  of  the  governed.  The  conduct 
of  Morris  received  the  support  of  the  administration. 
His  new  instructions,  when  they  came,  authorized 
him  to  continue  the  course  he  had  started  upon.  "  It 
accords  with  our  principles/'  wrote  Jefferson,  stating 
the  law  of  recognition  of  governments  as  it  has  come 
to  be  accepted  to-day,  "  to  acknowledge  any  Govern- 
ment to  be  rightful  which  is  formed  by  the  will  of 
the  nation,  substantially  declared.  The  late  Govern- 
ment was  of  this  kind,  and  was  accordingly  acknowl- 
edged by  all  the  branches  of  ours;  so  any  alteration 
of  it  which  shall  be  made  by  the  will  of  the  nation, 
substantially  declared,  will  doubtless  be  acknowl- 
edged in  like  manner.  With  such  a  Government, 
every  hind  of  business  may  be  done."  ^°  The  situa- 
tion was  such  as  has  been  insisted  upon  as  essential 
for  the  development  of  a  precedent  in  recognition; 
there  was  a  change  of  government,  the  effect  of  it 
was  being  contested,  a  neutral  party  with  no  interest 
in  a  termination  in  either  direction  acted  as  seemed 
to  it  reasonable  and  right.  It  is  well  for  the  develop- 
ment of  international  law  when  the  interest  of  States 
guides  them  into  loyjca.)    ^^aths  rather  than   selfish 

sojeflferson  to  Morris, Not  792.    Ford,  Writings,  YI:  131. 


Introduction  41 

ones.  "  The  President  receives,  with  great  satisfac- 
tion," wrote  Jefferson  to  the  French  minister  in 
Philadelphia,  acknowledging  his  notification  of  the 
change  of  government,  "  this  attention  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council  and  the  desire  they  have  manifested  of 
making  known  to  us  the  resolution  entered  into  by 
the  National  Convention,  even  before  a  definite 
regulation  of  their  new  establishment  could  take 
place.  Be  assured,  Sir,  that  the  Government  and  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  view  with  the  most  sin- 
cere pleasure  every  advance  of  your  nation  towards 
its  happiness,  an  object  essentially  connected  with  its 
liberty,  and  they  consider  the  union  of  principles  and 
pursuits  between  our  two  countries  as  a  link  which 
binds  still  closer  their  interests  and  affections."  ^^ 

The  actual  outbreak  of  war  between  France  and 
England,  in  1793,  brought  to  this  attitude  of  neu- 
trality the  supreme  test.  France  was  at  once  the 
traditional  friend  of  the  United  States,  and  the  ex- 
ponent of  a  governmental  system  that  could  not  fail 
to  command  the  warmest  admiration  in  America. 
She  had  rendered  to  the  struggling  States,  fifteen 
years  before,  an  assistance  that  at  a  later  date  in  the 
war  had  become  decisive;  and  it  was  by  no  means 
clear  that  the  bond  whereby  she  pledged  her  assist- 
ance did  not  entitle   her  to  the  aid  of  the  United 

M  Jefferson  to  Ternant,  February  23, 1793.  Ford,  Writinga,\J  :    189. 


42  South  American  Independence 

States  in  her  own  crisis.  To  resist  a  popular  distrust 
of  England,  a  sympathy  with  France  and  the  obliga- 
tion of  the  treaty  of  1778  was  no  easy  task.  By 
rather  close  reasoning  on  the  changed  situations  in 
Europe,  and  the  obligations  of  treaties,  reinforced  by 
a  profound  realization  of  the  need  of  peace  to  the 
United  States,  Washington  was  led  to  take  for  his 
country  an  epoch-making  attitude. 

Summoning  his  cabinet  to  meet  him,^^  the  Presi- 
dent hurried  from  Mt.  Vernon  to  Philadelphia  when 
news  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  reached  him.  To 
his  advisers  he  propounded  a  series  of  thirteen  per- 
tinent questions  on  neutrality  and  the  Erench 
treaties,^^  and  with  their  approval,  on  22d  April, 
1793,  issued  a  proclamation  that  "  has  had  greater 
influence  in  moulding  international  law  than  any  sin- 
gle document  of  the  last  hundred  years."  ^*  With 
the  brief  neutrality  proclamation  as  a  text,  Jefferson, 
in  his  later  correspondence  with  Genet,  formulated 
"  against  France,"  and  against  his  own  inclination,  it 
might  be  added,  "  broad  principles  of  neutrality,  to 
which  time  has  added  nothing."  ^^  A  year  later 
these  principles  of  international  law,  now  for  the  first 

"  Circular  to  Cabinet,  April  12, 1793.  J.  Sparks,  Writings  of  Wash- 
ington, X :    336. 

"  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  X  :    533. 

'*  J.  W.  Foster,  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy  (Boston,  1900), 
154. 

"  W.  F.  Reddoway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine  (Cambridge,  1898),  15, 


Introduction  43 

time  laid  down  with  authority,  were  enacted  with 
fitting  pains  and  penalties  into  a  statute  by  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States. 

This  prompt  recognition  of  the  French  republic, 
accompanied  by  a  more  thorough-going  neutrality 
than  had  yet  been  seen,  marks  the  entrance  into 
European  diplomacy  of  a  new  power,  in  whose  guid- 
ance principles  distinctly  different  from  those  of 
Europe  would  predominate.  It  may  be  conjectured 
that  the  development  of  international  law  since  1793 
has  been  influenced  more  by  this  power  than  by  any 
other,  just  because  of  the  isolation  of  interests  that 
forced  it  into  a  neutral  attitude,  from  which  it  could 
act  freely,  as  a  logical  international  theory  might 
dictate.  From  the  action  of  the  United  States  re- 
garding the  French  governments,  for  the  Director- 
ate, the  Consulate  and  the  Empire  were  severally 
acknowledged  as  the  Republic  had  been,  and  the 
French  wars,  it  might  be  guessed  with  considerable 
accuracy  what  would  be  its  action  when  the  next 
great  case  for  recognition  should  arise — when  the 
American  colonies  of  His  Catholic  Majesty  should  be 
driven  by  a  Castilian  stupidity,  even  greater  than  an 
eighteenth-century  English  stupidity,  into  a  war  for 
independence. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  SOUTH  AMERICAN  WARS  OF  LIBEKATION 

The  enterprise  of  the  inhabitants  of  Spain's  four 
American  viceroyalties  displayed  itself  in  systematic 
and  consistent  smuggling  rather  than  in  any  form  of 
opposition  to  Spanish  rule  as  such.  Exploitation  and 
repression  were  the  essential  features  of  the  Spanish 
colonial  system.  If  Buenos  Ayres  proved  to  be  a 
competitor  to  the  Spanish  merchants,  her  olive  trees 
must  come  down  and  her  vines  must  come  up  by  the 
roots,  for  it  was  clearly  understood  that  Spain  was  to 
be  protected,  and  that  colonies  existed  onlj  for  the 
benefit  of  the  mother  country.  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
such  a  system  could  have  been  carried  out  honestly, 
or,  if  this  were  possible,  how  it  could  have  been  en- 
dured. But  the  administrators  of  Spain  made  the 
colonial  system  a  means  for  recuperating  distressed 
fortunes,  while  the  colonists  utilized  the  cupidity  of 
their  rulers  to  develop  an  extensive,  illicit  and  profit- 
able foreign  commerce.^ 

No  community  of  interest  could  well  exist  in  the 

•  E.  G.  Bourne,  Spain  in  America  (New  York,  1906),  gives  a  de- 
tailed account  of  the  Spanish  colonial  system.  He  had  already  edited 
a  chapter  from  Roscher ,  Kolonien,  Kolonialpolitik  und  Auswanderung, 
under  the  title  The  Spanish  Colonial  System  (New  York,  1904).  His 
analysis  is  more  sympathetic  than  the  one  here  given. 


Wars  of  Liberation  45 

population  of  the  Spanish  American  colonies.  Ex- 
cepting their  American  residence,  and  conmion 
dependence  on  a  mother  country,  there  are  few 
generalizations  that  can  be  made  regarding  the  peo- 
ple living  in  the  southern  Americas.  Some  families 
were  Castilian,  were  insolently  proud  of  their  birth 
in  the  peninsula,  and  looked  to  a  speedy  return  to 
civilization  and  Spain,  At  the  other  end  of  the  social 
scale  were  negroes  and  Indians  of  unmixed  blood. 
Between  these  was  an  immense  population  made  up 
of  Creoles  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  of  vari- 
ous degrees  of  mestizos  and  mulattos,  for  the  Spanish 
settlers  in  America  had  amalgamated  with  the  native 
and  lower  races  as  only  peoples  of  Latin  blood  have 
done.  Caste  and  class  flourished  in  Latin  America, 
and  gave  a  clear  promise  of  pennanence  to  Spanish 
dominion  which  was  the  one  unifying  principle  on 
the  continent.  Without  the  assistance  of  Spain  no 
other  common  fact  could  come  to  exist,  and  no 
dangerous  spirit  of  revolution  could  prevail  without 
some  other  common  facts. 

South  America,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  in  spite  of 
centuries  of  misgovernment  and  blindness  on  the 
part  of  the  mother  country,  was  patriotic  during 
those  early  years  of  the  last  century,  when  patriotism 
was  almost  the  only  asset  of  the  Spanish  peoples.  \ 
The  colonial  system  had  been  atrocious,  but,  keeping 


46  South  American  Independence 

those  at  the  bottom  of  the  social  scale  in  dense  ignor- 
ance, and  allowing  those  at  the  top  to  enrich  them- 
selves by  illicit  means,  it  had  been  successful.  The 
history  of  1806  and  1807  proves  this  with  reasonable 
conclusiveness. 

Three  great  names  stand  forth  in  the  history  of 
South  American  Liberation.^  To  Jose  de  San  Martin 
and  Simon  Bolivar  belongs  the  credit  of  accomplish- 
ing the  emancipation;  to  Francisco  de  Miranda  that^ 
of  inaugurating  the  movement.'  The  first  liberator, 
Miranda,  was  a  man  of  good  family,  a  native  of 
Caracas,  in  Venezuela,  and  a  wanderer  of  much 
experience.*  Bom  in  1754,  he  had  fought  in  the 
American  revolution  with  the  French  allies,  and  had 

•  The  historj  of  the  wars  of  liberation  is  yet  to  be  written.  They 
•re  the  sabject  of  a  balky  Latin  American  literature,  much  of  which 
is  lowered  in  value  by  its  partisan  character  and  its  lack  of  critical 
spirit.  Little  use  has  been  made  of  this  in  the  above  chapter,  although 
references  to  it  are  included  in  the  foot-notes.  The  principal  sources 
of  the  chapter  are  the  memoirs  and  travels  of  foreigners  in  South 
America  during  the  revolutionary  period,  the  British  and  American 
foreign  correspondence,  and  the  original  documents  accompanying  the 
files  of  the  latter.  Bulletins  of  the  armies,  pamphlet  laws  and  con- 
Btitutions,  and  the  like,  are  preserved  in  great  number  in  the  archives. 

•  W.  S,  Robertson, "  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing 
of  Spanish  America,"  in  Amer,  Hist.  Asso.  Ann.  Report,  1907,  1 :  189- 
639,  gives  the  best  account  of  the  inception  of  the  movement  for  liber- 
ation, and  describes  in  substantiated  detail  the  career  here  alluded  to. 

•  Documents  on  the  revolutionary  career  of  Miranda  are  in  Alph. 
Comte  O'Kelly  de  Galway,  Francisco  de  Miranda:  General  de 
Division  dea  Armiet  de  la  Republique  {1791-1794);  Heros  de  I'  Ind^ 
pendanet  Amiricaine  {1756-1816).    (Paris,  1913.) 


Wars  of  Liberation  47 

there  formed  the  resolution  to  repeat  the  process  in 
his  own  land.  Years  of  travel  over  all  of  Europe, 
broken  into  by  service  at  the  head  of  a  French 
republican  brigade,  and  by  visits  to  London  and  con- 
ferences with  British  and  American  statesmen,  had 
confirmed  the  resolution,  and  it  was  only  a  change 
in  the  conditions  of  Europe  that  kept  Pitt  from  back- 
ing a  filibustering  expedition  under  his  leadership 
in  1798.  Another  change  of  conditions  brought  the 
object  of  his  ambitions  within  his  reach,  and  in 
Februaiy,  1806,  the  Leander  sailed  from  New 
York,  under  one  Martin,^  who  at  sea  turned  into 
Miranda,  the  leader  of  a  revolutionary  expedition 
against  Venezuela.®  After  touching  at  a  port  of  San 
Domingo,  the  Leander  proceeded  to  the  north 
coast  of  Venezuela,  where  a  Spanish  force  drove  it 
back.  But  Lord  Cochrane,  from  the  West  Indian 
station,  was  induced  to  convoy  the  expedition  to  an 
easy  landing  in  the  neighborhood  of  Coro,  whence 
he  convoyed  it  once  more  to  Trinidad  and  safety  a 
few  days  later.  The  days  at  Coro  had  been  spent  in 
vigorous  revolutionary  propagandism,  to  no  effect. 

^Annals  of  Congress,  11th  Cong.,  Ist  Sess.,  257. 

*The  diary  and  letters  of  Henry  Ingersoll,  who  accompanied  the 
Leander  expedition  as  a  printer,  are  given  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  Ill: 
674. 


48  South  American  Independence 

The  one  thing  essential  to  a  revolution  was  lacking — 
the  people  of  Venezuela  would  not  revolt.^ 

The  experience  of  Miranda  with  an  apathetic  and 
timorous  population  was  duplicated  in  the  same  year 
by  the  experience  of  another  filibustering  expedition, 
this  time  directed  against  the  viceroyalty  of  Buenos 
Ayres.  While  the  British  ministry  was  considering 
the  plans  of  Miranda,  in  1804,  Sir  Home  Eiggs  Pop- 
ham  had  been  designated  as  commander  of  a  possible 
British  contingent,  and  had  been  placed  in  communi- 
cation with  the  South  American  adventurer.®  Thus 
Popham  had  come  to  consider  the  possibilities  of 
South  American  independence.  And  when  the 
capture  of  Cape  Colony,  in  January,  1806,  left  him 
free  to  act  with  his  fleet,  he  listened  to  the  tales  of 

^  The  History  of  Don  Francisco  de  Miranda's  Attempt  to  effect  a 
Revolution  in  South  America,  in  a  Series  of  Letters,  by  a  Gentleman 
who  was  an  Officer  under  that  General,  to  his  Friend  in  the  United 
States.  To  which  are  annexed  Sketches  of  the  Life  of  Miranda,  and 
Geographical  Notices  of  Caracas  (Boston,  1808),  110;  Annual 
Register,  1806,  239  ;  A.  S.  P.  F.  R. ,  III :  256  ;  Amer.  Hist.  Rev. ,  VI : 
508;  Annals  of  Congress,  11  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  257-315;  J.  H.  Latane, 
The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spanish  America 
(Baltimore,  1900),  21-29  ;  Colombia,  Being  a  geographical,  statistical, 
agricultural,  commercial,  and  political  Account  of  that  Country,  adap- 
ted for  the  general  Reader,  the  Merchant  and  the  Colonist.  (2  vols., 
London,  1822)  II:  302,  — perhaps  by  Zea,  the  Colombian  agent  since 
it  is  a  tract  in  favor  of  Colombian  loans  and  contains  the  documents  on 
recognition  by  the  United  States. 

*  C.  W.  Vane,  ed..  Correspondence,  Despatches,  and  other  Papers  of 
Viscount  Castlereagh,  Second  Marquess  of  Londonderry  (12  vols.,  Lon- 
don, 1851-        ),  VII :     288. 


Wars  of  Liberation  49 

the  captain  of  an  American  merchantman,  borrowed 
Lord  Beresford  and  twelve  hundred  men,  and  sailed 
west  to  free  Montevideo  and  Buenos  Ayres  from  the 
Spanish  tyranny  under  which  they  groaned,  and  to 
open  to  British  merchants  their  valuable  commerce.'* 
The  Spanish  viceroy  was  so  hopelessly  incompetent 
that  Buenos  Ayres  fell  before  Beresford's  handful 
of  troops,  in  July.  But  the  groaning  and  oppressed 
people  united  under  the  lead  of  a  French  officer  in 
the  Spanish  service,  Liniers,  and  shortly  made  Beres- 
ford and  his  soldiers  prisoners  of  war.^"  So  success- 
ful was  their  resistance  that  when  General  White- 
locke  arrived  with  nine  thousand  reinforcements, 
and  a  commission  as  civil  governor  of  the  province, 
he  was  forced  to  give  up  hostilities  and  return  to 
England  to  be  court-martialed  and  cashiered.*^ 

Thus  the  attempts  to  revolutionize  South  America 
under  British  auspices  proved  to  be  premature.  liVith 

i»C.  W.  Vane,  Castlereagh  Corresp.  VII:  302;  W.  M.  Sloane,  in 
Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  IV :  449-453;  see  text  of  proclamations  in  S.  H. 
Wilcocke,  History  of  the  Viceroyalty  of  Buenos  Ayres;  containing 
the  most  accurate  Details  relative  to  the  Topography,  History,  Com- 
merce, Population,  Government,  etc.,  etc.,  of  that  valuable  Colony  (Lon- 
don, 1807),  356. 

^°  Joseph  Andrews,  Journey  from  Buenos  Ayres,  through  the  Prov- 
inces of  Cordova,  Tecuman,  and  Salta,  to  Potosi,  thence  by  the  Deserts 
Carauja  to  Arica,  and  s^ibsequently,  to  Santiago  de  Chili  and  Coquimbo 
.    .   .in  the  years  1825-26  (2  vols.,  London,  1827),  1 :  34. 

"C.  W.  Vane,  Castlereagh  Corresp.,  VII:  314;  Latan6,  Dipt. 
Bel.,  29-31 ;  and  Dictionary  of  National  Biography. 


50  South  American  Independence 

all  their  grievances  the  colonists  were  not  yet  pre- 
pared for  independence.  And  when  at  last  the  first 
step  was  taken  that  led  to  the  ultimate  separation, 
the  motive  was  not  love  of  freedom,  but  a  patriotic 
desire  to  maintain  Spanish  authority  in  Spanish 
QoJbpnies. 

/  When  jSTapoleon  established  his  brother  on  the 
throne  of  Spain  he  gave  the  signal  for  the  erection 
of  patriotic  juntas  throughout  the  peninsula.  The 
inhabitants  of  Spanish-America  were  no  less  deter- 
mined than  those  of  Ferdinand's  European  posses- 
sions not  to  submit  to  French  rule.  With  some 
friction  ^^  caused  by  the  desire  of  the  regency  of 
Cadiz  to  iTile  the  colonies  as  well  as  Spain,  they  took 
matters  into  their  own  hands  and  set  up  independent 
local  governments  in  the  name  of  Ferdinand.  At 
Buenos  Ayres  the  viceroy  Cisneros  met  with  opposi- 
tion from  the  minute  of  his  arrival,  in  May,  1809.^' 
A  year  later  he  was  deposed  by  a  movement  inspired 
by  a  writer  of  pamphlets,  Moreno,  who  became  the 
soul  of  the  new  "  junta  gubemative  "  that  succeeded 
him."     Valparaiso  followed  the  example  of  Buenos 

**  Colombia  .    .    .  Account,  II :    320. 

1*  J.  R.  Rengger,  The  Reign  of  Doctor  Joseph  Gaspard  Roderick 
de  Francia  in  Paraguay  ;  being  an  Account  of  a  Six  Years'  Residence 
in  that  Republic,  from  July,  1819,  to  Mv.y,  1825  (London,  1827), 
Introd.  xiv. 

1*  Jolm  Miller,  Memoirs  of  General  Miller,  in  the  Service  of  the 
Republic  of  Pent  (2  vol.,  London,  1828),  I:    59.    These  memoirs  of 


Wars  of  Liberation  51 

Ayres,  in  July,  1810,  deposed  the  president  Carrasco, 
and  turned  the  municipal  cabildo  into  a  patriotic 
junta.^°  Santiago  did  the  same  in  September,  and 
with  a  remarkable  unanimity  Chile  detennined  no 
longer  to  form  a  captain-generalcy  under  the  viceroy 
of  Peru,  and  met^Jn  her  first  free  congress  in  the 
spring  of  1811/*  y  In  the  northern  viceroyalty  of 
New  Granada,  Quito  had  set  up  the  first  junta  in 
Aug-ust,  1809/^  Caracas  joined  in  the  movement 
six  months  later,  and  abolished  slavery,  in  addition 
to  proclaiming  Ferdinand  and  forming  a  federative 
government  for  Venezuela. ^^  Bogota  acted  in  simi- 
lar manner  in  July,  follo\ving  this  in  December, 
1810,  with  a  congress  and  a  "  Republic  of  Cundina- 
marca  "  to  be  ruled  by  a  president  and  vice-president 
in  the  name  of  the  old  King  of  Spain/^    And  on  5th 

the  most  successful  foreign  officer  in  the  service  of  the  liberating  army 
form  the  most  valuable  single  source  on  the  history  of  the  war.  The 
military  operations  are  particularly  well  treated. 

**W.  B.  Stevenson,  A  historical  and  descriptive  Narrative  of  a 
Twenty  Yeart'  Residence  in  South  America  (3  vol.,  London,  1825), 
III:    176. 

"  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :    105. 

^'  The  Republic  of  Colombia  :  an  Account  of  its  Boundaries,  Extent 
.  .  .and  History.  Printed  from  the  Article  in  the  Seventh  Edition 
of  the  Encyclopaedia  Brifannica  (New  York,  1836),  45-49. 

"Simon  de  Schryver,  Esquisse  dc  la  Vie  Bolivar  (Brussels,  1899), 
13  ;  Jonathan  Elliott,  The  American  J}iplomatic  Code  (2  vols.,  Wash- 
ington, 1834)  1 :   14. 

"Bernard  Moses,  "  Political  Constitution  of  Colombia,"  in  Ann. 
Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol.  and  Soc.  Science,  III :  67. 


52  South  American  Independence 

July,  1811,  the  first  motion  of  independence  of 
Spain  was  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  Venezuela.^" 
The  widespread  popular  feeling  which  showed 
itself  in  the  movements  here  described  was  founded 
on  loyalty  to  Spain.^^  Many  of  the  leaders  of  the 
day  were  individually  in  favor  of  a  complete  inde- 
pendence, but  there  was  as  yet  no  public  opinion  to 
support  them.  Even  so  much  as  had  been  attained 
was  soon  lost,  as  throughout  the  greater  part  of 
South  America  the  popular  governments  were  sup- 
pressed, with  varying  degrees  of  difficulty.  But  the 
fact  of  independence  was  established.  Although  in 
name  Spain  continued  to  rule  the  Americas  for 
several  years  to  come,  her  rule  had  now  ceased  to  be 
effectual,  and  the  principle  of  commercial  restriction 
upon  which  her  colonial  policy  was  founded  ceased  to 
be  operative.  The  great  English  trade  which  came 
at  once  into  existence  made  the  restoration  of  the 
old  system  more  impossible  every  day,  and  gave 
strength  to  the  real  movements  for  political  inde- 
pendence which  at  once  began.  The  overthrow  of 
Ferdinand  in  Spain  had  established  the  economic 
independence  of  the  colonies. 

'0  Repuhlic  of  Colombia,  51 ;  The  Present  State  of  Colombia ;  by 
an  Officer,  late  in  the  Colombian  Service  (London,  1827),  29. 

21  William  Walton,  An  Expose  of  the  Dissensions  of  Spanish  Amer- 
ica .  .  .  intended  as  a  means  to  induce  the  mediatory  Interference 
of  Great  Britain  (London,  1814),  100. 


Wars  of  Liberation  53 

The  overthrow  of  Spanish  rule  in  America  is  the 
result  of  two  simultaneous  movements  which  origi- 
nated in  local  disturbances  in  Venezuela  and  Buenos 
Ayres,  which  spread  gradually  northward  and  south- 
ward along  the  western  coast  of  the  continent  de- 
veloping leaders  as  they  advanced,  and  which  finally 
united  within  the  limits  of  the  present  republic  of 
Ecuador,  to  continue  the  advance  together  into  the 
heights  of  upper  Peru,  until  the  attainment  of  a  com- 
plete and  perfect  independence.^^  The  name  of 
Simon  Bolivar,  who  was  the  spirit  of  the  northern 
movement,  is  better  known  than  that  of  San  Martin, 
who  accomplished  a  greater  work  in  the  southern 
half  of  the  continent. 

When  economic  independence  was  forced  upon  the 
Spanish  provinces,  about  the  year  1810,  and  their 
ports  were  opened  more  widely  than  ever  before  to 
foreign  commerce,  there  began  an  invasion  of  capital 
and  commercial  adventurers  that  had  a  permanent 
influence  on  the  history  of  the  colonies.^^    There  had 

"A  great  calendar  of  documents  bearing  upon  the  liberation  was 
published  in  1912  by  Pedro  Torres  Lanzas,  Director  of  the  General 
Archive  of  the  Indies  at  Seville,  under  the  title  Jndependencia  de 
America:  Fuentes  para  su  Estudio.  Catdlago  de  Documentos  con- 
servados  en  el  Archivo  General  de  Indias  de  Sevilla.  (6  vols.,  Madrid 
1912).  These  volumes  will  be  indispensable  to  the  definitive  historian 
of  the  movement. 

^*  A  Five  Years'  Residence  in  Buenos  Ayres  during  the  Years  1820 
to  1825,  containing  Remarks  on  the  Country  and  Inhabitants,  and  a 
Visit  to  Colonia  del  Sacramento.  By  an  Englishman  (2  ed.,  London, 
1827) ,  33 ;  Wilcocke,  Viceroyalty,  preface. 


54  South  American  Independence 

always  been  much  foreign  commerce  in  spite  of  Span- 
ish colonial  system,  but  it  had  paid  a  heavy  unofficial 
tax,  and  the  goods  were  distributed  through  Spanish 
hands.  L^ow  began  the  establishment  of  commercial 
houses  in  the  large  cities  and  the  permanent  invest- 
ment of  foreign  capital,  which  was  mostly  English. 
It  was  not  long  before  those  houses  and  this  capital 
were  forced  into  politics,  and,  owing  their  life  to  the 
existence  of  an  illegal  condition,  they  necessarily 
fought  to  maintain  that  condition  and  enlisted  heart- 
ily in  the  cause  of  independence.  The  materials  are 
not  yet  collected  to  show  how  far  Spanish  American 
independence  was  due  to  the  Liverpool  and  Man- 
chester merchants,  but  such  as  are  available  seem  to 
show  that  commercial  pressure  was  the  great  influ- 
ence in  keeping  the  patriots  patriotic.  Particularly 
was  this  true  in  the  chief  port  of  entry  for  the 
southern  provinces,  Buenos  Ayres. 

The  junta  guhenmtive,  which  was  set  up  in  Buenos 
Ayres  on  the  25th  of  May,  1810,"*  was  the  beginning 
of  an  independent  regime  that  has  endured  in  that 
territory,  in  one  form  or  another,  from  that  day  to 
this.  It  was  a  doubtful  period  of  political  instability 
that  followed  the  erection  of  this  government  for  ten 

»*  T.  C.  Dawson,  The  South  American  Republics  (2  vols.,  1903, 1904, 
in  "  The  Story  of  the  Nations"),  I:  90.  Dawson  gives  an  intelligent 
popular  survey  of  South  American  affairs. 


Wars  of  Liberation  55 

years  or  more.  War  was  almost  constant  on  three 
parts  of  the  frontier:  Artigas  dominated  in  the  city 
of  Montevideo,  and  declined  to  submit  to  the 
authority  of  Buenos  Ayres;  Dr.  Francia  shut  him- 
self up  in  the  city  of  Paraguay  and  maintained  a 
permanent  embargo  on  the  inhabitants  of  the 
province  under  his  control;  and  on  the  northern 
frontier  of  the  viceroyalty  the  Spanish  forces  from 
upper  Peru  were  constant  in  their  depredations. 

Meanwhile,  within  the  frontiers  thus  harassed, 
partisan  politics  was  doing  its  worst,  and  between  the 
rivalries  of  revolutionary  chieftains  and  the  jeal- 
ousies existing  between  the  rural  districts  and  the  city 
of  Buenos  Ayres  the  province  had  little  domestic 
stability.^^  Moreno,  who  led  the  attack  on  the  vice- 
roy Cisneros,  in  1810,  dominating  the  junta  that  suc- 
ceeded him,  seems  to  have  been  an  honest  man  and 
too  severe  for  his  time.^^  He  died  while  on  a  forced 
mission  to  England.  Saavcdra,  who  drove  him  out, 
was  himself  forced  to  leave  abruptly  before  the  end 

'*  An  account,  historical,  political  and  statistical,  of  the  United 
Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  ;  vnth  an  Appendix  concerning  the  Usur- 
pation of  ifonte  Video  by  the  Portuguese  and  Brazilian  Governments. 
Translated  from  the  Spanish  (London,  1825)  9,  et  seq.,  — this  is  a  semi- 
official account,  prepared  at  the  request  of  the  British  agent,  and  con- 
tains an  excellent  map  and  numerous  documents. 

'6  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  60,  et  seq.;  Don  Vicente  Pazos,  Letters  on  the 
United  Provinces  of  South  America,  addressed  to  the  Hon.  Henry  Clay 
(New  York  and  London,  1819),  49. 


56  South  American  Independence 

of  1811.  And  after  an  interregnum  of  several 
months  Juan  Martin  Pueyrredon  arrived  from  the 
army  and  took  command  at  Buenos  Ayres.^^  In  the 
last  month  of  1813  the  position  of  Supreme  Director 
was  established,  to  be  filled  for  the  first  time  by 
Gervasio  Antonio  de  Posadas.  He  was  followed  by 
General  Alvear,^^  later  the  victim  of  another  revolu- 
tion, succeeded  by  Alvarez,  pro  tempore,  and  by 
Pueyrredon,  who  was  chosen  Supreme  Director  in 
March,  1816,  by  the  Congress  of  Tucuman.^^ 

Throughout  this  period  of  strife  Buenos  Ayres  was 
in  an  anomalous  condition.  She  had  revolted  in  the 
name  of  Ferdinand  VII.  She  did  not  issue  any 
declaration  of  independence  until  1816.  Spain  was 
maintaining  that  her  own  sway  was  still  unbroken: 
"  the  Laws  of  the  Indias  (which  are  still  in  force) 
do  not  permit  any  Foreign  Vessel  to  approach  or 
carry  on  commerce  with  "  the  port  of  Buenos  Ayres. 
Yet  when  the  British  Foreign  Ofiice  sent  a  consul  to 
that  city  the  junta  declined  to  grant  him  an  exequa- 
tur, because  in  his  commission  the  independence  of 
Buenos  Ayres  was  not  acknowledged.  The  congress 
that  met  at  Tucuman  in  1816  ended  this  uncertainty. 
By  this  time  negotiations  entered  into  for  the  estab- 

"  Bland,  in  Annals  of  Congress,  15th  Cong.,  Ist  Sess.,  2146. 
*8  Halsey  to  Secretary  of  State,  May  5,  1815.    State  Dept.  Mss. 
"  Bland,  in  Annals  of  Congress,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  2149. 


Wars  of  Liberation  57 

lishment  of  a  Spanish  prince  on  the  throne  of  Buenos 
Ayres  had  failed  because  of  the  unalterable  deter- 
mination of  Spain,  after  the  restoration,  to  reconquer 
the  colonies.^"  So  the  representatives  of  the  United 
Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  declared  their  inde- 
pendence at  Tucuman  on  July  9th,  1816,  and  issued 
a  manifesto  of  causes  on  the  25th  of  the  following 
month.^^ 

The  series  of  military  successes  that  was  destined 
to  lead  to  South  American  independence  began  at 
Tucuman  in  the  fall  of  1812,  and  at  Salta  on  Febru- 
ary 20th,  1813.^^  In  these  battles  the  Spanish  forces 
from  upper  Peru  were  driven  back  as  they  crossed 
the  frontier  of  Buenos  Ayres,  and  at  the  latter  the 
royalist  general  Tristan  was  decisively  defeated  by 
the  patriot  Belgrano.  But  on  the  1st  of  October,  of 
the  same  year,  the  royalists,  violating  their  parole 
given  after  Salta,  destroyed  Belgrano's  army  at 
Vilcapujio.  This  was  a  distinct  service  to  the 
patriots,  for  it  placed  in  command  of  the  remnants  of 
Bclgrano's  force  Jos6  de  San  Martin,  just  returned 

'"Sir  Woodbine  Parish,  Buenos  Ayres  and  the  Provinces  of  the  Rio 
de  la  Plata :  from  their  Discovery  and  Conquest  by  the  Spaniards  to 
the  Establishment  of  their  political  Independence  (2d  ed.  London,  1852), 
75,  386. 

'^Annals  of  Congress,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1877,  2045;  Annual 
RegisUr,  1816  [159]  ;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV  :   30. 

'2  North  American  Review,  CLX  V :    556 ;    Miller,  Memoirs  1 :    76. 


58  South  American  Independence 

from  twenty  years  of  honorable  service  in  the 
Spanish  armies  to  aid  his  countrymen  in  their  fight. 
San  Martin  recognized  at  once  the  futility  of 
attacking  Spain  in  the  mountains  of  upper  Peru, 
with  more  than  four  hundred  leagues  of  impassable 
roads^^  between  his  army  and  his  base  of  supplies.^* 
He  conceived  the  idea  of  forcing  Spain  to  defend  her 
own  base  at  Lima  and  Callao,  and  to  this  purpose 
elaborated  a  plan  for  an  invasion  of  Chile,  a  capture 
of  Valparaiso,  and  a  combined  military  and  naval 
attack  on  the  capital  of  Peru.  To  this  end  he  will- 
ingly gave  up  the  command  of  his  northern  army 
to  General  Alvear,  taking  for  himself,  in  September, 
1814,  the  governorship  of  the  backwoods  province 
of  Cuyo,  Mendoza  the  capital,  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  Uspallata  pass  over  the  Andes.^® 

''In  1908  and  1909  Hiram  Bingham,  of  Yale  University,  in  connec- 
tion with  his  visit  to  the  First  Pan-American  Scientific  Congress 
at  Santiago,  made  the  overland  trip  along  the  old  road  from  Buenos 
Ayres  to  Bolivia  and  Peru.  He  describes  and  illustrates  the  supreme 
difficulties  that  would  have  impeded  San  Martin  in  an  overland  con- 
quest of  Peru  in  Across  South  America,  An  Account  of  a  Journey  from 
Buenos  Aires  to  Lima  by  Way  of  Potosi  (Boston,  1911),  50,^. 

'*  Peter  Schmidtraeyer,  Travels  into  Chile,  over  the  Andes,  in  the 
Years  1820  and  1821  (London,  1824),  132,  gives  the  distance  from 
Buenos  Ayres  to  Tucuman  as  328  leagues,  and  to  Salta  415  leagues. 

'5  J.  H.  Latan6,  Dipl.  Rel.,  37  ;  Alexander  Cadcleugh,  Travels  in 
South  America  during  the  Years  1819-20-21,  containing  An  Account  of 
the  present  State  of  Brazil,  Buenos  Ayres  and  Chile  (2  vols.,  London, 
1825),  1 :    293-297. 


^  ^ars  of  Liberation  59 

\^A  popular  revolt  had  occurred  in  Chile  a  short 
ume  after  the  overthrow  of  the  viceroy  at  Buenos 
Ayres,  the  cabildo  of  Valparaiso  advancing  the  pre- 
text that  the  captain-general  could  not  save  the  prov- 
ince for  Ferdinand.  Following  a  common  line  of 
development  this  revolt  ripened  into  a  popular  con- 
gress in  June,  1811,  only  to  fall  in  December  of  the 
same  year  before  "  the  unprincipled  ambition  "  of 
three  gifted  brothers  Carrera.  Encouraged  by  the 
factions  so  soon  developed  in  Chile,  the  viceroy  of 
Peru  seized  the  opportunity  to  send  down  an  army  in 
the  early  months  of  1813.  The  Chilenos  at  once 
put  aside  their  strife,  met  the  invaders,  and  under 
the  leadership,  jBrst  of  Jose  Miguel  Carrera,  and 
then  of  Bernardo  O'Higgins,  extorted  a  truce  at  Talca 
on  the  5th  of  May,  1814.  By  this  truce  the  existing 
order  in  Chile  was  acknowledged.  The  truce  was  the 
signal  for  the  renewal  of  partisan  strife  between 
O'Higgins  and  the  Carreras,  who  had  been  forced 
to  surrender  to  him  the  command  of  the  patriot 
army.  But  once  more  they  came  to  a  forced  recon- 
ciliation, when  the  news  arrived  that  the  viceroy 
repudiated  the  truce  of  Talca,  and  that  General 
Osorio  was  on  his  way  south  with  another  royalist 
army.  The  patriots  were  hopelessly  weakened  by 
their  domestic  strife,  however,  so  that  a  decisive 
victory  at  Rancagua,  on  1st  October,  1814,  marked 


60  South  American  Independence 

a  complete  restoration  of  Spanish  ^authority  in 
Chile.^®  O'Higgins  and  a  few  of  his  officers  escaped 
from  the  wreck  of  their  army,  crossed  the  Andes, 
and  placed  themselves  under  the  command  of  San 
Martin,  the  new  governor  at  Mendoza.^^ 

San  Martin  settled  down  at  Mendoza  "Q^ith  a  hand- 
ful of  recruits — the  number  is  stated  at  160 — and  a 
great  plan.  In  a  few  weeks  he  was  joined  by  another 
handful  of  Chilenos,  who  escaped  destruction  at 
Rancagua.  Then  he  began  the  long  task  of  building 
up  a  weak  province,  collecting  and  organizing  an 
army,  and  educating  the  authorities  of  Buenos  Ayres 
in  the  strategic  necessities  of  the  war.  From  th'e 
city  he  had  chosen  for  his  capital  it  was  only  a  short 
journey  to  the  coast  cities  of  Chile.  But  the  passage 
of  the  Andes  was  considered  impossible  for  an  army, 
and  few  stratagems  were  needed  to  close  the  eyes  of 
the  Spanish  forces  to  the  possibility  of  danger  from 
this  side. 

His  long  experience  in  the  Spanish  army  had  given 
San  Martin  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war. 

36  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  105-118  ;  Stevenson,  Narrattveof  Residence, 
III :  176-181 ;  Maria  Graham,  Journal  of  a  Residence  in  Chile  during 
the  Year  1S22  ;  and  a  Voyage  from  Chile  to  Brazil  in  1823  (London, 
1824),  16.  The  history  of  this  period  is  based  on  memoirs,  the  public 
records  having  been  destroyed  to  keep  them  from  the  Spaniards. 
Graham,  Introd.,  3. 

'■f  Samuel  Haigh,  Sketches  of  Buenos  Ayra  and  Chile  (London, 
1829),  160. 


Wars  of  Liberation  61 

To  this  were  added  a  character  that  inspired  confi- 
dence, and  a  greater  amount  of  industry  than  was 
common  to  Latin  Americans.  Recruiting  proceeded 
at  Mendoza  with  considerable  rapidity;  constant 
drilling  turned  the  raw  recruits  into  first-rate  sol- 
diers; from  the  foreign  merchants  at  Buenos  Ayres, 
whose  confidence  had  early  been  gained,  came  a  sup- 
ply of  material  ^*  things  that  made  the  equipment  of 
an  army  possible. 

After  two  years  of  quiet  organization  the  new 
army  was  ready  to  move,  and  notice  to  this  effect  was 
served  in  an  indirect  way  on  the  Spanish  authorities 
in  Chile.  Relying  confidently  on  the  insincerity  of 
the  native  Indians,  San  Martin  summoned  them  to  a 
great  conference  and  celebration  in  the  fall  of  1816. 
Here,  under  pledge  of  profound  secrecy,  he  told  the 
chiefs  of  his  purpose,  and  marked  out  for  them  a  line 
of  march  across  the  Andes  that  he  had  no  intention  of 
following.^"  Having  thus  successfully  misled  his 
enemy,  San  Martin  moved  from  Mendoza  on  the  17th 
of  January,  1817,  with  a  force  of  about  4,000  men. 
After  a  terrible  journey  over  the  Uspallata  pass, 
four  thousand  feet  higher  than  another  more  famous 
one,  of  St.  Bernard,  he  descended  the  western  slope 

**  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  88. 

»9  Miller,  Memoirs,  I  :    89-102  ;    Graham,  Journal,  29. 


62  South  American  Independence 

of  the  Andes  and  fell  upon  the  Spanish  outpost  at 
La  Guardia,  on  7th  February,*** 

The  liberation  of  Chile,  the  second  step  in  San 
Martin's  plan,  of  which  the  creation  of  an  army  at 
Mendoza  was  the  first,  was  the  work  of  fifteen 
months.  Osorio,  who  had  become  captain-general  of 
Chile  after  his  victory  at  Eancagua,  in  1814,*^  had 
been  suspecting  danger  as  he  watched  the  proceedings 
across  the  mountains,  and  soon  had  an  army  ready  to 
be  sacrificed  before  the  invader  at  Chacabuca,  on 
February  12th.*^  Two  days  later  the'Tiberating 
army  entered  Santiago.  During  the  succeeding 
months  the  patriot  government  in  Chile  was  erected 
again.  A  congress  met  to  offer  the  Supreme 
Directorship  to  San  Martin,  and  then  to  O'Higgins, 
when  the  former  refused  it;  while  on  the  first  day 
of  the  ensuing  year  the  independence  of  Chile  was 
proclaimed.*'  Meanwhile  the  Spanish  army,  in  its 
refuge  at  Talcuhuana,  in  the  south  of  Chile,  was 
gathering  reinforcements  from  Peru.     Then  Osorio 

*o  C.  R.  Markham,  A  History  of  Peru  ( Chicago,  1892) ,  239  ;  Miller, 
Memoirs,  1 :    120. 

"  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  120. 

"Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  182;  Journal  of  a  Residence 
in  Chile.  By  a  Young  American,  detained  in  that  Country  during  the 
revolutionary  Scenes  of  1817-18-19  (Boston,  1823),  1-17  ;  Schmidtmeyer, 
Travels,  351. 

*••  Annual  Register,  1818,  44. 


Wars  of  Liberation  63 

marched  **  against  the  patriots  with  8,000  men,  and 
defeated  them  completely  at  Talca,  19th  March, 
1818.*®  But  this  was  only  the  dark  before  dawn, 
for  the  patriots,  who  rallied  under  San  Martin  and 
O'Bjggins,  melted  down  their  plate  and  sold  their 
jewels,  and  in  three  weeks  placed  a  new  army  in  the 
field.  On  the  5th  of  April,  1818,  the  virtual  inde- 
pendence of  Chile  was  achieved  on  the  plain  of  V 
Maypu.*^  Spain  never  again  had  any  considerable 
force  in  the  province. 

With  Chile  cleared  of  Spanish  troops,  and  with 
Valparaiso  at  his  service  for  a  base  of  supplies,  San 
Martin  was  ready  to  enter  iipon  the  next  stage  of  his 
work,  the  liberation  of  Peru.  From  this  point  in  his 
career  he  is  no  longer  to  be  considered  as  a  general 
of  Buenos  Ayres.  He  is  become  the  Liberator,  with 
larger  plans  than  the  home  faction  that  appointed 
him  can  comprehend.  We  are  not  at  this  place  con- 
cerned with  the  internecine  strife  that  continued  in 
Buenos  Ayres  regardless  of  his  successes,  or  with  his 
summons  by,  disobedience  to,  and  final  nipture  with 
the  Buenos  Ayrean  authorities.    San  Martin  realized 

**  Graham,  Journal,  33  ;  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  179  ;  Basil  Hall, 
Extracts  from  a  Journal  ivritten  on  the  coasts  of  Chili,  Peru  and 
Mexico  in  the  years  1S20,  1821,  1823  (2  vol.,  Edinburgh,  1824),  1 :  58, 
a  yaluable  account  by  an  outsider  skilled  in  travel  and  observation. 

*^  Journal  by  a  Young  American,  40-71. 

*«  Haigh,  Sketches,  190-239  ;  Cadcleugh,  Travels,  II :  31. 


64  South  American  Independence 

that  extinction  of  Spanish  power  was  more  important 
than  local  politics,  and  continued  on  the  course  he 
had  mapped  out  in  spite  of  the  orders  and  pleadings 
that  he  come  home  and  restore  peace.*^ 

Another  period  of  two  years  elapsed  between  the 
decisive  victory  at  Maypu  and  the  definitive  invasion 
of  Peru.  It  was  a  period,  like  that  at  Mendoza,  filled 
with  recruiting,  organizing,  drilling  and  educating. 
A  series  of  proclamations  prepared  the  Peruvians  for 
their  emancipation;  the  friendship  and  protection  of 
the  Liberator  were  promised  them;  while  a  treaty  of 
alliance  between  Buenos  Ayres  and  Chile  guaranteed 
the  independence  of  a  new  State  to  be  erected  by 
their  joint  army  in  Peru.*^ 

At  this  time  arrived  in  Valparaiso  a  most  consid- 
erable addition  to  the  patriot  force  in  the  person  of 
Thomas,  Lord  Cochrane,  later  tenth  Earl  of  Dun- 
donald.  Cochrane,  who  was  an  energetic  and  able 
naval  officer,  had  been  thrown  out  of  the  British 
navy  on  a  rather  doubtful  charge,  and  had  been 
engaged,  in  181Y,  by  Alvarez,  the  Chilian  agent  in 
London,*®  to  go  out  and  organize  a  naval  force  for 

« February,  1820.    Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :    258. 

*8  Graham,  Journal,  481 ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII : 
811. 

"Thomas  Cochrane,  Teuth  Earl  of  Dundonald,  Narrative  of 
Services  in  the  Liberation  of  Chili,  Peru  and  Brazil,  from  Spanish 
and  Portuguese  Domination  (2  vols.,  London,  1859),  I.    This  is  one  of 


Wars  of  Liberation  65 

Chile.  His  arrival  in  November,  1818,  introduced 
at  once  an  element  of  efficiency  in  the  branch  of  the 
service  on  which  San  Martin  was  most  dependent  for 
success  in  Peru.^°  But  it  also  introduced  feelings  of 
jealousy  among  the  native  officers  thus  superseded 
that  well  nigh  wrecked  the  whole  enterprise. 

An  active  naval  warfare  was  at  once  begun  against 
the  Spanish  forces,  and  before  long  reports  began  to 
come  to  Europe  and  the  United  States  of  the  pirati- 
cal proceedings  of  insurgent  cruisers  in  the  Pacific, 
of  seizures  of  neutrals,  and  of  paper  blockades.^^  The 
first  expedition  of  Cochrane  anchored  off  Callao  on 
28th  February,  1819,  after  a  twelve  days'  voyage 
from  Valparaiso. ^^  The  following  day  a  blockade  of 
the  Peruvian  coast  was  instituted. ^^  But  this  attack 
accomplished  nothing  of  consequence.  With  a  fleet 
of  eight  vessels  Cochrane  sailed  for  a  second  time  in 

the  best  accounts  of  the  war,  but  is  violently  prejudiced  against  San 
Martin.  Cochrane  also  published  The  Autobiography  of  a  Seaman 
(2  vols.,  London,  1860) ;  which  was  completed  in  The  Life  of  Thomas, 
Lord  Cochrane,  Tenth  Earl  of  Dundonald  (2  vol.,  London  1869),  by 
the  Eleventh  Earl  of  Dundonald  and  11.  R.  Fox  Bourne.  On  his 
earlier  career,  see  J.  B.  Atlay,  The  Trial  of  Lord  Cochrane  before  Lord 
Ellenborough  (London,  1897),  and  The  Guilt  of  Lord  Cochrane,  A 
Criticism  (London,  1914),  by  Lord  Ellenborough,  grandson  of  the 
Lord  Chief  Justice. 

^Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Hesidence,  III :    147. 

"  Mies  Register,  XVII :    191. 

^*  Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III  :  139  ;  Cochrane,  Narra- 
tive, 1:5.  53  Annual  Register,  1819,  II  :    154. 


66  South  American  Independence 

September  of  this  same  year,  only  to  find,  when  he 
met  the  enemy,  that  his  rockets  were  filled  with  sand 
instead  of  powder.  The  Chilian  authorities  had 
frugally  employed  Spanish  prisoners  in  the  manu- 
facture of  ammunition.^*  In  spite  of  this  disap- 
pointment, however,  Valdavia  was  captured  by  the 
fleet,  and  at  once  Spain  was  deprived  of  her  best 
harbor  in  the  Pacific,  and  San  Martin  was  enabled 
to  devote  his  whole  attention  to  Peru.^^  By  this 
time  the  latter  was  ready  to  move  his  new  army,  and 
in  August,  1820,  a  combined  military  and  naval 
expedition  departed  from  Valparaiso. 

Peru,  the  stronghold  of  Spanish  power  in  America, 
had  undergone  less  violent  revolutionary  movements 
than  any  other  part  of  the  continent ;  and  in  August, 
1820,  was  fully  under  the  control  of  General  Don 
Joaquin  de  la  Pezuela,  forty-fourth  viceroy  after 
Pizarro.  But  it  was  three  years  now  since  Pezuela 
had  written  home  that  he  stood  over  a  volcano  liable 
to  burst  into  action  at  any  time.^*  To  understand 
San  Martin's  campaign  against  the  viceroy,  and  his 
illegitimate  successor.  La  Serna,  we  must  remember 
that  San  Martin  realized  this  condition  and  labored 
to  produce  an  eruption  of  the  volcano,  to  induce  the 
Peruvians  to  free  themselves. 

6*  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  220.  **  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :   246. 

5«Markham,  Peru,  237. 


Wars  of  Liberation  67 

On  August  21st,  1820,  the  liberating  squadron 
sailed  from  Valparaiso  with  San  Martin,  Cochrane 
and  some  4,500  troops  on  board.  On  12th  Septem- 
ber these  were  landed  at  the  bay  of  Pisco,  and  two 
weeks  later  the  viceroy  concluded  a  truce  at  Mira- 
flores.^^  This  was  the  beginning  of  what  seemed  to 
Lord  Cochrane  to  be  a  series  of  dilatory  movements 
inspired  by  irresolution  and  incapacity,  if  not  by 
actual  cowardice.  Cochrane  was  a  strenuous  leader, 
and  could  not  understand  a  war  conducted  without 
fighting.  All  his  life  he  had  been  engaged  in  con- 
flicts with  his  superiors  in  the  navy,  magistrates  and 
committees.  ISTow  began  the  misunderstanding  that 
led  to  an  open  rupture  between  the  leaders,  and 
finally  induced  the  admiral  to  abandon  a  service 
where  he  considered  himself  ill-treated,  to  enter 
what  he  hoped  would  be  a  more  congenial  service  in 
Brazil.  The  truce  of  Miraflores  came  to  nothing,  for 
Pezuela  had  no  power  to  treat  on  the  only  basis  San 
Martin  would  consider — that  of  independence.  So 
hostilities  were  soon  resumed.  The  campaign  was 
one  of  education.  "  I  come  to  fulfil  the  expecta- 
tions," proclaimed  the  Liberator,  "  of  all  those  who 
wish  to  belong  to  the  country  that  gave  them  birth, 
and  who  desire  to  be  governed  by  their  own  laws. 
On  that  day  when  Peru  shall  freely  pronounce  as 

"  Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  1 :    70 ;    Graham,  Journal  67-69. 


68  South  American  Independence 

to  the  form  of  her  institutions,  be  they  whatever 
they  may,  my  functions  shall  cease,  and  I  shall  have 
the  glory  of  announcing  to  the  government  of  Chile, 
of  which  I  am  a  subject,  that  their  heroic  efforts 
have  at  last  received  the  consolation  of  having  given 
liberty  to  Peru,  and  security  to  the  neighboring 
States."  ^^  To  a  British  officer  on  duty  in  South 
American  waters,  San  Martin  declared  that  he  de- 
sired to  convert  thinking  men,  but  had  no  ambition 
to  jBgure  as  a  conqueror.^* 

After  a  few  weeks  at  Pisco  the  army  was  again 
placed  on  its  transports  and  moved  off  Callao,  where 
it  remained  long  enough  for  Cochrane  to  cut  out  a 
Spanish  frigate,  the  Esmeralda,  which  lay  in  the  har- 
bor. Then  it  was  moved  to  a  bay  some  twenty-nine 
leagues  north  of  Callao  and  disembarked  at  Huacho 
on  9th  November.  Here,  "  having  shown  sufficiently 
what  his  army  and  fleet  were  capable  of,"  ®°  San 
Martin  settled  for  a  period  of  six  months,  and  con- 
tinued the  dissemination  of  revolutionary  principles.®^ 

Colonel  Arenales  was  perhaps  the  most  efficient 
educator  employed  by  the  patriots.  While  the  army 
lay  at  Pisco,  he  set  out  with  1,000  troops,  crossed 
the  Andes,  marched  north  through  the  heart  of  the 

58 October  13,  1820.    Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III:   286. 

59  Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  1 :    210. 

^f^Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  1 :  83. 

•'  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :    270 ;    Cochrane,  Narrative,  1 :    82. 


Wars  of  Liberation  69 

Spanish  territory,  and  rejoined  the  main  body  of  the 
army  at  Huacho.  As  he  marched  around  Lima, 
Arenales  spread  a  feeling  of  independence  among 
the  inhabitants.  Troops  sent  against  him  from  Lima 
were  defeated.  A  long  line  of  revolutionized  towns 
was  left  in  his  wake;  while  Spanish  soldiers  by  the 
hundred  deserted  and  marched  over  to  the  patriot 
army.^^ 

Meanwhile  the  effects  of  war  were  being  felt  by 
the  royalists  in  Lima.  Cochrane  was  maintaining  a 
rigorous  blockade  of  Callao,  and  San  Martin  and 
Arenales  were  investing  the  city  from  the  land. 
Faction  and  dissatisfaction  prevailed,  so  that  when 
General  La  Serna  came  down  from  Upper  Peru,  on 
his  way  to  Spain,  he  went  no  further  than  the  capital. 
Here  he  was  promoted  by  the  viceroy  Pezuela  to  the 
command  of  the  royalist  armies;  and  by  the  favor  of 
the  army  he  deposed  Pezuela  and  inaugurated  him- 
self as  viceroy  in  his  place.'^^  This  was  on  the  29th 
of  January,  1821.  No  general  actions  occurred  dur- 
ing the  ensuing  months.  Miller,  the  only  English 
officer  who  fought  through  the  whole  war,  was  en- 
gaged in  an  expedition  similar  to  that  of  Arenales, 
when  news  came  to  him  of  the  conclusion  of  another 
armistice  on  the  23d  of  May.*"*     La  Serna,  in  the 

**  Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III :   303. 

^  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  281.  "  Miller,  Memoirs,  I  :   284. 


70  South  American  Independence 

negotiations  wkich  now  occurred,  was  more  pliable 
than  Pezuela  had  been  during  the  truce  of  Mira- 
flores.  He  was  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  hope- 
lessness of  his  fight,  and  was  ready  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  Peru,  and  permit  the  establishment 
of  a  provisional  government  until  a  Bourbon  prince 
could  come  out  to  take  the  throne.  But  his  officers 
forced  him  to  abandon  those  terms  and  end  the  truce. 
Spain  made  no  terms  with  rebels;  but  her  position 
in  Lima  had  become  untenable,  and  at  daybreak  on 
the  6th  of  July,  1821,  she  marched  her  army  out  of 
the  city.^* 

With  deliberation,  San  Martin  moved  his  army 
into  the  capital  thus  evacuated.  He  had  long  since 
proclaimed  that  he  did  not  come  as  a  conqueror,  and 
now  he  delayed  his  entry  until  the  fiery  Cochrane 
was  almost  blind  with  anger,  and  the  cabildo  sent  a 
deputation  of  magnates  to  invite  him  to  take  pos- 
session.^®  Even  then  he  did  not  move  his  troops 
until  he  had  thoroughly  policed  the  town. 

Although  Lima  was  in  his  hands,  the  political  edu- 
cation of  the  Peruvians  was  by  no  means  completed, 
and  harmony  had  ceased  to  exist  in  the  ranks  of  the 
patriots.  At  the  suggestion  of  the  Liberator  an  as- 
sembly of  eminent  citizens,  the  cabildo,  the  arch- 
es Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  1 :  217  ;  Markham,  Peru,  249. 
•'Markham,  Peru,  250. 


Wars  of  Liberation  71 

bishop,  the  prelates  and  the  nobles,  met  on  the 
15th  of  July  and  declared  the  independence  of  / 
Peru,  which  was  publicly  proclaimed  a  little  later:  f^ 
"  Peru  is  from  this  moment  free  and  independent, 
by  the  general  vote  of  the  people,  and  by  the  justice 
of  her  cause,  which  God  defend !  "  ®'  This  act  ac- 
complished, the  erection  of  a  government  was  the 
next  problem  to  be  solved.  It  "  was  necessary  that 
an  authority  should  be  created  capable  of  restoring 
the  movement  of  this  grand  machine,  by  preparing 
it  to  receive  new  forms  and  modifications.  Im- 
perious circumstances  pointed  out  the  person  on 
whom  the  supreme  power  was  to  fall."  ®^  Accord- 
ingly, on  3d  August  San  Martin  issued  a  proclama- 
tion assuming  the  supreme  power,  giving  himself  the 
title  of  Protector,  and  promising  to  surrender  the 
government  to  the  people  as  soon  as  Peru  should  be 
free.^^  It  was  a  curious  paper,  wrote  Basil  Hall, 
"it  has  little  of  the  wonted  bombast  of  such  docu-  'V 
ments,  and  though  not  sparing  of  self-praise,  is  manly 

8^  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :  393 ;  Stevenson,  Narra- 
tive of  Residence,  111:  341. 

*8  Bernardo  Monteagudo,  Peruvian  Pamphlet :  Being  an  Exposition 
of  the  administrative  Labours  of  the  Peruvian  Government,  from  the 
Time  of  Its  Formution,  till  the  15th  of  July,  1822 ;  Presented  to  the 
Council  by  the  Minister  of  State  and  Foreign  Relations,  .  .  .in  Con- 
formity with  a  protectorial  Decree  of  the  18th  of  January  (London, 
1823),  12.  Monteagudo's  work  is  partisan  in  character,  but  as  a  confi- 
dential agent  of  San  Martin  he  was  in  a  position  to  know  his  facts. 

^British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  VIII :  1271. 


72  8outh  American  Independence 

"  i  ded ;  and,  as  I  believe,  from  a  number  of 

CO  circumstances,  perfectly  sincere."  '"*     But 

by  ae  the  controversy  between  the  Protector 

and  the  Admiral  had  become  so  bitter  that  there  was 
no  longer  hope  of  reconciliation,  and  the  former  had 
to  order  the  latter,  with  his  fleet,  to  leave  the  coast 
of  Peru.  "  It  now  became  evident  to  me,"  is  Coch- 
rane's  story,  "  that  the  aimy  had  been  kept  inert  for 
the  purpose  of  preserving  it  entire  to  further  the  am- 
bitious views  of  the  general,  and  that  with  the  whole 
force  now  at  Lima  the  inhabitants  were  completely  at 
the  mercy  of  their  pretended  liberator,  but  really 
their  conqueror."  '^^  "  It  is  almost  unnecessary  to 
say,"  complained  one  of  his  partisans,  "  how  ill  this 
self-constituted  authority  agrees  with  the  promises 
made  by  the  Supreme  Director  of  Chile  in  his  procla- 
mation to  the  Peruvians;  and  in  that  of  General  San 
Martin,  issued  after  his  arrival  in  Peru."  ""  San 
Martin  was  not  unmindful  of  the  difficulties  of  his 
position  when  he  reported  to  his  superior,  O'Higgins, 
that  he  would  retain  his  authority  "  until  the  meet- 

^"Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  I:  266. 

"1  Cochrane,  Narrative  1 :   125. 

'''^^tQYQn^on,  Narrative  of  Residence, 111:  352;  John  Miers,  Travels 
in  Chile  and  La  Plata,  including  Accounts  respecting  the  Geography 
Geology,  Statistics,  Government,  Finances,  Agriculture,  3Ianners  and 
Customs,  and  the  mining  Operations  in  Chile  (2  vol.,  London,  1826), 
64  ;  Gilbert  F.  Mathison,  Narrative  of  a  Visit  to  Brazil,  Chile,  Peru, 
and  the  Sandvnch  Islands,  during  the  Years  1821  and  18S2  (London, 
1825),  243. 


Wars  of  Liberation  73 

"  ing  of  the  sovereign  congress,  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives from  all  the  districts,  into  which  august 
body  I  will  resign  my  command,  and  to  which  I  will 
be  answerable  for  what  I  may  have  done."  '' 

The  wisdom  of  this  assumption  of  power  at  this 
critical  period  of  Peruvian  history  is  hardly  to  be 
contested.  These  were  the  decisive  campaigns  of 
the  war  of  liberation.  The  future  of  Buenos  Ayres 
and  Chile,  of  New  Granada  and  Venezuela,  of  all 
the  Spanish  provinces,  depended  on  the  battles  that 
were  now  to  be  fought  in  the  mountains  of  Peru. 
For  this  was  the  royalist  heart  of  South  America. 
San  Martin  was  not  destined  to  fight  these  final  bat- 
tles, but  he  has  the  honor  of  conceiving  the  plan  of 
action,  of  executing  it  almost  to  the  end,  and  of 
showing  a  moderation  and  modesty  unparalleled 
among  Latin  American  politicians. 

The  great  popularity  of  the  Liberator  seems  to 
have  begun  to  wane  shortly  after  this  time.  It  is 
said  on  excellent  authority  that  he  always  retained 
the  affections  of  the  common  people,  but  jealousy 
and  distrust  had  split  his  co-workers  into  hostile  fac- 
tions. There  was  little  plunder  to  be  shared  by  the 
followers  of  San  Martin;  there  was  little  military 
glory  to  be  achieved,  for  his  policy  was  never  one  of 
fighting.     The  greatest  blow  he  sustained  was  per- 

^'  Monteagudo,  Peruvuin  Pamphlet,  App.,  88,  et  seq. 


74  South  American  Independence 

haps  one  that  came  a  month  after  his  accession  of 
power.  Spain,  in  evacuating  Lima,  had  retained  the 
port  of  Callao,  and  on  10th  September,  1821,  she 
marched  reinforcements  into  the  fort.  San  Martin, 
with  what  his  apologist  well  calls  the  "  prudence  of 
real  courage,"  declined  to  fight,  and  permitted  the 
Spanish  force  to  pass  unmolested  within  sight  of  his 
army.  The  fact  that  in  eleven  days  Callao  was 
quietly  evacuated,  without  loss  of  life,  and  with  con- 
sequent discredit  to  the  royalists,  was  as  nothing  in 
the  minds  of  the  general's  detractors.  As  they  told 
the  story,  habitual  cowardice  alone  kept  him  out  of 
action.'* 

For  a  year  San  Martin  remained  in  Peru.  It  was 
a  year  of  great  activity  on  his  part,  but  of  no  per- 
manent result.  His  effective  contribution  had  been 
made.  The  organization  of  a  government  was  his 
first  work;  ""^  a  provisional  constitution  was  promul- 

'*  Miller,  Memoirs  1 :  336  ;  Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  II :  69 ; 
Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III :  374 ;  D.  Geronimo  Espejo, 
Recuerdos  historicos :  San  3Iartin  y  Bolivar.  Entrevista  de  Guaya- 
quil  {1822),  .  .  .  illuslrada  con  dos  retrados  (Buenos  Ayres,  1873),  12, 
contains  an  attack  on  Cochrane.  Espejo  was  at  Guayaquil  during  the 
interview ;  Monteagudo,  Peruvian  Pamphlet,  16,  30 ;  Markham, 
Peru,  253. 

'5 "  I  never  mentioned  a  wish  to  San  Martin,  or  to  Monteagudo,  that 
was  not  granted,  and  granted  immediately,  in  the  most  obliging  man- 
ner. After  their  going  away,  I  scarcely  mentioned  anything  I  wished 
done  that  was  not  refused."  James  Thomson,  Letters  on  the  moral  and 
religious  State  of  South  America,  written  during  a  Residence  of  nearly 
seven  Years  in  Buenos  Ayres,Chile,  Peru,  and  Colombia  (London,  1827), 


Wars  of  Liberation  75 

gated;  a  committee  was  started  on  a  general  codej 
and  a  representative  congi-ess  was  summoned.  In 
the  meantime  the  northern  movement,  under  the 
direction  of  Simon  Bolivar,  was  approaching  Peru, 
arriving  at  Guayaquil  in  the  spring  of  1822.  The 
meeting  of  the  two  Liberators  marks  the  end  of  San 
Martin's  career.  Appointing  as  Supremo  Delegado 
the  Marquis  of  Torre  Tagle,  a  member  of  the  old 
nobility,  who  had  turned  patriot,  and  leaving  the 
actual  administration  of  affairs  in  the  hands  of 
Bernardo  Monteagudo,  San  Martin  set  sail  for  Guay- 
aquil in  February,  1822.^^  A  change  in  Bolivar's 
plans  making  a  meeting  impossible  at  this  time,  he 
returned  to  Lima  in  a  few  weeks,  but  did  not  resume 
the  government.  This  was  unfortunate.  Montea- 
gudo, whose  ability  was  undoubted,  was  "  a  most 
zealous  patriot,"  but,  "  besides  being  very  unpopular 
in  his  manners,  was  a  bitter  enemy  to  the  whole  race 
of  Spaniards."  ^^  His  enemy  tells  us  he  was  "  of  the 
lowest  rank  in  society,  of  spurious  offspring,  and 
African  genealogy."  ''^  Ultimately  a  mob  at  Lima  re- 
warded his  actions  by  taking  his  life  in  the  streets. 
Under    Monteagudo    a    series    of    proscriptions     of 

70.  Thomson  was  an  English  missionary  and  teacher  of  the  Lancas- 
trian school  system.  In  his  latter  capacity  he  was  employed  by  the 
revolutionary  government. 

■>*  Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III :  432. 

^''  Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  II :  85. 

"Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III :  281. 


76  South  American  Independence 

Spaniards  took  place  that  brought  the  administration 
into  great  disfavor.^*  An  incompetent  general  lost 
a  whole  division  of  the  liberating  army.^**  And 
when  San  Martin,  for  the  second  time,  went  to 
Guayaquil,  in  July,  the  city  rose  in  revolt. 

Various  accounts,  and  none  of  them  authentic, 
have  recorded  the  meeting  of  the  two  leaders  at 
Guayaquil,  on  the  26th  of  July,  1822.  According  to 
Lord  Cochrane,  Bolivar  "  bitterly  taunted  San  Mar- 
tin with  the  folly  and  cruelty  of  his  conduct  towards 
the  Limenos;  to  such  an  extent,  indeed,  that  the  lat- 
ter, fearing  designs  upon  his  person,  precipitately  left 
Guayaquil  and  returned  to  Callao."  ®^  Such  taunts 
would  not  have  come  well  from  the  lips  of  Bolivar. 
More  reasonable  and  more  in  harmony  with  prece- 
dent and  subsequent  facts  is  the  conclusion  of  Sir 
Clements  R.  Markham :  "  General  Bolivar  came  to 
the  port  of  Guayaquil  flushed  with  victory,  and  full 
of  ambition  to  add  to  the  lustre  of  his  name  by  the 
liberation  of  Peru.  General  San  Martin  was  a  pure 
patriot,^^  with  little  personal  ambition.  He  saw 
clearly  that  there  could  be  no  room  for  himself  and 
Bolivar  in  the  same  sphere  of  action,  and  it  was 
necessary  for  the  welfare  of  the  common  cause  that 

"Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal,  II:  86;  Mathison,  Narrative  of 
Visit,  234. 

*>  Monteagudo,  Peruvian  Pamphlet,  33  ;  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :   350. 

81  Cochrane,  Narrative  1 :  225.  s^xiiomson.  Letters,  52. 


Wars  of  Liberation  77 

one  of  them  should  retire.  He  did  not  hesitate  to 
make  the  sacrifice."  ^^  And  so,  after  a  conference  of 
a  single  day,  San  Martin  returned  to  the  revolted  city 
of  Lima.  Here  he  remained  for  a  short  time  restor- 
ing order  and  preparing  for  an  expedition  into  upper 
Peru;^*  then  upon  the  meeting  of  the  first  Peruvian 
Congress,  he  "  resigned  the  supreme  authority  he 
had  assumed  a  year  before,"^^  accepted  the  honorary 
title  of  Generalissimo  and  a  pension,^®  issued  a  proc- 
lamation of  farewell,  and  returned  to  Chile.  A  few 
months  later  he  passes  out  of  history,  causing  a  mild 
flutter  at  the  Foreign  Office  as  he  came  from  Buenos 
Ayres  to  London,  bringing  his  little  daughter  to  be 
educated.^' 

It  is  now  necessary  to  take  up  the  other  chain  of 
events  of  the  war  of  liberation,  to  bring  it  down  to 
the  point  reached  by  San  Martin,  and  to  carry  it  on 
to  the  successful  termination  of  the  struggle. 

We  have  already  seen  how  the  premature  attempt 
of  Miranda  to  revolutionize  South  America  met  with 
failure  in  1806,  and  how  in  1810  the  patriotic  wave 
established  at  Caracas  and  Bogota  juntas  ruling  in 
the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.*^    Simon  Bolivar,  who, 

^  Markham,  Pez-it,  254.     ^  Monteagudo,PeruvianPamphlet,App.  63. 
^Hall,  Extracts  from  Journal, 11:  8S.     ^Cochiane,Ifarrative,l:  226. 
8T  Parish  to  Canning,  April  25,  1824.    F.  0.  3fss. 
"^Jos^  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitucional  de  Venezuela  (2  vol., 
Berlin,  1907,  1909),  is  described  by  H.  Bingham  as  "  a  most  interesting 


78  South  American  Independence 

like  Miranda  and  San  Martin,  came  of  an  honorable 
American  family,  at  once  placed  his  services  at  the 
disposition  of  the  Venezuelan  junta.^"  Miranda  ar- 
rived a  few  months  later;  and  in  March,  1811,  the 
first  congress  met.  This  body,  after  four  months  of 
deliberation,  abandoned  the  policy  with  which  the 
revolution  had  started  and  proclaimed  the  independ- 
ence of  Venezuela.'""' 

The  movement  which  had  thus  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  extremists  advanced  rapidly.  The  con- 
gress framed  a  liberal  constitution  and  presented  it 
to  the  people  of  Venezuela  for  approval.®^  But  the 
patriot  cause  was  literally  shattered  by  an  unfortu- 
nate earthquake  that  occurred  on  Holy  Thursday  of 
1812,  and  gave  the  clergy  of  the  province  a  chance  to 
preach  the  wickedness  of  insurrection  and  the  terrors 
of  divine  vengeance."^  This  moral  blow  was  closely 
followed  by  a  series  of  military  successes  on  the  part 
of  Spain,  Dissensions  arose  among  the  leaders. 
Bolivar  deserted  Porto  Cabello,  Miranda  and  the  in- 

and  satisfactory  account"  by  "a  really  notable  historian."  Amer. 
Hist.  Rev.,  XV  :    907.  ^9  Dg  Schryver,  Bolivar,  13. 

^Present  State  of  Colombia,  29.     ^^ Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  53. 

'2  For  an  account  of  the  destruction  which  left  Caracas  in  ruins  and 
reduced  Cucuta  from  12,000  to  3,000,  see  Letters  written  from  Colombia 
during  a  Journey  from  Caracas  to  Bogotd,  and  thence  to  Santa  3Iartha 
in  1833  CLondon,  1824),  76  ;  R.  Bache,  Notes  on  Colombia,  taken  in  the 
Years  1S22-S.  With  an  Itinerary  of  the  Route  from  Caracas  to  Bogotd ; 
and  an  Appendix,  By  an  Officer  in  the  United  States  Army  (Philadel- 
phia, 1827),  38. 


Wars  of  Liberation  79 

surgent  army  leaving  them  to  the  mercy  of  the 
Spaniards,  who  promptly  took  the  city.  Miranda 
himself  was  captured  as  he  attempted  to  escape,  and 
his  partisans  maintain  that  the  deliberate  desertion  of 
Bolivar  was  the  cause  of  his  being  surrendered  to  the 
Spanish  general  Monteverde.  While  that  general, 
beginning  a  policy  that  became  common  among  roy- 
alist officers,  coolly  violated  the  pledge  of  safety  he 
had  given  to  his  prisoner,  and  sent  him  to  Spain, 
where  he  speedily  died  in  prison.®^ 

The  valley  of  the  Orinoco,  extending  east  and  west 
across  three-fourths  of  the  continent,  is  the  backbone 
of  Venezuela.  It  is  separated  by  the  high  mountain 
wall  of  the  Andes  from  the  north  and  south  valley  of 
the  Magdalena,  which  similarly  is  the  backbone  of 
New  Granada.  The  wall  is  so  solid  that  the  two 
provinces  were  practically  isolated,  the  one  land 
route  of  importance  being  a  road  running  from 
Caracas  to  the  southwest,  crossing  the  Andes  between 
Barinas  and  Merida,  and  continuing  its  course  np  the 
valley  of  the  Magdalena  from  San  Rosario  de 
Cucuta,  through  the  city  of  Tunja,  to  Santa  Fe  de 
Bogota,  in  the  district  of  Cundinamarca.^*    But  the 

"  Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  58  ;    Markham,  Peru,  267. 

•*  Partly  for  the  purpose  of  studying  the  difficulties  overcome  by 
Bolivar,  Hiram  Bingham  has  made  the  journey  which  he  has  recorded 
in  The  Journal  of  an  Expedition  Across  Venezuela  and  Colombia, 
1906-07  (New  Haven,  1909). 


80  South  American  Independence 

road  was  long  and  the  journey  one  of  many  weeks, 
so  that  land  communication  between  the  capitals  was 
considered  out  of  question  for  large  bodies  of  troops. 
The  situation  was  similar  to  that  of  Buenos  Ayres 
and  Chile,  which  were  thought  to  have  no  military 
communication  by  land  until  San  Martin  did  the  im- 
possible and  crossed  at  Uspallata. 

The  elimination  of  Miranda  gave  Simon  Bolivar 
full  sway  in  the  militar^^  and  political  councils  of  the 
northern  provinces.  His  vigor  and  activity  were 
equal  to  the  opportunity.  When  the  disastrous  re- 
sults ^°  of  the  spring  of  1812  destroyed  the  insurgents 
in  Venezuela,  and  gave  their  cities  into  the  hands  of 
the  royalists,  he  crossed  into  Kew  Granada  for  the 
time.  There  he  found  no  powerful  Spanish  force  in 
the  upper  country;  but,  instead,  the  patriots  them- 
selves were  quarreling  over  the  principle  of  federa- 
tion, the  City  of  Bogota  standing  out  in  determined 
resistance  against  the  Congress  of  New  Granada.®* 
In  the  fall  of  the  year,  under  authority  of  this  Con- 
gress, Bolivar  was  able  to  open  the  mouth  of  the 
Magdalena  to  the  patriots.  A  little  later,  with  six 
hundred  men,  he  struck  the  Spanish  at  Cucuta, 
passed  through  Merida  and  over  the  Andes  to 
Barinas,  proclaiming  "  War  to  the  Death."  On  the 
4th    of    August,    1813,    he    entered    Caracas    once 

•5  Colombia  Account,  II :  334.  ^  Colombia  Account,  II :   337. 


Wai's  of  Liberation  81 

more.*'  Here  the  Dictatorial  career  of  the  Liberator 
began.  Disregarding  his  orders  from  the  Congress 
of  'New  Granada,  to  reassemble  the  Congress  of 
Venezuela,  Bolivar  called  an  assembly  of  notables  in 
Caracas,  told  them  what  he  had  done,  confided  to 
them  his  plans,  and  resigned  into  their  hands  his  au- 
thority. As  was  to  be  expected,  his  notables  at  once 
reinvested  him  with  Dictatorial  power,  to  last  until  a 
union  between  Venezuela  and  New  Granada  should 
come.^*  With  a  promising  beginning,  1814  came  to 
a  disastrous  end.  Royalist  successes  drove  the  Lib- 
erator out  of  Venezuela.  Returning  to  New  Granada, 
the  Congress,  then  sitting  at  Tunja  sent  him 
against  the  stubborn  city  of  Bogota,  which  he  re- 
duced to  membership  in  the  federation."®  As  a  re- 
ward, the  Congress  made  him  Captain-General  of  its 
armies,  arousing  thereby  a  feeling  of  discontent 
among  its  officers  that  defeated  all  his  plans.  Even 
darker  days  were  to  follow. 

The  restoration  of  Ferdinand  VII.  to  the  throne  of 
Spain  was  the  beginning  of  an  absolutist  reaction  in 
the  peninsula,  and  of  a  determined  attempt  at  recon- 
quest  in  the  colonies.     By  this  time  the  movements 

"  Colombia  Account,  II :    345.    Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  61. 

98  January  2,  1814.  Present  State  of  Colombia,  35 ;  Colombia 
Account,  II :  351  ;  Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  64. 

99 G.  MoUien,  Travels  in  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  in  the  Years 
1822  and  182S.     Translated  from  the  French  (London,  1824),  136. 


82  South  American  Independence 

that  had  started  in  favor  of  the  monarchy  had  devel- 
oped into  struggles  for  political  independence.  Spain 
showed  no  disposition  to  conciliate  the  provinces, 
failed  to  recognize  the  changes  that  a  decade  of 
economic  independence  had  wrought,  and  bj  her  own 
fatuous  policy  made  her  rehabilitation  as  an  Ameri- 
can power  impossible.  For  a  time,  however,  she  had 
the  appearance  of  success  in  all  her  provinces  but 
Buenos  Ayres. 

In  the  spring  of  1815  it  was  announced  that  an 
extensive  armament  was  preparing  for  the  subjuga- 
tion of  South  America.  In  July  General  Morillo,  as 
skillful  and  experienced  a  soldier  as  Spain  possessed, 
arrived  off  Carthagena  with  two  ships  of  the  line,  six 
frigates,  seventy  transports  and  twelve  thousand 
veteran  troops. "°  For  a  time  the  patriot  forces  re- 
pulsed Morillo  from  this  city,  but  the  latter  settled 
down  before  it  with  so  rigorous  an  investment  that 
after  six  months'  siege  an  evacuation  took  place,  and 
the  insurgent  troops  departed  for  Aux  Cayes.'"'  At 
the  end  of  the  year  the  Spanish  general  made  the  pre- 
mature but  significant  boast  that  he  had  not  "  left 
alive,  in  the  kingdom  of  !N^ew  Granada,  a  single  indi- 
vidual of  sufficient  influence   or  talents  to  conduct 

100  Annual  Register,  1815,  [127]  ;    Mollieu,  Truveh,  141. 

101  December  6,  1815.    Annual  Register,  1816,  [157]. 


Wars  of  Liberation  83 

"  the  revolution."  "^  After  another  period  of  six 
months  the  boast  might  have  been  well  founded,  for 
in  June,  1816,  the  invading  army  completed  its 
march  up  the  Magdalena  and  entered  the  capital  city 
of  Bogota  in  triumph/"^ 

"With  the  arrival  of  Morillo  in  the  Vermillion  Sea, 
Bolivar  abandoned  the  continent,  went  to  Jamaica, 
and  thence  to  the  island  of  St.  Domingo.  Then  at 
Aux  Cayes  he  was  joined  by  the  garrison  at  Cartha- 
gena,  and  in  May,  1816,  he  started  an  expedition  to 
Venezuela.  I^o  permanent  success  rewarded  this 
attempt.  In  a  few  weeks  the  Liberator  was  back 
in  Aux  Cayes  preparing  a  second  expedition,  which 
was  able  to  possess  itself  of  the  island  of  Margarita 
in  December.^"*  Co-operating  with  Sir  Gregor 
M'Gregor  who  had  taken  Caracas  for  the  patriots  in 
October,  Bolivar  advanced  from  Margarita  to  the 
mainland  and  set  up  his  government  at  Barcelona, 
some  two  hundred  miles  east  of  Caracas.  But 
Morillo  had  moved  his  army  to  Margarita,  after  the 
capture  of  Bogota  in  June,  1816,  and  now  opposed 
himself  to  the  Liberator  in  Venezuela.^"®  In  April, 
1817,  the  royalists  took  Barcelona.     Bolivar  moved 

102  Present  State  of  Colombia,  40,  quoting  Cadiz  Journal  of  January 
6,  1816.  10'  Annual  Register,  1816,  [158]. 

^'^  Annual  Register,  1916,  [Ih^"]  ;    Colombia  Account,  II:    367. 
^^^  Annual  Register,  1818,  18. 


84  South  American  Independence 

his  capital  to  the  lower  valley  of  the  Orinoco,  where 
he  placed  it  in  the  city  of  St.  Thomas  de  Angostura. 
The  campaign  of  1818  was  undecisive.  Morillo 
held  the  valley  of  the  Magdalena  and  the  cities  of 
New  Granada  with  almost  uncontested  authority, 
while  he  was  well  established,  also,  on  the  northern 
coast  of  Venezuela,  in  the  vicinity  of  Caracas. 
Bolivar  was  at  Angostura  organizing  his  government 
and  worrying  the  enemy.  In  February  he  shut  up 
the  Spaniard  within  the  walls  of  Calaboza,  and  later 
forced  him  to  withdraw  hurriedly  to  the  north.  In 
the  fall  he  established  a  Council  for  Foreign  Rela- 
tions at  Angostura,  and  issued  writs  for  an  assembly 
to  meet  in  1819.^*^®  The  second  Congress  of  Vene- 
zuela convened  at  Angostura  on  15th  February, 
1819,  pursuant  to  the  call  of  the  Liberator,  Before 
this  body  Bolivar  made  a  long  and  eloquent  speech, 
and  again  resigned  his  Dictatorial  authority,  only  to 
be  elected  to  the  same  position  once  more.^°^  Mean- 
while, in  July  and  August  of  the  previous  year,  most 
important  reinforcements  to  the  patriot  cause  had 
arrived  at  Margarita,  in  the  shape  of  various  Irish 

^"^  JRepublic  of  Colombia  Account,  81. 

1^^  Colombia  Account,  II :  376  ;  Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  88 ; 
Simon  Bolivar,  South  American  Independence  !  The  Speech  of  His 
Excellency,  Oen.  Bolivar,  on  the  Act  of  Installation  of  the  Second 
National  Congress  of  Venezuela,  on  the  15th  day  of  February,  1819. 
.  .  .  With  an  accurate  Account  of  the  Proceedings  on  that  interesting 
Occasion  (London,  1819). 


Wars  of  Liberation  85 

and  Albion  brigades,  forming  a  Foreign  Legion,  and 
recruited  in  Great  Britain  from  the  discharged 
veterans  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.^"'^  With  the  aid 
of  these  disciplined  adventurers  Bolivar  was  pre- 
pared to  make  significant  advances  in  1819, 

In  the  spring  of  1819  Morillo  advanced  from 
Caracas  inland  towards  the  Orinoco  with  ten  thou- 
sand men.  Bolivar,  from  Angostura,  sent  Santan- 
dar  west  to  head  off  Spanish  reinforcements  coming 
down  the  I^ew  Granada  road,  sent  Marino  north  to 
head  off  Morillo's  left  wing  at  Barcelona,  established 
his  foreign  auxiliaries  on  Margarita  to  move  as  di- 
rected, and,  with  Paez,  marched  himself  against  the 
main  column  of  Morillo."^  The  strategy  of  the 
campaign  was  completely  successful.  Barcelona  fell 
before  the  combined  attack  of  Marino  and  the  Eng- 

^^  Recollections  of  a  Service  of  three  Years  during  the  War-of- 
Extermination  in  the  Republics  of  Veneztiela  and  Colombia.  By  an 
Officer  of  the  Colombian  Navy  (2  vol.,  London,  1828),  I:  6-19; 
James  Hackett,  First  Lieutenant  of  the  late  Venezuelan  Artillery 
Brigade,  Narrative  of  the  Expedition  which  sailed  from  England 
in  1817  to  join  the  South  American  Patriots,  comprising  every 
Particular  concerned  with  its  Formation,  History  and  Fate;  with 
Observations  and  authentic  Information  elucidating  the  real  Character 
of  the  ConteM,  Mode  of  Warfare,  State  of  the  Armies,  etc.,  (London, 
1818) ;  George  Laval  Chesterton,  late  Captain  and  Judge  Advocate  of 
the  British  Legion,  raised  for  the  Service  of  the  Republic  of  Venezuela, 
A  Narrative  of  Proceedings  in  Venezuela  in  SoiUh  America,  in  the 
Years  1819  and  1820 ;  with  general  Observations  on  the  Country  and 
People;  the  Character  of  the  Republican  Government,  and  its  leading 
Members  (London,  1820).  ^"^  Annual  Register,  1819,  [241]. 


86  South  American  Independence 

lish/^"  Santandar  checked  his  opponent  in  the 
west.  And  the  Liberator  left  Paez  to  drive  Morillo 
into  a  comer  at  the  mouth  of  Lake  Maracaibo,  while 
he  himself  joined  Santandar's  wing/^^  made  an  unex- 
pected crossing  of  the  AndeSj  struck  the  Spaniards 
at  Tunja  ""  on  the  25th  of  July,  and  won  the  decis- 
ive battle  of  Boyaca  "^  on  the  7th  August.  The 
following  day  the  liberating  army  marched  into 
Santa  Fe  de  Bogota."* 

The  battle  of  Boyaca  was  decisive  in  the  affairs  of 
New  Granada.  The  Spanish  army  was  wrecked,  its 
general  was  a  prisoner,  and  the  viceroy  was  a  fugi- 
tive. From  this  time  Spain  never  had  an  effective 
force  in  the  upper  valley  of  the  Magdalena,  and  her 
fortR  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  were  soon  lost.  The 
Liberator  lingered  in  ISTew  Granada  for  some  weeks; 
then  he  made  a  quick  trip  back  across  the  Andes  and 
down  into  Angostura,  where  he  reported  his  successes 
to  the  Venezuelan  Congress.^^^  It  speaks  well  for 
this  influence  over  that  body,  that  on  the  day  after 
his  arrival  it  promulgated  a  Fundamental  Law  for 

11"  Chesterton,  Proceedings  in  Venezuela,  29. 

"1  Colombia,  Account,  II :  418  ;  Charles  Stewart  Cochrane,  Journal 
of  Residence  and  Travels  in  Colombia  during  the  Years  1823  and  1824 
(2  vols.,  London,  1825),  1 :    477. 

112  Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  90 ;  Recollections  of  a  Service, 
I:    21. 

113  Present  State  of  Colombia,  45  ;    Letters  from  Colombia,  137. 
ii*iVt7e«  Register,  XVII :  328  ;   Annual  Register,  1819,  245. 
^^Recollections  of  a  Service,  II :    28. 


Wars  of  Liberation  87 

the  union  of  New  Granada  and  Venezuela  as  the 
Republic  of  Colombia,^^®  and  but  little  later  sum- 
moned a  general  Congress  of  two  houses,  represent- 
ing both  provinces,  to  meet  at  the  city  of  Rosario  de 
Cucuta,  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  New  Granada. 
The  law  was  issued  December  17,  1819;  the  Con- 
gress met  in  May,  1821.  ^Meanwhile  the  last  steps 
in  the  liberation  of  Colombia  had  been  taken. 

Dujingv  the  .year  1820  there  was  no  fighting  of 
consequence  in  Venezuela.  It  was  a  period  rather 
of  negotiation,  tentative  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish 
officials,  definite  on  the  part  of  Bolivar.  Morillo 
opened  the  correspondence,  addressing  the  Congress 
of  Angostura  in  June,  calling  the  patriots  brothers, 
summoning  them  to  peace  on  a  constitutional  basis, 
and  announcing  the  beginning  of  negotiations  for 
an  armistice  preliminary  to  a  reconciliation.^^''  This 
was  an  act  under  orders,  for  Ferdinand  VII.  had  ex- 
perienced a  change  of  heart  in  the  spring  of  1820. 
He  had  accepted  a  revolution,  and  with  it  a  constitu- 
tion for  the  Spanish  monarchy.  On  this  basis  he 
sought  a  peace.  "Vanquished,  expelled,  or  rather 
effaced  from  the  American  soil,"  wrote  the  Abbe  de 
Pradt,    "  impotent  to   re-establish   herself,    and   tor- 

""  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :  407  ;  Colombia  Account, 
II :    439  ;    Moses,  Const.  Colombia,  13. 

"'  Ifiles  Register,  XVII :  463  ;  Cochrane,  Residence  in  Colombia 
I:    506. 


88  South  American  Independence 

"  merited  bj  the  two-fold  feeling  of  this  impotency 
and  the  greatness  of  a  loss,  the  sorrowful  weight  of 
Avhich  was  exaggerated  in  her  eyes  by  the  want  of  re- 
flection, Spain  has,  since  the  period  of  the  last  revolu- 
tion, adopted  various  expedients  in  order  to  neutral- 
ize the  consequences  of  a  position,  which  a  secret  in- 
stinct informed  her  she  could  not  escape."  ^^^  This 
expedient,  however,  was  wasted,  for  the  Congress  of 
Angostura,  meeting  in  a  special  session,  promptly  re- 
plied to  General  Morillo  that  they  w^ould  hear  with 
pleasure  any  proposals  based  on  an  "  absolute  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  entire  sovereignty  and  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic  of  Colombia,"  ^^*  and  no 
others  whatsoever.  Later  in  the  year  pacific  over- 
tures were  more  successful,  and  Bolivar  signed  an 
armistice  with  the  royalist  leaders  at  Truxillo  on  the 
25th  of  mvember."" 

The  truce  had  not  been  on  for  many  weeks  before 
Bolivar  realized  that  it  was  a  mistake  on  his  part. 
He  had  met  the  royalist  leaders  at  Truxillo,  had  em- 
braced and  eaten  and  drunk  with  them,  and  had 
joined    in    fervent    protestations  of  undying  frater- 

1'^  Abb6  de  Pradt,  Europe  and  America  in  1831 ;  with  an  Examin- 
ation of  the  Plan  laid  before  the  Cortes  of  Spain  for  the  Recognition  of 
the  Independence  of  South  America.  Translated  from  the  French  .   .    . 
by  J.  G.Williams  (2  vols.,  London,  1822)  II:  app.,  11. 

"»  Niles  Register,  XVII :    463. 

120  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  VIII :    1225. 


Wars  of  Liberation  89 

nitj.  But  no  results  came/^^  Instead,  as  the 
months  went  on,  and  the  time  passed  when  a  reply 
from  Spain  could  have  been  expected,  his  troops 
dwindled  and  suffered.  It  was  almost  impossible  to 
hold  a  patriotic  army  together  except  by  the  imme- 
diate prospect  of  fighting.  And  so,  in  March,  1821, 
he  took  advantage  of  a  clause  providing  for  renewal 
of  hostilities  on  forty  days'  notice,  and  declared  the 
truce  at  end.^^"  La  Torre  was  now  in  command  of 
the  Spanish  armies,  for  Morillo  had  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity afforded  by  the  truce  to  return  to  Spain,  where 
he  played  a  great  part  in  the  domestic  revolution. 

The  final  campaign  in  the  Colombian  war  now  fol- 
lowed. As  it  went  on,  there  was  sitting  in  the 
sacristy  of  the  parish  church  at  Rosario  de  Cticuta 
the  first  general  congress  of  Colombia.^^^  Here  the 
Act  of  Union  of  Angostura  and  the  principle  of  cen- 
tralization were  debated  for  three  months.  Here,  on 
12th  July,  it  was  declared  that  "  "We,  the  Representa- 
tives of  the  People  of  N'ew  Granada  and  Venezuela, 
in  General  Congress  assembled "  do  decree  that 
these  same  provinces  "  shall  remain  united,  in  one 
single   ISTational  Body,"  forever  to  be  independent 

^*^  Recollections  of  a  Service,  II :   109. 

^^^  Annual  Register,  1821  [261]  ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
VIII:  1233. 

12S  Moses,  Const.  Colombia,  16  ;  Letters  from  Colombia,  106  ;  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :    410. 


^ 


90  South  American  Independence 

and  a  republic."*  And  here,  on  the  30th  of  August, 
was  promulgated  a  constitution  in  which  the  princi- 
ple of  centralization  prevailed  over  that  of  federa- 
tion/" 

The  last  important  battle  had  been  fought  before 
the  constitution  was  proclaimed.  The  truce  expired 
on  28th  April,  with  the  Spanish  under  La  Torre  and 
Morales  concentrated  around  Valencia.  Caracas 
changed  hands  several  times  in  the  early  weeks. 
Bermudez  took  this  city  for  the  patriots  in  May,  only 
to  be  driven  out  in  twelve  days.^^^  In  another 
month  he  re-entered,  to  be  driven  out  again  just  be- 
fore the  decisive  battle.  These  were  skirmishes. 
The  armies  met  on  June  24th  at  Carabobo,  where 
Paez,  Sedeno,  and  Mackintosh  with  his  English 
brigade,  led  the  patriots  to  a  complete  victory  that 
virtually  ended  the  war  in  the  north. ^^''  Bolivar 
marched  into  Caracas  at  once,^^*     La    Guayra    and 

1**  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :  696. 

'**  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX :  698  ;  Republic  of 
Colombia  Account,  105. 

'**  Annual  Register,  1821,  262  ;    Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  103. 

1"  Niles  Register,  XXI :  15 ;  Annual  Register,  1821,  [262] ; 
Recollections  of  a  Service,  II :  196  ;  Bache,  Notes  on  Colombia,  144 ; 
H.  L.  V.  Decoudray-Holstein,  Memoirs  of  Simon  Bolivar,  President 
Liberator  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia ;  and  of  his  principal  Generals; 
secret  History  of  the  Revohition,  and  of  the  Events  which  preceded  it, 
from  1807  to  the  present  Time  (Boston,  1829)  281,  gives  an  adverse  view, 
by  Bolivar's  former  chief  of  staff. 

128  Decoudray-Holstein,  Bolivar,  286. 


Wars  of  Liberation  91 

Carthagena  yielded  to  the  insurgents,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  year  Spain  held  only  Porto  Cabello  and 
Panama.  On  the  3d  of  October,  1821,  the  Libera- 
tor once  more,  and  for  the  third  time,  was  induced, 
under  pressure,  to  take  the  oath  of  office  as  President 
of  the  Republic. ^^^  With  plans  of  larger  conquest 
in  mind  he  soon  moved  the  capital  from  Cucuta  up 
the  valley  of  the  Magdalena  to  Santa  Fe  de  Bogota. 
San  Martin  had  just  entered  the  city  of  Lima. 

It  has  already  been  seen  how  Jose  de  San  Martin 
fathered  a  series  of  patriotic  successes,  extending 
from  the  city  of  Mendoza,  in  the  viceroyalty  of 
Buenos  Ayres,  to  the  city  of  Lima,  in  the  viceroyalty 
of  Peru.  In  the  summer  of  1821  the  two  liberating 
armies  were  drawing  close  together,  with  only  the 
territory  known  to-day  as  Ecuador  lying  between 
them.  To  gain  this  territory,  and  complete  the  de- 
liverance of  South  America  from  the  hands  of  her 
master,  was  the  patriotic  aim  of  both  the  Liberator 
of  Colombia  and  the  Protector  of  Peru.  The  for- 
mer, however,  had  the  easier  task  and  the  better 
chance  to  reach  the  goal,  for  the  Spanish  armies  still 
existing  in  South  America  were  massed,  not  in  the 
territory  intervening  between  the  patriot  forces,  but 
in  the  mountains  around  and  to  the  southward  of 
Lima.     Bolivar  bad  less  to  fear  from  royalist  move- 

1^9  Annual  Register,  1821,  [264] ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
IX:  414. 


92  South  American  Independence 

ments  than  San  Martin,  who  was  in  danger  of  ex- 
tinction by  an  army  of  upper  Peru  at  any  time. 

The  city  of  Guayaquil,  the  chief  port  of  Ecuador, 
lying  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf  whose  name  it  bears, 
erected  a  junta  and  declared  its  independence  in  the 
fall  of  1820/^°  This  act,  it  is  said,  convinced  Gen- 
eral Morillo  of  the  utter  hopelessness  of  all  efforts  at 
reconquest,  and  caused  him  to  return  to  Spain  to  in- 
sist upon  a  peace/^^  The  patriots  helped  the  new 
junta  when  they  could.  Cochrane,  mth  his  fleet, 
called  at  Guayaquil  from  time  to  time,  while  San 
Martin  sent  a  division  of  his  army  as  soon  as  he  was 
established  at  Lima.^'^  It  was  left  for  Bolivar  to 
take  the  really  effective  action.  After  his  victory  at 
Carabobo  the  Liberator  left  Paez  to  hold  Morales  in 
check  along  the  seacoast,  and  returned  himself  to  the 
capital  of  Colombia,  which  he  soon  moved  up  the 
river  to  Bogota.  From  this  city,  in  the  spring  of 
1822,  he  marched  on  up  the  valley  towards  the  city  of 
Quito.  At  Bompono,  on  7th  March,  he  destroyed  a 
considerable  Spanish  force;  ^^^  while  his  right  hand, 
Sucre,  who  had  been  sent  on  ahead  won  a  more  de- 
cisive battle  at  Pichincha,  on  24th  May.  The  narra- 
tives of  the  battle  tell  us  that  a  dash  of  Colombian 
cavalry  decided  the  day  after  its  burden  and  heat  had 

I'^Espejo,  Reeuerdas,  26.       ^^^  Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  100. 

1*2  Espejo  Reeuerdas,  87  :   Stevenson,  Narrative  of  Residence,  III : 

414.  "s  De  Schryver  Bolivar,  260. 


Wars  of  Liberation  93 

been  borne  by  the  Peruvian  division  and  the  Enerlish 
battalion.  ^^*  Quito,  a  league  from  Pichincha,  fell 
at  once,  and  four  days  later  an  assembly  of  its  promi- 
nent men  agreed  upon  an  act  of  union  with  Vene- 
zuela and  New  Granada/^^  The  idea  of  the 
Liberator  of  a  grand  federation  of  American 
republics,  under  his  guidance,  was  one  step  nearer 
attainment. 

Prom  Quito,  over  the  mountains  to  Guayaquil, 
was  the  next  move.  San  Martin's  enemies  say  that 
now  the  Limenos  were  secretly  begging  the  Liberator 
to  advance  even  to  Peru  and  free  them  at  once 
"  from  the  Protector  and  the  Spaniards,"  ^^®  and  that 
Sucre  was  now  hurried  on  to  the  coast  to  make  sure 
that  Guayaquil  might  not  fall  into  Peruvian  hands. 
Certain  it  is  that  Bolivar,  following  up  the  victories 
of  his  lieutenant,  made  his  triumphal  entry  into 
Quito  on  the  16th  of  June;  on  the  very  day,  could 
he  but  have  known  it,  that  Don  Manuel  Torres  was 
informed  by  John  Quincy  Adams  that  the  President 
of  the  United  States  was  ready  to  receive  him  as 
Charge  d' Affaires  from  the  Republic  of  Colom- 
bia.^^^     The  occupation  of  Guayaquil  was  peaceful. 

^'*  Espejo,  Recuerdas,  55  ;  Republic  of  Colombia  Account,  109 ; 
Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :  353. 

i^»De  Schryver,  Bolivar,  261. 

1**  Cochrane,  Narrative,  1 :  219 ;    Miers,  Travels  in  Chile,  II :   80. 

1"  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI :  23. 


94  South  American  Independence 

The  Peruvian  division,  needed  at  home,  and  no 
longer  of  use  in  Ecuador,  was  embarked  on  its  trans- 
ports in  July,  while  the  Liberator  offered  to  lend 
San  Martin  some  regiments  of  Colombian  troops  for 
service  in  Peru."*  At  the  same  time  treaties  of 
union,  league  and  confederation,  were  signed  at 
Lima  for  the  preservation  of  South  American  inde- 
%j  pendence  and  the  gathering  of  a  pan-American  Con- 
gress at  Panama.^^®  A  week  later  a  proclamation 
of  the  Liberator  annexed  Guayaquil  to  Colombia/*" 
On  the  26th  of  July,  1822,  San  Martin  disem- 
barked at  Guayaquil;  on  the  28th  he  left  that  port 
for  Callao.^*^  What  occurred  at  the  meeting  of  the 
generals,  as  has  been  seen,  is  not  really  known,  but 
the  result  is  clear.  Up  to  this  day  there  are  two 
dominant  forces  to  be  considered  in  the  war;  after 
this  day  Bolivar  becomes  the  one  center  of  activity, 
and  under  his  leadership,  along  the  lines  mapped  out 
by  San  Martin,  the  final  blows  are  struck  and  the 
final  peace  is  attained.  We  have  no  occasion  here  to 
enter  into  the  controversy  waged  over  the  merits  of 

i*'Espejo,  Recuerdas,  57. 

1*9  July  6,   1822.      British  and  Foreign  State   Papers,  XI:    105; 
Annual  Register,  1823,  204,*  [247]. 

i^Espejo,  Recuerdas,  lb;  Miller,  Memoirs,  1 :    304. 
1"  E^pejo,  Recuerdas,  94. 


Wars  of  Liberation  95 

these   men."'     The   steps   in   the    achievement   of 
actual  independence  alone  concern  us. 

Had  the  Protector  been  sincere,  cried  his  oppo- 
nents, who  had  cried  loudly  at  his  assumption  of 
supreme  authority  the  year  before,  he  would  not 
have  abandoned  Peru  at  this  critical  period. ^*^  In 
April,  Canterac,  one  of  the  ablest  and  boldest  of 
Spain's  generals  in  America,  had  surprised  and 
routed  completely  a  whole  division  of  the  patriot 
army  at  lea.  During  the  last  two  months  of  his 
protectorship,  San  Martin  worked  to  repair  this  loss, 
with  the  result  that  at  his  departure  he  left  an  army 
of  eight  thousand,  under  Alverado  and  Arenales,  for 
the  protection  of  the  country.  But  the  new  govern- 
ment failed  to  make  effective  use  of  this  force.  The 
provisional  junta  kept  half  the  army  idle,  and  sent 
the  other  half  down  to  Arica,  and  thence  up  into  the 
country,  where,  at  Moquegua,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  next  year  Canterac  again  destroyed  a  republican 
army."*    The  Congress  meanwhile  busied  itself  with 

'*^  J.  P.  Hamilton,  Travels  through  the  interior  Provinces  of  Colom- 
bia (2  vols.,  London,  1827),  1 :  229.  ITamilton,  who  was  British  com- 
missioner in  Colombia,  gives  a  friendly  view  of  Bolivar. 

'*'  Stevenson,  Narrative,  of  Residence,  III :  458. 

^^  Annual  Register,  182.S,  [248]  ;  Robert  Proctor,  Narrative  of  a 
Journey  across  the  Cordillera  of  the  Andes,  and  of  a  Residence  in 
Lima  and  other  Parts  of  Peru,  in  the  Years  18S3  and  18£4  (London, 
1825),  126. 


96  South  American  Independence 

treaties  of  alliance  and  bases  for  constitutions.**''  As 
the  fragments  of  the  dismembered  army  drifted  into 
Lima,  the  Congress,  with  its  three-headed  junta,  be- 
came impopular,  was  declared  unfit  to  govern,  the 
army  mutinied,  "  and  the  people  of  Lima  rose  and 
deposed  them,  &  placed  a  popular  leader  of  the  name 
of  Riva-Aguero  at  the  head  of  affairs."  ^*® 

With  Don  Jos6  de  la  Rive-Aguero  as  president, 
the  Peruvian  revolution  was  for  the  first  time,  and 
last,  in  the  hands  of  native  Peruvians.  Santa  Cruz 
was  put  in  command  of  the  troops,  and  his  activity 
was  at  once  reflected  in  their  higher  discipline.  The 
foreign'  merchants  were  won  over  to  the  side  of  the 
government,  while  Bolivar  was  summoned  to  take  up 
the  work  San  Martin  had  dropped.  Sucre  had 
already  appeared  in  Lima  as  his  agent. ^*^  In  May 
Santa  Cruz  was  sent  to  Arica  with  another  army,  to 
regain  the  ground  lost  by  the  defeat  at  Moquegua. 
Almost  as  he  left,  the  army  of  Canterac  approached 
Callao  and  occupied  the  capital  ^*^  on  16th  June, 
1823.  The  Congress  at  once  lost  its  head  and  pre- 
pared for  instant  flight.    Before  it  left,  "  after  much 

^*^  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX:  919,  X:  666-696, 
XII:   813. 

i*«  Robertson  to  Parish,  May  7,  1823.     F.  O.  3fss. 

I*''  Miller,  Blemoirs,  II :  57 ;    Proctor,  across  the  Cordillera,  129. 

'**  Proctor,  Across  the  Cordillera,  liS ;  'B.a.W,  Extracts  from  Journal, 
II :    93 ;    Miller,  Memoirs,  II :    63,  says  June  18. 


Wars  of  Liberation  97 

"  boisterous  discussion,  Sucre  was  named  supreme 
military  chief,  with  powers  little  short  of  a  dictator- 
ship, a  step  imperiously  demanded  by  the  critical 
situation  of  the  patriots."  ^*®  With  the  elevation  of 
Sucre  came  the  practical  end  of  the  career  of  Rive- 
Aguero.  He  was  probably  the  victim  of  Colombian 
intrigues  that  induced  Congress  to  put  Sucre  in  his 
place  until  the  arrival  of  Bolivar.  He  was  allowed, 
however,  to  accompany  the  Congress  in  its  flight  to 
Truxillo,  where  he  ran  an  isolated  course  until 
Bolivar  suppressed  him  in  November. ^^^  On  the 
first  day  of  September  the  Liberator  entered  the  city 
of  Lima,  and  received  from  the  welcoming  people  the 
new  title  of  Deliverer. 

Early  in  June  Santa  Cruz  sailed  for  Arica,  whither 
Miller  followed  him  wath  reinforcements  in  July."^ 
The  march  of  the  patriots  into  upper  Peru  was  suc- 
cessfully accomplished.  They  passed  by  the  bridge 
of  the  Inca,  over  the  Desaguadero,  on  25th  July,  and 
two  weeks  later  entered  the  city  of  La  Paz.^^^  On 
25th  August  they  marched  out  from  that  city  to 
defeat Valdez,  who  had  come  up  against  them  by  a 
long  and  rapid  march.  But  soon  Valdez  was  joined 
by  La  Sema,  the  viceroy,  and  Olaneta  brought 
further  aid  to  the  royalists,  while  the  patriots  began 

i*»  Miller,  Memoirs,  II :    63.      ^^  Proctor,  Across  the  Cordillera,  135. 
i»i  Proctor,  Across  the  Cordillera,  160.      i^^  Miller,  Memoirs,  II :  67. 


,/■"■ 


98  South  American  Independence 

an  inevitable  retreat  to  the  coast.  With  the  royal- 
ists following,  the  retreat  turned  into  a  precipitate 
and  shameless  flight.  A  third  army  had  been  sacri- 
ficed. Sucre  had  marched  to  support  Santa  Cruz 
after  the  evacuation  of  Lima  by  the  royalists  [July 
17th,  1823].  E'ow  he  returned  to  the  capital."' 
The  task  of  Bolivar,  to  drive  the  Spanish  forces 
V  from  their  almost  impregnable  situation  in  the 
mountains  of  Upper  PeiTi,  seemed  great  at  the  end 
of  1823.  The  defeat  of  the  army  of  Santa  Cruz,  in 
September,  had  left  them  with  as  strong  a  hold  as 
ever  on  Potosi,  La  Paz  and  the  Desaguadero;  while 
his  own  time  had  been  frittered  away  in  suppressing 
the  ci-devant  president,  Rive-Aguero,  and  erecting 
a  new  Congress  to  continue  the  work  of  constitution 
making.  But  the  Spaniards  themselves  came  royally 
and  unexpectedly  to  his  assistance.  Ferdinand  VII., 
whose  heart  had  become  constitutional  in  1820, 
experienced  another  change  in  1823,  when  the  Holy 
Allies  lent  him  troops.  The  domestic  troubles  were 
reflected,  in  the  colonies.  "  We  have  pretty  late 
accounts  from  the  Interior  of  Peru,"  wrote  one  of 
the  British  merchants,  "  and  they  are  at  last,  &  in 
the  least  expected  way  truly  favorable  for  the  cause 
of  the  patriots.  The  Royalists  have  gone  to  Logger- 
heads among  themselves !    Olaneta,  the  Commander- 

is'  Miller,  Memoirs,  II :  76. 


Wars  of  Liberation  99 

"  in-chief  at  Potosi,  has  declared  for  the  absolute 
Ferdinand,  and  the  Catholic  religion,  as  'twas  an 
hundred  years  ago.  La  Serna  &  Canterac  cry.  Long 
live  the  Constitution,  &  down  with  the  serviles !  and 
there  seems  little  chance  of  a  composition  between 
these  doughty  Chiefs.  Blood  has  already  been  shed 
in  the  quarrel;  and  the  advocate  of  absolute  power 
&  blind  obedience,  &  breathes  nothing  but  vengeance 
&  death  to  the  Traitors  &  Innovators  who  would 
betray  their  Country.  The  Patriots  could  have  hit 
upon  no  better  plan  than  their  own  Enemies  have 
done,  to  get  rid  of  the  whole  of  the  latter."  ^®* 

The  campaign  of  1824  opened  with  a  mutiny  of 
patriot  troops  in  the  fortress  of  Callao  that  gave  that 
place  into  the  hands  of  the  royalists  and  threatened 
serious  injury  to  the  Peruvian  cause. ^^^  The  Con- 
gress, startled  by  the  sudden  danger,  ceased  its  con- 
stitutional debates,  "  named  General  Bolivar  dictator, 
and  dissolved  itself.  Thus,  at  least,  closing  their  r^ 
political  existence  with  an  act  of  unquestionable  wis- 
dom." ^^"  With  his  accustomed  professions  of  re- 
luctance   the    Liberator    accepted    the    dictatorial 

15*  John  Parish  Robertson  &  Co.,  to  Mr.  Parish  of  Bath,  March  10, 
1824.     F.  0.  Mss. 

155  Proctor,  Across  the   Cordillera,  ^^Q ;    Miller,  Memoirs,  II:   98; 
Parish  to  Canning,  No.  11,  April  25,  1824.    F.  O.  Mss. 

156  Miller,  Memoirs,  II :    102 ;    British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XI:   866. 


100  South  American  Independence 

power  and  proceeded  to  justify  his  possession  of  it. 
He  suppressed  the  mutiny.  "  By  his  firmness, 
activity,  and  seasonable  severities,  he  checked 
further  defections,  and  obtained  the  respect  and 
entire  confidence  of  every  faithful  patriot.  There 
was  a  charm  in  the  name  of  Bolivar,  and  he  was 
looked  up  to  as  the  only  man  capable  of  saving  the 
republic."  ^^^  Then,  with  the  mutiny  quelled,  he 
abandoned  Lima  to  the  royalists,  who  had  already 
obtained  Callao,  and  marched  against  Canterac. 

From  Huaraz,  on  the  coast,  and  sixty  leagues 
north  of  Lima,  the  armies  of  Bolivar  marched  up 
into  the  country.  A  new  discipline  appeared  in  the 
regiments  as  the  result  of  his  activity.  A  new  spirit 
of  contentment  prevailed,  for  he  saw  to  it  that  the 
wages  of  the  soldiers  were  paid  to  the  soldiers.^^^ 
In  June  he  crossed  the  Andes  in  three  divisions,"® 
making  long  marches  through  the  mountains  that 
would  have  been  impossible,  perhaps,  to  any  Euro- 
pean armies.  In  July  he  drew  near  to  Pasco,  where 
Arenales  had  won  a  noted  victory  as  he  marched 
around  Lima  at  San  Martin's  command  in  1820.  In 
August  he  came  up  to  Canterac,  who  marched  con- 
fidently to  meet  him.  Emboldened  by  their  recent 
successes,  the  royalists  had  been  content  to  leave 

"7  Miller,  Jfemofrs,  II :    106.  ^^MiWer,  Memoirs,  II:   113. 

i5'-»  Parish  to  Canning,  No.  44,  September  26,  1824.     F.  0.  3fss. 


Wars  of  Liberation  101 

Valdez  to  struggle  with  Olafieta,  the  absolutist,  in 
the  mountains  around  Potosi.  With  some  nine  thou- 
sand men  Canterac  met  the  rebels  on  the  plain  of 
Junin,  at  the  southern  end  of  Lake  Chinchaycocha, 
on  the  6th  of  August,  1824,  only  to  have  his  victory 
turned  into  an  utter  defeat  by  a  despairing  charge 
of  the  Peruvian  lancers.""  Satisfied  with  the  work 
of  the  campaign,  Bolivar  left  his  army  to  go  into 
cantonments  for  the  rainy  season,  and  returned  to 
direct  in  person  the  operations  around  Lima. 

The  river  valleys  run  from  the  plain  of  Junin  up 
mto  the  southeast  for  a  hundred  leagues  to  the 
ancient  city  of  Cuzco;  thence  in  the  same  direction  a 
second  hundred  leagues  extend  beyond  Lake  Titicaca 
to  the  city  of  La  Paz,  at  its  southeast  comer;  a  third 
hundred,  bearing  somewhat  more  to  the  south,  covers 
the  distance  from  La  Paz  to  Potosi  and  Chuquisaca. 
At  the  southern  end  of  this  long  chain  of  valleys 
Olaneta  and  Valdez  were  giving  a  death-blow  to 
their  own  cause.  La  Paz  and  Cuzco  were  strong- 
holds of  the  royalist  army.  At  Junin  Sucre  was  in 
command  of  the  patriots,  at  last  victorious  in  Peru. 

Sucre  failed  to  put  his  troops  into  cantonments  as 
Bolivar  had  expected,  but  spent  two  months  manosu- 
vering  in  the  valleys,  and  watching  the  armies  of  La 
Sema  and  Canterac.     On  3d  December  the  viceroy 

^*"  Miller,  Memoirs,  II :  127,  gives  map ;  De  Schryver,  Bolivar,  263. 


102  South  American  Independence 

met  the  patriots  and  defeated  them/®^  On  9th 
December  he  came  up  with  them  again  half  way 
between  Cuzco  and  Jimin,  The  royalists  were  flushed 
with  confidence,  for  they  already  had  one  victory 
to  their  credit  in  that  week.  The  patriots  were 
hungry,  hard-pressed  and  discouraged.  But  when 
the  eighty  minutes  of  battle  on  the  plain  of  Ayacu- 
cho  were  over.  La  Serna,  the  viceroy,  was  dead,  and 
Canterac,  a  prisoner,  signed  a  capitulation  for  his 
whole  army.^^^  The  war  as  such  was  ended.  Ga- 
marra,  with  an  advance  guard  of  the  patriots, 
entered  Cuzco  on  Christmas  day,  with  the  rest  of 
the  army  close  behind  him.^^^ 

Olaneta  still  held  out  for  his  master  in  Upper 
Peru.  Although  possessed  of  great  mining  estates, 
he  resisted,  even  to  the  end,  all  overtures  of  the 
patriots  to  exchange  his  lost  cause  for  his  property. 
He  kept  up  the  warfare  in  this  final  stronghold  of 
Spanish  authority  against  the  armies  of  Buenos 
Ayres,  under  the  veteran  Arenales,  and  against  the 
armies  of  Peru,  under  the  English  veteran  Miller. 
For  fifteen  years  an  active  state  of  war  had  existed 
in  the  country  between  Salta  and  Potosi,  the  country 
which  San  Martin  had  wisely  despaired  of  conquer- 

^^^  Annual  Register,  1825,  [209]. 

162 i^.  0.  Mss.  Buenos  Ayres,  Vol.  VIII ;  Niles  Register,  XXVIII : 
156;  Annual  Register,  m2.5,U9,.*  is^  Miller,  il^/emom  II :  183. 


Wars  of  Liberation  103 

ing  ten  years  before/**  On  Christmas  day,  1824,  the 
patriots  reached  Cuzco;  in  March,  1825,  they  came 
to  La  Paz,  whence  Miller  was  sent  on  to  end  the 
struggle.  At  the  close  of  March  Olaiieta  was  beaten, 
and  his  own  troops  slew  him.  Miller  entered  Potosi, 
April  25th.''= 

Bolivar  had  meanwhile  reassembled  the  Peruvian 
Congress  on  10th  February,  and  had  gone  through 
the-  ceremony  of  resigning  and  accepting  for  another 
year  his  dictatorial  authority.^^*  Then  he  had  de- 
parted for  a  triumphal  progress  through  the  country. 
At  Arequipa  he  confirmed  a  Congress  for  Upper 
Peru  that  Sucre  had  called;  its  proceedings  were  to 
be  subject  to  the  action  of  the  Peruvian  Congress  of 
1826,  while  Sucre  himself  should  be  the  government 
for  the  intervening  year.^®^  This  Congress,  meeting 
at  Chuquisaca,  later  rebaptized  Sucre,  declared  for 
^e_Jndependence  of  Upper  Peru,  on  August  6th, 
1825,  and  five  days  later  adopted  the  name  of  the 
Liberator  for  the  new  republic.**^  Peru  and  Buenos 
Ayres  joined    in    confirming   the    independence    of 

'**  Andrews,  Journey  from  Bnenos  Ayres,  II:  252. 

1^''  Miller,  Memoirs,  II :  200 ;  Andrews,  Journey  from  Buenos 
Ayres,  I:  296;  Parish  to  Canning,  No.  10,  February  10,  1825. 
F.  O.  3fss. 

i(x  JBriMsh  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII :  885  ;  De  Schry ver, 
Bolivar,  2fi7;  Annual  Register,  1825,  [211]. 

ifiT  Parish  to  Canning,  No.  55,  August  6,  1825.    F.  O.  Mss. 

188  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII :    859. 


104  South  American  Independence 

Bolivia  in  the  following  spring.  The  Spanish  sur- 
rendered the  port  of  Callao  on  19th  January,  1826. 
From  this  port,  nine  months  later,  the  Liberator 
sailed  for  Guayaquil,  never  to  return.  From  Guay- 
aquil he  journeyed  down  to  Bogota  and  reassumed 
his  functions  as  President  of  Colombia. 


CHAPTER  II 

SOUTH  AMERICAN  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


Ui 


Liberty  and  independence  have  always  been  names 
to  conjure  with  in  the  United  States^ Popular  sym- 
pathy has  always  gone  out  to  a  party  or  a  people 
struggling  with  these  as  their  watchwords.  Yet  it  is 
rarely  that  the  government  has  allowed  them  to 
blind  its  eyes  to  its  international  duties  or  interests. 
The  wave  of  feeling  engendered  by  the  French  revo- 
lution threatened  for  a  time  to  drive  the  country 
into  an  active  foreign  alliance,  but  its  ultimate  re- 
sult was  only  to  bring  about  the  enunciation  of  a 
system  of  neutral  obligations  that  has  endured  to 
this  day.  The  sufferings  of  the  Greek  patriots  called 
forth  the  eloquence  of  Henry  Clay  and  Daniel  Web- 
ster and  Edward  Everett;  called  forth  money  by 
thousands  from  the  pockets  of  liberty-loving  citizens; 
but  failed  to  move  for  an  instant  the  administration 
from  its  proper  course.  At  a  later  time  the  misery  of 
Cuba  aroused  the  national  emotion,  but  an  entirely 
different  cause  precipitated  a  war.  So  it  was  in  the 
South  American  struggle  for  independence. 

Before  the  contest  had  really  begun  it  had  become 
evident  that  the  events  in  South  America  would  be 


106  South  American  Independence 

watched  with  a  more  eager  interest  than  our  semi- 
hostile  relations  with  Spain  could  explain^  /  When  it 
came  to  the  issue  Jefferson  was  unwilling  to  impli- 
cate the  country  in  movements  hostile  to  Ferdinand, 
but  the  ease  with  which  Miranda  had  secured  audi- 
ence of  the  president  and  his  secretaries,  and  had 
won  over  to  his  enterprise  prominent  federal  officials 
of  New  York,  indicated  that  few  were  unfriendly  to 
a  South  American  cause  as  such.  And  when  some 
two  years  after  the  failure  of  his  expedition  the 
petition  of  thirty-six  American  citizens  incarcerated 
in  the  fortress  of  Carthagena  came  before  Congress 
a  lively  interest  in  their  behalf  was  at  once  called 
forth/  The  story  told  by  these  young  filibusters, 
with  variations,  had  become  a  familiar  tale:  their 
expedition  was  the  prototype  of  innumerable  later 
expeditions,  extending  through  the  times  of  William 
Walker  to  the  days  of  John  D.  Hart,  the  Three 
Friends  and  the  Laurada;  their  career  was  the 
familiar  one  of  great  expectations  veiled  in  alluring 
mystery,  doubtful  expedients,  suspicion,  and  utter, 
hopeless  failure;  and  now  they  came  to  Congress 
to  find  friends  who  should  urge  an  intervention  in 
their  behalf. 

For  two  weeks,  in  the  beginning  of  June,  1809, 
weeks  in   which  the   South  Americans   were   ovqT' 

^A.S.P.F.R.,lll:   257. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  107 

throwing  their  viceroys  and  erecting  juntas  in 
the  name  of  Ferdinand,  the  petition  of  the  Miranda 
men  was  under  consideration  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. It  was  accompanied  by  a  favorable  re- 
port from  a  special  committee,  and  a  resolution 
recommending  that  the  President,  if  convinced  that 
they  were  involuntarily  drawn  into  the  unlawful 
enterprise,  should  use  every  effort  to  obtain  their 
release.^  The  debate  ran  on  for  several  days,  re- 
viewing laws  of  neutrality  and  relations  with  France 
and  Spain,  until  at  last  the  Committee  of  the  Whole, 
from  sympathy  and  the  underlying  conviction  that 
Spain  had  no  rights  in  her  colonies  which  a  friend 
of  liberty  was  bound  to  respect,  passed  the  resolu- 
tion.^ Before  the  House,  the  opposition,  with  John 
Randolph  at  its  head,  became  more  insistent.  Here 
the  latter  continued  his  heavy  fire  of  sarcasm  and 
vituperation  that  had  already  brought  Pearson,  of 
North  Carolina,  to  offer  him  his  blood,  until  the 
sentimental  inclinations  of  the  House  were  in  a 
measure  overcome.  He  alluded  particularly  to  the 
rupture  of  relations  with  Spain,  which  had  occurred 
upon  the  elevation  of  Joseph,  raising  for  the  first 
time  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  South 
American  provinces.     To  accomplish  the  release  of 

^A.S.P.F.R., Ill:   258 ;  Annals  of  Congress,  11  Cong. ,  1  Sess.,  257. 
'June  13,  1809.    Annals  of  Congress,  11  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  283. 


108  South  American  Independence 

the  prisoners  an  agent  must  be  sent  to  Caracas.  But 
we  cannot  send  this  agent,  declared  Randolph, 
"  without  acknowledging  the  independence  of  the 
colonies  of  South  America,  and  then  involving  our- 
selves in  a  war  with  France,  or  addressing  ourselves, 
in  the  first  instance,  to  the  Government  of  France."  * 
The  truly  American  doctrine  that  a  premature 
recognition  is  a  cause  for  war,  was  thus  declared. 
Later  in  the  same  day,  by  the  vote  of  the  Speaker, 
the  j-e solution  was  defeated.^ 

I  Two  years  later  this  tendency  of  the  House  was 
pevealed  in  connection  with  the  President's  message. 
In  J^ovember,  1811,  Madison  alluded  to  the  interest- 
ing scenes  "  developing  themselves  among  the  great 
communities  which  occupy  the  southern  portion  of 
our  own  hemisphere."  ^  The  special  committee  to 
which  this  portion  of  the  message  was  referred  read 
the  declaration  of  independence  of  Venezuela  and 
reported  a  resolution  expressing  a  friendly  solicitude 
in  the  welfare  of  these  communities  and  a  readiness, 
when  they  should  have  become  nations  "  by  a  just 
exercise  of  their  rights,"  to  unite  with  the  executive 
in  establishing  with  them  such  relations  as  might 

*  Annals  of  Congress,  11  Cong.,  1  Sess,,  306. 

*  June  14,  1809.    Annals  of  Congress,  11  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  316. 

*  J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents  I:  494. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  109 

become  necessary/  This  was  an  indication  of  the 
sentiment  of  Congress.  Evidently  the  sentiment 
might  become  more  pronounced  if  events  in  South 
America  should  become  more  active. 
pPresident  Madison  realized  the  significance  of  the 
movements  that  took  place  throughout  South 
America  in  1809  and  181C^_]jHe  saw  clearly  that 
they  might  in  time  call  upon  the  United  States  for 
political  action,  and  that  already  there  were  com- 
mercial interests  to  be  protected  and  developed.  As 
early  as  1807  the  State  Department  had  been  in- 
formed of  the  embarrassments  under  which  Ameri- 
can commerce  struggled  at  Buenos  Ayres.®  The 
commerce  was  admittedly  illegal,  but  it  was  toler- 
ated, and  the  need  of  an  agent  to  protect  it  was 
avowed.  The  Jefferson  administration  took  no  action 
in  this  direction,  but  on  28th  June,  1810,  Secretary 
Smith  instructed  an  agent  to  visit  South  America. 
Joel  Roberts  Poinsett,^   of  South   Carolina,   had 

''A.S.  P.  F.  R.,  Ill :  538 :   Annals  of  Congress,  12  Cong.,  1  Sess., 427. 

/'      "David  C,  De  Forest  to  James  Madison,  Oct.  4,  1807.    Stale  Dept. 
Mss. 

*  In  the  library  of  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania  are  the 
papers  of  Joel  Roberts  Poinsett,  in  some  fourteen  folio  volumes.  They 
contain  not  only  duplicates  of  his  correspondence  with  the  State  Depart- 
ment, but  even  many  of  the  originals,  for  which  search  may  be  made 
in  vain  in  Washington.  A  short  "  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Joel  R. 
Poinsett,"  by  C.  J.  StiUe  is  in  Pa.  Mag.  of  Hist,  and  Biog.,  XII: 
129,  257. 


110  South  American  Independence 

already  seen  much  of  the  world  when  Madison 
appointed  him  to  this  new  mission.  Possessed  of 
independent  fortune,  he  had  traveled  over  Europe, 
visited  Siberia  and  the  interior  of  Russia,  and  de- 
clined to  enter  the  service  of  the  Czar.  Later  he 
became  a  center  of  contention  in  Mexico  and  played 
a  part  in  the  emancipation  of  Greece.  Now,  as 
American  agent,  he  journeyed  into  Buenos  Ayres 
and  Chile,  and  in  the  latter  country  led  a  brigade 
of  the  patriot  army  against  the  Spaniards.^"  In 
spite  of  this  lapse  from  duty — which  went  unblamed 
— he  seems  to  have  been  one  of  the  ablest  and  best 
representatives  of  the  United  States  in  South 
America.  He  seems  not  to  have  engaged  in  priva- 
teering or  commerce.  Some  years  later  it  is  de- 
clared that  there  was  not  a  single  American  in 
Buenos  Ayres  who  was  not  interested  in  privateer- 
ing. The  list  is  quite  long  of  improper  persons, 
English  and  American,  who  were  sent  to  South 
America. 

"  As  a  crisis  is  approaching,"  ^^  went  Poinsett's 
instructions,  "  which  must  produce  great  changes  in 
the  situation  of  Spanish  America,  and  may  dissolve 
altogether  its  colonial  relations  to  Europe,  and  as  the 
geographical  position  of  the  United  States  and  other 

'"Graham,  Journal,  23. 

"  R.  Smith  to  J.  R,  Poinsett,  June  28, 1810.    S.  D.  Mss. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  111 

"  obvious  considerations  give  them  an  intimate  inter- 
est in  whatever  may  affect  the  destiny  of  that  part  of 
th^  American  Continent,  it  is  our  duty  to  turn  our 
attention  to  this  important  subject,  and  to  take  such 
steps  not  incompatible  with  the  neutral  character  and 
honest  policy  of  the  United  States,  as  the  occasion 
renders  proper.  With  this  view  you  have  been 
selected  to  proceed  without  delay  to  Buenos  Ayres, 
and  thence,  if  convenient,  to  Lima  in  Peru  or 
Santiago  in  Chile  or  both.  You  will  make  it  your 
object  whenever  it  may  be  proper,  to  diffuse  the  im- 
pression that  the  United  States  cherish  the  sincerest 
good  will  towards  the  people  of  South  America  as 
neighbors,  as  belonging  to  the  same  portion  of  the 
globe,  and  as  having  a  mutual  interest  in  cultivating 
friendly  intercourse;  that  this  disposition  will  exist 
whatever  may  be  their  internal  system  or  European 
relations,  with  respect  to  which  no  interference  of 
any  sort  is  pretended;  and  that  in  the  event  of  a 
political  separation  from  the  parent  country  and  of 
the  establishment  of  an  independent  system  of  Na- 
tional Government,  it  will  coincide  wdth  the  senti- 
ments and  policy  of  the  United  States  to  promote 
the  most  friendly  relations  and  the  most  liberal 
intercourse  between  the  inhabitants  of  this  Hemis- 
phere, as  having,  all  a  common  interest,  and  as  lying 
under  a  common  obligation  to  maintain  that  system 


112  South  American  Independence 

of  peace,  justice  and  good  will,  which  is  the  only 
source  of  happiness  for  nations. 

"  Whilst  you  inculcate  these  as  the  principles  and 
dispositions  of  the  United  States,  it  will  be  no  less 
proper  to  ascertain  those  on  the  other  side,  not  only 
towards  the  United  States,  but  in  reference  to  the 
great  nations  of  Europe,  as  also  to  that  of  Brazil, 
and  the  Spanish  branches  of  the  Government  there; 
and  to  the  Commercial  and  other  connections  with 
them  respectively,  and  generally  to  inquire  into  the 
State,  the  characteristics,  intelligence  and  wealth  of 
the  several  parties,  the  amount  of  the  population, 
the  extent  and  organization  of  the  military  force  and 
the  pecuniary  resources  of  the  country. 

"  The  real  as  well  as  ostensible  object  of  your  mis- 
sion is  to  explain  the  mutual  advantages  of  a  com- 
merce with  the  United  States,  to  promote  liberal  and 
stable  regulations,  and  to  transmit  seasonable  infor- 
mation on  the  subject."  ^^ 

"  Until  about  1835  the  State  Department  kept  two  series  of  letter* 
books,  one  containing  copies  of  instructions  to  American  ministers 
abroad,  and  the  other  all  notes  sent  to  the  legations  in  Washington. 
In  addition,  two  files  were  kept  for  each  country,  comprising,  respec- 
tively, the  despatches  from  the  American  minister  and  the  notes  re- 
ceived from  the  legations.  After  this  date  the  consolidated  letter-books 
were  abandoned,  and  manuscripts  in  the  State  Department  are  most 
easily  traced  through  C.  H.  Van  Tyne  and  W.  G.  Leland,  Guide  to  the 
Archives  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  Washington  (Car- 
negie Institution,  1907). 


Policy  of  the  United  States  113 

With  these  objects  in  view,  Poinsett  was  given  the 
title  of  Agent  for  Seamen  and  Commerce  in  the  Port 
of  Buenos  Ayres.  Ten  months  later  Louis  Godde- 
froy  was  appointed  "  Consul  for  Buenos  Ayres  and 
the  ports  below  it  on  the  River  Plate,"  ^^  and  Poin- 
sett was  raised  to  Consul  General.  "  The  instructions 
already  given  you,"  wrote  Monroe,^*  "  are  so  full 
that  there  seems  to  be  little  cause  to  add  to  them  at 
this  time.  Much  solicitude  is  felt  to  hear  from  you 
on  all  the  topics  to  which  they  relate — the  dis- 
position shown  by  most  of  the  Spanish  provinces  to 
8eparate_,imm..Europe  and  to  erect  themselves  into 
in^pendent  States,  ^ex5ite&  ■  grGftt>Jiit£r^8t^hgfC^  As 
Inhabitants  of  the  same  Hemisphere,  as  Neighbors, 
the  United  States  cannot  be  unfeeling  Spectators  of 
so  important  a  moment  [movement?].  The  destiny 
of  these  provinces  must  depend  on  themselves. 
Should  such  a  revolution  however  take  place,  it  can-  r^^ 
not  be  doubted  that  our  relation  with  them  will  be  '  ' 
more  intimate,  and  our  friendship  stronger  than  it 
can  be  while  they  are  colonies  of  any  European 
power." 

For  a  period  of  six  years  the  United  States  main- 
tained consuls  or  agents  in  South  America.  William 
R.  Lowry  was  sent  to  Caracas  as  Poinsett  was  sent 

"  Monroe  to  Qoddefroy,  April  30,  1811.    S.  D.  Mss. 
"  Monroe  to  Poinsett,  April  30,  1811.    S.  D.  Mss. 


114  South  American  Independence 

to  Buenos  Ayres/^  But  the  representation  in  Vene- 
zuela was  not  kept  up  as  steadily  as  that  in  the  south 
of  the  continent,  for  the  patriotic  movements  in  that 
region  were  but  spasmodic  in  the  beginning  and 
finally  succumbed  to  the  pressure  of  Morillo's  armies. 
In  the  south  representation,  like  the  independent 
government,  was  maintained  steadily  after  1810. 
The  status  of  the  American  agents,  however,  is  not 
entirely  clear.  There  existed  no  intent  to  recognize 
the  governments  at  this  time,  and  the  administration 
was  not  sure  that  the  juntas  would  give  public  recog- 
nition to  United  States  consuls  who  could  not  give 
reciprocal  recognition  to  them.^"  So  Poinsett  went 
out  as  an  unofficial  but  accredited  agent  for  seamen 
and  commerce  with  letters  similar  to  those  held  by 
various  agents  in  the  West  Indies.  Yet  in  1811  he 
was  commissioned  as  consul-general  and  a  consul  was 
appointed  under  him  while  the  State  Department 
constantly  addressed  him  and  his  successors  by  these 
titles.  No  trace  has  been  found  of  an  exequatur 
issued  to  any  of  these  agents,  but  they  speak  in  their 
despatches  of  being  formally  received."  In  March, 
1812,  the  junta  of  Buenos  Ayres  definitely  refused 

15  Smith  to  Lowry,  November  6,  1810.    S.  D.  Mss. 

16  Smith  to  Poinsett,  August  7,  1810.    S.  D.  Mss. 
1''  Poinsett  Mss.,  Vol.  I. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  115 

an  exequatur  to  Robert  Staples,  British  Consul,  be- 
cause he  could  not  acknowledge  its  independence/^ 
Through  these  agents  the  State  Department  kept 
itself  informed  on  events  in  Spanish  America.  In 
their  despatches  can  be  found  accounts  of  the  fre- 
quent revolutions  that  made  government  in  Buenos 
Ayres  a  hazardous  and  fascinating  pastime.  The 
military  events  on  the  frontiers  are  told  with  con- 
siderable exactness,  and  original  bulletins  of  the 
junta  and  the  liberating  army  are  frequently  en- 
closed. At  times  the  agents  themselves  played  a 
part  in  the  local  events.  Poinsett  went  from  Buenos 
Ayres  into  Chile,  there  to  make  friends  with  the 
Carreras  and  fight  in  their  armies.  He  returned  to 
Buenos  Ayres  just  in  time  to  escape  the  disasters  of 
Eancagua  that  sent  O'Higgins  and  his  handful  of 
survivors  to  swell  the  forces  of  San  Martin  at  Men- 
doza.^''  Thence,  dodging  the  British  cruisers,  he 
returned  to  the  United  States  to  be  congratulated 
by  Monroe  in  the  name  of  the  President  on  the 
ability,  zeal  and  success  with  which  he  had  conducted 
his  delicate  mission. ^°  At  a  later  day  his  successor, 
Devereux,  guaranteed  a  loan,  that  snatched  the 
existing  government  from  the  hands  of  its  enemies. 

18  Memorandum  dated  June  26,  1823.    F.  0.  Mss. 

19  Halsey  to  See.  State,  Feb.  11,  1815.    S.  D.  Mss. 
'0  Monroe  to  Poinsett,  July  16,  1815.     Poinsett  Mss. 


116  South  American  Independence 

Less  successful  than  Poinsett,  this  agent  was  dis- 
avowed and  dismissed.^^ 

The  South  Americans  were  as  eager  to  give  infor- 
mation as  the  United  States  to  receive  it.  Their 
Directors  and  Dictators  constantly  addressed  the 
northern  President  with  news  of  victory  and  requests 
for  arms,  accompanied  by  expressions  of  profound 
friendship.  At  the  same  time  their  agents  appeared 
at  Washington  as  well  as  at  London,  Venezuela 
sent  Don  Luis  Lopez  Mendez  to  the  latter  city  in 
1811,^^  having  already  sent  Don  T.  Orea  to  the 
United  States  in  1810."  In  1816  the  first  repre- 
sentative from  Buenos  Ayres  appeared  at  Washing- 
ton with  an  apology  for  the  delay  and  an  assurance 
that  a  declaration  of  independence  would  soon  be 
passed.  "  In  the  meantime,"  his  credentials  went 
on,^*  "  our  deputy  near  your  Excellency  will  not  be 
invested  with  a  public  character,  nor  will  he  be  dis- 
posed to  exceed  the  object  of  his  mission,  without 
an  understanding  with  your  Excellency  and  your 
Ministers.  That  these  views  may  be  exactly  fulfilled, 
I  have  selected  a  gentleman  who,  from  his  personal 
qualities,  will  not  excite  suspicion  that  he  is  sent  by 
the  Government  invested  with  so  serious  and  im- 

21  Rush  to  Halsey,  April  21,  1817.    S.  D.  Mss. 

22  Present  State  of  Colombia,  86.  23  Aurora,  October  29,  1817. 
^^  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1876. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  117 

"portant  a  commission.  He  is  Colonel  Martin  Thomp- 
son. ...  I  hope  jour  Excellency  will  give  him  full 
credit,  and  secure  for  him  all  the  consideration 
which,  in  a  like  case,  we  would  give  and  secure  to 
the  Ministers  whom  your  Excellency  may  think 
proper  to  send  to  these  provinces." 

The  Spanish  minister  in  the  United  States,  Don 
Luis  de  Onis,  failed  to  view  the  development  of  these 
friendly,  though  unofficial,  relations  with  equanim- 
ity. For  six  years  in  his  informal  capacity  he  had 
watched  the  growth  of  a  sentiment  in  favor  of  South 
America.  Arriving  with  credentials  from  the 
Regency  of  Cadiz,  in  the  early  days  of  Madison's 
first  administration,  he  had  been  refused  a  reception 
on  the  ground  of  the  uncertain  character  of  that 
government.  Madison  never  recognized  the  revolu- 
tionary and  JSTapoleonic  governments  in  Spain,  so  it 
was  not  until  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand  VII.  in 
1815  that  the  Spanish  minister  was  received  in  his 
official  capacity.  Thereupon  the  latter  took  up  in  a 
formal  way  the  protests  he  had  long  been  making 
informally. 

The  South  American  situation  was  at  this  time 
bound  up  with  the  aggressions  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Floridas  and  the  piratical  establishments  in  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  their  broadest  extent  the  de- 
mands of  de  Onis  comprehended  the  complete  exclu- 


118  South  American  Independence 

sion  of  the  various  South  American  flags  from  the 
ports  of  the  United  States.  To  these  pretentions  the 
Secretary  of  State  replied  with  proper  dignity  that 
the  United  States  could  pay  no  attention  to  the  flags 
of  vessels  seeking  admission  to  its  harbors  and  obey- 
ing its  laws.^^ 

But  Spain  had  reasonable  grievances  enough  with- 
out resorting  to  preposterous  demands. 

The  neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States,  although 
adequate  in  spirit,  failed  in  their  details  to  meet  the 
situation  created  by  the  revolt  of  Spain's  American 
provinces.  Based  upon  the^^reat  proclamation  of 
the  first  President,  and  enacted  in  179-1,  the  law  con- 
templated wars  between  independent  States.  So  far 
it  was  correct  in  spirit  and  formulated  for  the  first 
time  the  principles  of  international  law  upon  the  sub- 
ject. But  the  law  was  difficult  of  execution,  for  no 
authority  was  given  in  it  for  the  seizure  of  vessels 
suspected  of  intention  to  violate  neutrality,  and  its 
provisions  did  not  sufficiently  cover  acts  done  by 
aliens  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States.  At  a 
later  day  the  courts  discovered  that  services  in 
behalf  of  unrecognized  governments  were  not  un- 
neutral in  the  eye  of  the  law,  for  this  contemplated 
only  offenses  in  behalf  of  sovereign  States.^® 

**  Monroe  to  de  Onis,  January  19,  1815.  National  Intelligencer, 
November  12, 1817.  "  Qelston  vs.  Hoyt.     Wheaton,  III :    246. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  119 

Through  these  inadecjuacies  in  the  law,  the  sym 
pathies  and  commercial  interests  of  the  Americans 
had  come  to  the  support  of  the  southern  patriots. 
Blank  commissions  for  privateers  issued  from  th^ 
South  American  capitals  in  shoals,  and  from  Balti- 
more the  vessels  thus  equipped  put  out  to  prey  upon 
Spanish  commerce;"^  too  often  upon  any  commerce 
that  was  not  armed  to  protect  itself.  At  times  with 
scrupulous  regard  for  the  dictates  of  neutrality,  the 
privateer  would  go  to  a  port  in  South  America  be- 
fore commencing  its  cruise;  too  often,  it  was  enough 
to  have  cleared  from  Baltimore  or  Xew  Orleans  for 
such  a  port.  And  when  the  cruise  was  ended,  no 
privateer  or  ship  of  war  hesitated  to  put  into  a 
United  States  port  to  refit  and  recruit,  to  restore  or 
augment  its  armament.  The  issuing  of  commissions 
within  the  United  States,  the  equipment  of  vessels 
to  destroy  the  commerce  of  Spain,  and  the  augmen- 
tation of  their  strength,  were  all  manifest  violations 
of  neutrality.  Against  them  the  Spanish  minister 
protested  with  propriety.  When  the  prizes  of  South 
American  privateers  came  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  courts  of  the  United  States,  these  examined  into 
the  antecedents  of  the  captors,  and  did  not  hesitate 

2^  Adams  to  Halsey,  January  22, 1818  ;  Halsey  to  Adams,  August  21, 
1818.  S.  D.  Ms8.  Halsey  was  dismissed  for  dealing  in  such  com- 
missions. He  defended  himself  by  alluding  to  the  notorious  equipment 
of  privateers  in  the  United  States. 


120  South  American  Independence 

to  restore  the  prize  to  the  proper  owners.  But  this 
possibility  of  redress  had  little  effect  upon  the  crime. 
And  so^  through  the  imperfections  of  the  law,  and 
the  prevalence  of  a  popular  sympathy  that  made  jury 
convictions  well-nigh  impossible,  the  Latin-Ameri- 
cans made  the  United  States  a  base  for  their  naval 
operations  with  impunity. 

When  the  fourteenth  Congress  met,  in  the  fall  of 
1816,  for  its  last  session,  the  question  of  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  South  American  provinces  did  not  exist. 
There  was  widespread  sympathy  for  those  provinces 
in  their  struggle,  and  a  general,  genuine  interest  in 
the  events  transpiring  in  their  continent.  Few 
would  have  disclaimed  a  hope  in  their  ultimate  inde- 
pendence and  recognition,  or  a  feeling  that  there  is  a 
real  American  community  of  interest;  in  spite  of  the 
scornful  epigram  of  Mr.  Adams,  "  As  to  an  Ameri- 
can system,  we  have  it;  we  constitute  the  whole  of 
it."  ^*  But  no  person  of  consequence  had  so  much  as 
intimated  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  an  acknowledg- 
es j.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs  (12  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1874-1877),  V  :  176. 
The  archives  of  the  Adams  family,  now  deposited  in  the  building  of 
the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  are  rich  in  materials  on  foreign 
affairs.  Here  are  to  be  found  duplicates  of  most  of  the  correspondence 
of  John  Quincy  Adams,  while  Secretary  of  State,  as  well  as  the  manu- 
script of  his  journal  and  the  papers  of  his  father  and  his  son.  From 
this  collection  W.  C.  Ford  has  drawn  materials  for  his  various  writings 
on  the  Monroe  doctrine  as  well  as  for  his  edition  of  The  Writings  of 
John  Quincy  Adams  (1913-        ). 


Policy  of  the  United  States  121 

ment  of  the  independence  of  these  States.  Indeed, 
all  the  States  but  Buenos  Ajres  had  been  extin- 
guished within  the  past  year  by  the  triumphant 
armies  of  the  restored  Ferdinand.  Before  the  end  of 
the  session  the  South  American  question  had  been 
again  reviewed  and  the  customary  expressions  of 
friendship  had  been  once  more  evoked. 

On  14th  January,  1817,  Forsyth,  from  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  reported  a  bill  ^" 
which  came  to  be  "  called,  and  properly  called,  a 
bill  for  making  peace  between  His  Catholic  Majesty 
and  the  town  of  Baltimore."  ^°  It  was  a  revision  of 
the  neutrality  act,  that  had  been  suggested  by  the 
President  in  a  special  message  of  26th  December.'^ 
The  debate  on  this  new  neutrality  act  extended  over 
the  rest  of  the  session  and  did  not  end  until  the  third 
of  March.  Much  opposition  was  shown  to  strength- 
ening the  legislation  in  the  interests  of  Spain;  an 
act  which  was  felt  to  be  hostile  to  the  rebellious 
colonies.  Some  were  almost  ready  for  a  positive 
intervention  on  the  side  of  these.  Henry  Clay 
thought  the  existing  acts  went  far  enough,  agreed 
that  a  professed  neutrality  must  be  maintained,  but 

^^  Annals  of  Congress,  14  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  477. 

»"  By  John  Randolph,  January  24,1817.  Annals  of  Congress,  14 
Cong.,  2  Sess,,  732. 

SI  Richardson,  Messages,  1 :  582 ,  Annals  of  Congress,  14  Cong.,  2 
Sess.,  39. 


122  South  American  Independence 

admitted  a  strong  hope  for  the  independence  of  the 
colonies.  Even  he  was  not  insistent  upon  an  imme- 
diate recognition.  When  the  next  Congress  met, 
recognition  had  been  made  a  question. 

During  the  winter  and  spring  of  1817  the  news 
from  South  America  indicated  that  affairs  had  taken 
a  more  hopeful  appearance  for  the  patriots.  A  new 
order  seemed  to  have  been  born  to  Buenos  Ayres, 
where  a  Congress  of  the  provinces  had  come  together 
at  Tucuman,  and  issued,  on  9th  July,  1816,  a  decla- 
ration of  independence  in  the  name  of  the  United 
Provinces  of  Eio  de  la  Plata. ^^  Its  manifesto  re- 
minded the  nations  of  the  world  that  Buenos  Ayres 
had  maintained  an  uncontested  independence  for  six 
years.  The  patriot  armies  too  had  begun  to  retrieve 
their  losses.  San  Martin,  in  his  province  of  Men- 
doza,  had  nearly  completed  the  period  of  recruit- 
ing, and  before  the  spring  was  far  advanced  the 
news  reached  Washington  that  he  had  broken  camp, 
made  a  marvelous  march  across  the  Andes  and  de- 
feated the  Spanish  army  at  Chacabuco.  With  more 
results  to  feed  upon,  popular  and  governmental  p^ 
interests  in  South  America  took  a  new  life.  The*^"^ 
President  determined  to  learn  the  truth  about  the 
revolution,  to  be  ready  for  any  event.    In  the  House 

^^  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Seas.,  1877;    Annual  Register, 
1816  [159]. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  123 

of    Commons,    Henry    Brougham   interrogated    the 
ministry  on  the  subject.^^ 

In  his  efforts  to  find  a  suitable  agent  for  this  mis- 
sion, President  Monroe  turned  once  more  to  Joel  R. 
Poinsett.  On  April  25th,  1817,  he  wrote  him  a 
personal  note,  asking  him  to  make  the  trip  to  Buenos 
Ay  res  in  a  pub^  ship,  and  offering  him  "  liberal 
compensation."  \Ji  The  progress  of  the  revolution 
in  the  Spanish  Provinces,"  he  wrote,  "  which  has 
always  been  interesting  to  the  U.  States,  is  made 
much  more  so,  by  many  causes,  and  particularly  by 
a  well-founded  hope,  that  it  will  succeed." ^'^^ut 
Poinsett  had  entered  the  Legislature  of  South  Caro- 
lina and  declined  the  appointment.^^  Forced  to  give 
up  this  plan,  the  President  settled  upon  a  Commis- 
sion, invited  Caesar  A.  Rodney,  of  Delaware,  and 
John  Graham  to  serve  upon  it,  and  departed  from 
the  capital  for  his  tour  through  New  England  and 
the  West,^®  leaving  Richard  Rush  as  Secretary  of 
State  to  carry  out  his  designs.  Through  the  months 
of  July  and  August  Rush  labored  zealously  to  carry 
out  the  wish  of  his  superior,  but  without  avail.  One 
commissioner  resigned.  Rodney  was  detained  at 
home  by  the  illness  of  a  son.     And  the  secretary 

"March  19,  1817.  YLansurd , Parliamentary  Debates,  XXXV:  1194. 

**  Monroe  to  Poinsett,  April  25,  1817.  S.  D.  Mss.  The  original  is  in 

the  Poinsett  Mss.  '*  Poinsett  Mss. 

36  J.  B.  McMaster,  Hist,  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  IV:  377. 


124  South  American  Independence 

did  not  dare  to  send  a  single  commissioner.  As  the 
President  was  out  of  communication  with  Washing- 
ton for  several  weeks  the  matter  had  to  drop  until 
his  return  in  September.  Then  the  business  was  re- 
sumed, with  the  result  that  on  4th  December  the 
frigate  Congress  sailed  from  Hampton  Roads,^^ 
carrying  Caesar  A.  Eodnev,  John  Graham  and 
Theodorick  Bland  as  commissioners,  and  H.  M. 
Brackenridge  as  secretary.^^  At  the  same  time  John 
B.  Prevost  was  sent  to  Chile  and  Peru  on  a  similar 
mission,  with  the  additional  charge  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  Oregon  country.^^  There  is  considerable 
justice  in  the  statement  that  "  several  "  of  the  men 
chosen  were  known  to  be  fanatics  in  the  "  cause  of 
emancipation;"  *°  Brackenridge,  in  particular,  was  a 
"mere  enthusiast;"  Judge  Bland  started  out  as 
one.*^ 

In  the  instructions  to  the  commissioners,  Richard 
Push  stated  the  policy  of  the  United  States :  "  The 
contest  beween  Spain  and  the  Spanish  colonies  in 
the  southern  parts  of  this  continent  has  been,  from 

"  Bland's  Report  in  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sees.,  2106. 

'8H.  M.  Brackenridge,  Voyage  to  South  America.  Performed  by 
Order  of  the  American  Government,  in  the  years  1817  and  1818,  in  the 
Frigate  Congress  (2  vols.,  Baltimore,  1819).  Brackenridge  became  a 
strong  partisan  of  the  South  Americans. 

39  Rush  to  Prevost,  July  18,  1817 ;  J.  Q.  Adams  to  Prevost,  Septem- 
ber 29,  1817.    S.  D.  Mss.  «  W.  F.  Reddaway, if onroe  Doctrine,25. 

"  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV:     156-388. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  125 

"  its  commencement,  highly  interesting,  under  many 
views,  to  the  United  States.  As  inhabitants  of  the 
same  hemisphere,  it  was  natural  that  we  should  feel 
a  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  the  colonists.  It  was 
nevertheless  our  duty  to  maintain  the  neutral  char- 
acter with  impartiality  and  allow  of  no  privileges  of 
any  kind  to  one  party  which  were  not  extended  to 
the  other.  The  government  of  Spain  viewing  the 
colonies  as  in  a  state  of  rebellion,  had  endeavored  to 
impose  upon  foreign  powers  in  their  intercourse  with 
them,  the  conditions  applicable  to  such  a  state.  This 
pretension  has  not  been  acceded  to  by  this  govern- 
ment, which  has  considered  the  contest  in  the  light 
of  a  civil  war,  in  which  the  parties  were  equal.  An 
entire  conviction  exists  that  the  view  taken  on  this 
point  has  been  correct,  and  that  the  United  States 
have  fully  satisfied  every  just  claim  of  Spain. 

"  In  other  respects  we  have  been  made  to  feel  the 
progress  of  this  contest.  Our  vessels  have  been  seized 
and  condemned,  our  citizens  made  captives  and  our 
lawful  commerce,  even  at  a  distance  from  the  theatre 
of  the  war,  been  interrupted.  Acting  with  im- 
partiality towards  the  parties,  we  have  endeavored 
to  secure  from  each  a  just  return.  In  whatever 
quarter  the  authority  of  Spain  was  abrogated  and  an 
independent  government  erected,  it  was  essential  to 
the  security  of  our  rights  that  we  should  enjoy  its 


126  South  American  Independence 

"  friendship.  Spain  could  not  impose  conditions  upon 
other  powers  incident  to  complete  sovereignty  in 
places  where  she  did  not  maintain  it.  On  this  prin- 
ciple the  United  States  have  sent  agents  into  the 
Spanish  colonies;  addressed  to  the  existing  authority, 
whether  of  Spain  or  of  the  colony,  with  instructions 
to  cultivate  its  friendship  and  secure  as  far  as 
practicable  the  faithful  observance  of  our  rights. 

"  The  contest  by  the  extension  of  the  revolution- 
ary movement,  and  the  greater  stability  which  it 
appears  to  have  acquired,  becomes  daily  of  more  im- 
portance to  the  United  States.  It  is  by  success  that 
the  colonies  acquire  new  claims  on  other  powers 
which  it  may  comport  neither  with  their  interest  nor 
duty  to  disregard.  Several  of  the  colonies  having 
declared  their  independence  and  enjoyed  it  for  some 
years,  and  the  authority  of  Spain  being  shaken  in 
others,  it  seems  probable  that,  if  the  parties  be  left 
to  themselves,  the  most  permanent  political  changes 
will  be  effected.  It  therefore  seems  incumbent  on 
the  United  States  to  watch  the  movement  in  its  sub- 
sequent steps  with  particular  attention,  with  a  view 
to  pursue  such  course  as  a  just  regard  for  all  those 
considerations  which  they  are  bound  to  respect  may 
dictate. 

"  Under  these  impressions,  the  President  deems 
it  a  duty  to  obtain,  in  a  manner  more  comprehen- 


Policy  of  the  United  States  127 

"  sive  than  has  heretofore  been  done,  correct  infor- 
mation of  the  actual  state  of  affairs  in  those 
colonies.  .  .  ."  *^ 

By  the  time  the  commissioners  bearing  these  in- 
structions sailed,  in  December,  1817,  the  whole 
question  of  recognition  had  assumed  a  new  shape.  It 
had  become  the  subject  of  a  factious  opposition 
waged  by  Henry  Clay.  When  Monroe  became  Presi- 
dent, the  Speaker  had  set  his  heart  on  the  position  of 
Secretary  of  State,  which  had  come  to  be  that  of 
heir-apparent.  "  In  the  government  of  the  United 
States,"  said  Simon  Bolivar,  in  one  of  his  addresses, 
"  it  has  latterly  been  the  practice  to  nominate  the 
prime  minister  as  successor  to  the  president.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  suitable  to  a  republic  than  this 
method."  *^  With  his  eye  fixed  upon  the  presidency, 
Clay  was  prepared  to  be  disgusted  and  thrown  into 
the  opposition  when  Monroe  looked  over  his  head 
and  recalled  Adams  from  the  Court  of  St.  James  to 
take  the  post.**  He  declined  the  portfolio  of  war,  as 
he  had  declined  it  in  the  previous  year,  when  Madi- 
son had  offered  it.     The  British  mission  was,  in  his 

"Rush  to  Rodney  and  Graham,  July  18,  1817.  S.  D.  Mss.  The 
commissioners'  sailed  in  December  with  these  instructions.  Adams 
was  then  Secretary  of  State. 

♦*  Address  to  the  Congress  of  Bolivia,  May  25,  1826.  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XII :    865-893 ;     Miller,  Memoirs,  II :    409. 

**  C.  Schurz,  Henry  Clay,  1 :  126, 141 ;  McMastcr,  Hist.  People,  IV: 
376;   J.  Q.  Adams,  J/e?7ioi>s,  IV:  63. 


128  South  American  Independence 

mind,  no  adequate  substitute,  and  he  returned  to 
Congress  eager  for  a  subject  upon  which  to  fight. 
The  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  Latin- 
American  States  that  were  waging  such  a  stubborn 
war  of  liberation  was  an  admirable  theme  for  a 
romantic  orator.  As  the  friend  of  liberty  he  might 
force  the  hand  of  the  administration,  or  perhaps 
overturn  the  succession  at  the  end  of  Monroe's  term. 
At  any  rate,  he  might  force  his  enemies  to  appear 
the  friends  of  Spain  and  the  upholders  of  a  heartless 
tyranny.*^  The  mutterings  of  the  coming  storm 
were  heard  during  the  recess  of  Congress. 

During  the  summer  of  1817  news  from  South 
America  occupied  a  prominent  place  in  the  news- 
papers. The  progress  of  San  Martin,  in  Chile,  and 
the  doings  of  Bolivar  and  his  Congress  of  Angostura, 
were  described  in  detail  that  grew  more  elaborate  as 
the  weeks  advanced.  In  September  the  topic  of  im- 
mediate recognition  was  broached  in  the  Richmond 
Enquirer.  In  a  series  of  seven  letters,  which  were 
immediately  reprinted  in  the  National  Intelligencer, 
"  Lautaro  "  addressed  the  Hon.  Henry  Clay."     He 

*^Schurz,  I:  146  et  seg.,  thinks  Clay's  adrocacy  was  due  to  sym- 
pathy and  was  not  inspired  by  a  desire  to  oppose  the  administration. 
He  shows  that  Clay  had  expressed  sympathy  as  early  as  1816.  There 
is  a  distinction,  however,  between  active  sympathy  and  a  demand  for 
immediate  recognition.  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  former  Clay  was 
sincere.       *«  National  Intelligencer,  September  30  to  October  18,  1817. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  129 

traversed  the  whole  subject  and  policy  of  the  war  of 
independence,  concluding  with  a  recommendation  of 
recognition  of  Chile  and  Peru,  as  the  most  difficult 
of  access  to  Spain  of  all  her  former  provinces.  Other 
writers  elaborated  and  controverted  various  points  of 
his  argument.  It  is  suspected  that  Mr.  Adams  him- 
self, over  the  name  of  "  Phocion,"  entered  the  con- 
troversy in  behalf  of  conservatism.  Six  weeks  before 
the  opening  of  Congress  the  editor  of  the  Intelli- 
gencer announced  that  if  the  President  should  neglect 
to  treat  the  matter  adequately  in  his  message,  he  was 
warranted  in  saying  that  it  would  be  broached  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  where  it  would  form  a 
good  theme  for  the  display  of  oratorical  abilities.*^ 
Monroe  saw  the  storm  coming  and  questioned  his 
cabinet  on  the  subject.  An  immediate  recognition 
would  remove  this  fertile  topic  from  the  reach  of 
Clay.  But  Mr.  Adams,  though  realizing  the  essen- 
tial rivalry  between  himself  and  the  Speaker,  did  not 
hesitate  to  avow  "  my  opinion  that  it  is  not  now  ex- 
pedient for  the  President  to  acknowledge  the 
Government  of  Buenos  Ayres,"  *^  He  continued  the 
preparations  begun  by  Mr.  Rush  for  sending  the 
commissioners  to  South  America,  determined  not  to 
act  without  real  knowledge  of  the  subject. 

^"^  National  Intelligencer,  October  21,  1817. 
**  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV  :     15. 


130  South  American  Independence 

On  3d  December,  1817,  the  day  before  the  "  Con- 
gress "  sailed,  Henry  Clay  rose  in  the  House  and 
offered  an  amendment  instructing  the  Committee  on 
the  Message  to  inquire  what  was  necessary  to  secure 
to  the  South  Americans  their  rights  as  belligerents." 
The  motion  was  accepted  without  opposition.  The 
period  of  factious  advocacy  had  begun. 

The  Secretary  of  State  was  by  no  means  blind  to 
the  nature  of  the  opposition.  Before  the  first  week 
of  the  session  ended  he  wrote  that  Mr.  Clay  "  had 
already  mounted  his  South  American  great  horse 
.  .  .  [in  his  effort]  to  control  or  overthrow  the 
Executive  by  swaying  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives," ^^  and  as  the  subsequent  weeks  passed  he 
began  to  fear  that  his  opponent  might  succeed.'^ 
Clay  did  not  force  the  fighting  rapidly.  One  of  his 
allies  called  for  the  papers  relating  to  the  independ- 
ence and  condition  of  South  America  on  December 
5th.^^  Three  days  later  he  himself  directed  the  de- 
bate on  Amelia  Island  and  Galveston  to  a  discussion 
of  the  hostility  of  the  administration  towards  the 
revolting  provinces.  ^^     A  little  later  he  opposed  in 

*9  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Seas.,  401. 
*^    ^0  J.  Q.  Adams,  Ifemoirs,   IV:     28. 
51  J.  Q.  Adams,  J/emMTs,   IV:     61. 
5*  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  406. 

S3  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  409,  1890, 1897 ;  A.  S.  P.  F. 
R.,l\:     173-183. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  131 

vain  an  amendment  to  the  neutrality  act.  At  the 
same  time,  stirred  up  by  the  attitude  of  the  opposi- 
tion, if  not  directly  inspired  by  its  members,  the 
South  American  agents  in  Washington  began  their 
importunities  for  immediate  recognition.  None  of 
them  had  presented  credentials  justifying  demands 
of  a  diplomatic  nature,  but  now  one  at  least  offered 
to  conclude  a  treaty,  without  instructions.  On  25th 
March,  1818,  the  President  sent  to  Congress  a  mass 
of  correspondence  on  South  America,  together  with 
a  critical  report  by  Adams  on  the  demands  of  the 
agents.  The  day  before.  Clay  had  come  out  with 
the  beginning  of  his  great  speech.  With  the  general 
appropriation  bill  under  consideration,  he  had  moved 
an  item  of  eighteen  thousand  dollars  to  provide  for 
a  minister  to  the  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata."* 

Candid  members  of  Congress,  as  their  recorded 
votes  show,  realized  that  there  was  no  pressing  need 
for  haste  in  recognizing  countries  that  had  not  even 
^senL  ininisters  to  demand  it.°^  Mr.  Clay's  devoted 
biographer  finds  in  this  "  daring  philanthropy  "  of 
his  subject,  better  described  as  rancorous  benevo- 
lence by  Mr.  Adams,  "  a  law  of  instructions  and 
authority  for  the  president  to  act  upon.  It  was  a 
step — a  large  step  in  advance,  not  only  of  the  coun- 

6*  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV:  67;  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong., 
1  SesB.,  1469.  ssPeck,  Jacksonian  Epoch,  76. 


132  South  American  Independence 

"  try  and  of  the  govemment,  but  of  the  whole  civil- 
ized world."  ^^  Clay  himself  later  discovered  that  it 
was  a  "  course  exclusively  American,"  opposed  to  the 
course  desired  by  the  President,  who  contemplated 
a  simultaneous  recognition  with  European  powers.^^ 
The  speech  was  able,  and  seems  to  have  been  appre- 
ciated by  the  countries  in  whose  behalf  it  was  made. 
"  We  have  learned  from  a  gentleman  who  has 
traveled  in  South  America,  that  the  noble  speeches, 
pronounced  by  Mr.  Clay  in  support  of  his  motion  for 
the  recognition  of  Colombian  Independence,  were 
printed  and  suspended  in  the  Legislative  Halls  and 
Council  Chambers  of  that  country,  and  that  his  name 
was  mentioned  only  to  be  blessed  by  the  people 
whose  cause  he  had  so  ably  and  so  eloquently 
espoused."  °* 

For  several  hours  on  25th  March,  1818,  Clay 
urged  upon  the  House  the  claims  of  South  America.^' 
He  was  as  consistent  as  his  position  at  the  head  of  a 
factious  opposition  would  permit.  He  disclaimed  a 
desire  for  war  with  Spain,  or  for  a  departure  from 
the  customary  course  of  neutrality,  maintaining  that 
a  mere  recogntion  was  no  cause  for  hostilities.     Yet 

^  Calvin  Colton,  The  Life  and  Times  of  Henry  Clay  (2  ed.,  2  voIb., 
New  York,  1846),  I:    216. 

"  Colton,  Clay,  1 :   225.   Speech  of  Clay  at  Lexington,  June  7, 1820. 
^  Littell,  The  Clay  Minstrel,  or  National  Songster,  43. 
^*  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess  ,  1474-1500. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  133 

in  the  same  breath  he  urged  that  Spain  be  pressed 
vigorously  for  redress  for  the  wrongs  she  had  done 
to  the  United  States,  and  that  pressure  be  brought 
not  bj  the  seizure  of  the  Floridas,  but  by  a  recogni- 
tion of  her  provinces. 

With  the  manifesto  of  the  Congress  of  Tucuman 
in  his  hand,  he  drew  an  eloquent  picture  of  an 
oppressed  people,  revolting  not  against  "  a  mere 
theory  of  tyranny,"  as  the  WorthAmerican  colonies 
did,  but  against  an  actual  tyranny  of  centuries,  horri- 
ble, bloody  and  destructive.  Playing  on  the  sym- 
pathies of  the  House  with  one  hand,  \vith  the  other 
he  played  upon  its  greed,  as  he  showed  the  extent  of 
South  American  commerce,  the  value  of  its  exports, 
and  the  deep  and  abiding  interest  of  the  United 
States  therein.  At  the  same  time  he  calmed  the 
fears  of  the  timorous  by  showing  that  Spain  was  in 
no  condition  to  enter  into  a  war — for  which  he  had 
already  said  she  would  have  no  just  cause;  that  the 
allies  had  lost  their  principle  of  cohesion  since 
Waterloo;  that  England,  the  only  dangerous  power 
of  Europe,  had  a  commercial  interest  in  independ- 
ence even  greater  than  our  own. 

As  to  recognition,  he  showed  that  the  United 
States  had  already  established  a  policy  of  acknowl- 
edging the  de  facto  government  without  regard  to  its 
legitimacy.     The   recognition   of  the  revolutionary 


134  South  American  Independence 

governments  of  France,  one  after  another,  proved 
this  conclusively.  The  refusal  to  recognize  either 
government  in  Spain  from  1808  to  1815  confirmed 
his  contention.  And  so,  he  maintained,  our  duty  to 
ourselves  bound  us  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
la  Plata,  which  possessed  an  organized  government 
and  an  unmolested  independence  of  eight  years' 
duration. 

In  conclusion  he  urged  the  co-ordinate  right  of 
Congress  in  recognition,  holding  it  proper  for  either 
Congress  or  President  to  take  the  initial  step. 

The  debate  on  Clay's  amendment  continued  for 
four  days,  revealing  a  general  sympathy  for  the 
patriots  that  brought  members  from  sick  bed  to 
speak  in  their  behalf.  The  heart  of  the  House  was 
generous,  but  its  head  leaned  strongly  to  expediency 
and  propriety  in  spite  of  Clay's  admonition  that  the 
former  was  the  better  guide.  Even  Forsyth,  chair- 
man of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  de- 
fender of  the  administration,  expressed  a  strong, 
hopeful  interest  in  the  colonies,  opposing  the  amend- 
ment on  the  grounds  of  its  impropriety, — for  he 
denied  the  fact  of  independence — its  influence  on 
other  foreign  relations,  and  the  insincerity  of  its 
origin.  "  Notice  had  been  given  from  this  city,  and 
was  now  ringing  through  the  western  country,  that 
questions  were  to  be  brought  in  view,  by  whose  de- 


Policy  of  the  United  States  135 

"  cision  the  people  .would  be  able  to  discriminate  be- 
tween those  who  were  just  and  unjust  to  the 
patriotic  cause — ^between  the  friends  and  the  enemies 
of  freedom."  On  the  28th  of  March  the  motion  was 
lost  by  the  decisive  vote  of  115  to  45.^" 

The  first  session  of  the  fifteenth  Congress  closed 
with  the  issue  of  South  American  recognition  well 
before  the  public,  and  with  Henry  Clay  pledged  as 
its  advocate.  When  the  Congress  met  for  its  second 
session,  the  commissioners,  sent  in  December,  1817, 
had  returned,  and  their  reports  were  transmitted  by 
the  President.  Unfortunately,  no  two  of  the  com- 
missioners could  agree  in  interpreting  what  they  saw. 
Bland  soon  had  lost  confidence  in  the  patriots;  then 
Rodney,  under  the  influence  of  their  secretary, 
Brackenridge,  perhaps,  wrote  an  enthusiastic  report, 
which  Graham  was  unwilling  to  sign.®^  Accordingly 
three  reports  by  the  commissioners  were  sent  to 
Congress  by  the  President  in  November  and  De- 
cember, 1818,  together  with  a  fourth  by  Joel  R, 
Poinsett.  ^^ 

1^0  new  facts  of  importance  were  given  out  in  the 

^Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1500-1522,  1646. 
"J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV:     156,  158.  "V.,^^ 

•'Messageof  November  17, 1818,  and  reportsof  Rodney  and  Graham.       >v 
A.S.P.F.R.,  IV:  217-348.     Message  of  December  15,  1818,  and  reports       / 
of  Bland   and    Poinsett.      Annals  of  Congress,   15  Cong.,    1  Sess.,     / 
2104-2316.  / 


136  South  American  Independence 

reports  of  the  commissioners.  Traveling  in  a  public 
ship  and  in  an  official  capacity,  the  agents  had  caused 
some  little  flutter  in  South  America.  At  Rio  de 
Janeiro  the  Spanish  minister  had  hastened  to  an- 
nounce that  his  master  had  petitioned  the  European 
allies  to  mediate  between  him  and  his  rebellious  sub- 
jects, and  that  Great  Britain  had  responded  favor- 
ably.®^ At  Buenos  Ayres  and  Montevideo  they  had 
been  received  with  every  courtesy  and  honor  that 
they  would  accept.  On  this  their  reports  agree.  But 
the  very  character  of  their  mission  made  it  difficult 
to  go  below  the  surface  in  the  politics  of  South 
America.  They  were  forced  to  accept  such  facts  as 
were  brought  officially  to  their  notice.  Their 
generalizations  upon  these  facts  varied  with  their 
prejudices. 

The  reports  told  the  same  story  that  had  run  in 
the  journals  for  eight  years.  It  was  the  story  of 
political  instability.  Buenos  Ayres,  since  the  erection 
of  her  junta,  in  1809,  had  enjoyed  independence 
of  Spain,  but  nothing  more.  At  no  time  had  she 
possessed  a  central  government  whose  authority  was 
recognized  throughout  all  the  provinces  of  the  old 
vice-royalty.  Several  times  she  had  experienced 
revolutions.  All  the  time  she  had  been  in  danger,  on 
her  northern   frontier,   of   attacks  by  the   Spanish 

«  Adams  to  Gallatin  May  19,  1818.    iS'.  D.  Mas. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  137 

forces  in  upper  Peru.  On  the  east,  Paraguay  re- 
fused resolutely  to  deal  with  Buenos  Ayres;  while 
the  Banda  Oriental  stood  in  continued  revolt  against 
her  authority,  under  the  lead  of  the  partisan  general, 
Artigas,  and  encouraged  by  Brazil,  who  claimed  the 
province. 

With  this  condition  before  him,  Monroe  was  non- 
committal in  his  message.^*  He  could  see  no  pros- 
pect of  a  "  speedy  termination  "  of  the  war.  He  de- 
scribed briefly  the  condition  of  the  rebellious  govern- 
ments. He  expressed  with  satisfaction  the  conviction 
that  the  allies  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  would  confine 
themselves  "  to  the  expression  of  their  sentiments, 
abstaining  from  the  application  of  force."  In- 
ferentially,  the  message  declared  to  Congress  and 
the  world  "  the  determination  of  the  United  States 
to  stand  neutral  in  the  great  contest  between  Spain 
and  her  colonies  till  success  shall  decide  it."  '^ 

Henry  Clay  failed  to  return  to  the  attack  in  this 
session,  although  it  would  have  been  well  for  his 
future  had  he  done  so.  Recognition  and  liberation 
were  essentially  popular  topics.  In  a  way  they  were 
a  manifestation  of  the  feeling  towards  Spain  that 
showed  itself  in  popular  approval  of  General  Jack- 
son's career  in  Florida.     Instead  of  choosing  a  sub- 

"  Richardson,  Meatages,  II :  43,  44 ;  J.  Q.  Adams.  Memoirs,  IV : 
1^.  «  Awimal  Register,  1819,  233. 


138  South  American  Independence 

ject  for  opposition  in  which  the  people  could  be  with 
him,  Clay  felt  bound  to  attack  the  conduct  of  the 
"  military  hero."  For  several  weeks  of  the  session, 
which  was  the  short  one,  he  kept  up  the  fight,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  safer  question  of  recognition.  To- 
wards the  end  of  the  session  Monroe  sent  to  Con- 
gress another  collection  of  documents,  bearing  this 
time  on  his  refusal  to  gi'ant  exequaturs  to  consuls 
from  South  America. ^^  Thereupon  Clay  arose  and 
apologized  for  not  speaking  at  length  in  favor  of  a 
recognition,  pleaded  illness  and  pressure  of  business 
as  an  excuse,  declared  that  his  conviction  as  to  its 
propriety  was  imshaken,  and  promised  to  return  to 
the  subject  when  Congress  should  meet  again.®'^ 

The  administration  was  more  than  content  not  to 
have  recognition  pressed  at  this  time.  Relations  with 
Spain  were  in  a  delicate  condition;  a  treaty  was Jn 
process  of  negotiation.  Determined  to  support  the 
acts  of  Jackson  and  to  acquire  Florida,  it  was  well 
not  to  aggravate  Spain  needlessly  on  the  score  of  her 
coloniesT  The  treaty  was  signed  22d  February,  1819. 
A  revival  of  the  recognition  question  in  the  follow- 
ing session  well-nigh  prevented  its  ratification  by  the 
King  of  Spain,  and  certainly  postponed  it. 

The  sixteenth  Congress  met  to  receive  a  message 

^A.S.P.F.R.,IY:    412 ;    J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV :  223. 
«T  February  10,  1819.    Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1148. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  139 

that  marked  an  advance  towards  recognition.  Mon- 
roe was  moving  as  rapidly  as  events  would  allow  and 
Adams  would  countenance.  The  latter  had  little 
confidence  in  the  South  Americans,  was  unwilling  to 
allow  a  sentimental  sympathy  to  compromise  the 
government,  and  argued  out  of  the  message  an  invita- 
tion to  France  and  Great  Britain  to  act  with  the 
United  States  in  a  joint  recognition.^*  France  and 
Russia  were  both  exerting  pressure  to  prevent  the 
act.  Accordingly  the  message  confined  itself  to  a 
strong  expression  of  sympathy. 

Clay  remembered  his  promise  of  the  last  winter 
and  renewed  his  attempt  to  hasten  the  steps  of  the 
administration. 

During  the  winter  of  1819-1820  the  relations  with 
Spain,  already  confused,  became  more  complicated 
by  the  revolution  in  the  peninsula  and  the  acceptance 
of  a  new  constitution  by  Ferdinand,  The  treaty  had 
not  yet  been  ratified.  The  Spanish  minister  had  been 
instructed  to  get  a  pledge  from  Monroe  that  he  would 
not  recognize  the  colonies  as  a  preliminary  to  ratifi- 
cation. On  9th  May,  1820,  the  President  stated  the 
situation  to  Congress  in  a  temperate  message.''®  He 
transmitted  at  this  time  correspondence  with  the 
envoy  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  over  the  treaty  of 

**  Richardson,  JJ/cssag'es,  II:   58;   J.  Q.  Adams,  ilfemotrs,  IV:  461. 
"Richardson,  JHfessapes,  II:   70. 


140  South  American  Independence 

22d  February,  1819.  He  commented  upon  the  com- 
plaints of  the  latter  respecting  the  hostility  of  the 
citizens  and  the  unfriendly  policy  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States  towards  the  subjects  and  do- 
minions of  Spain,  maintaining  that  both  were 
"  utterly  destitute  of  foundation.  ...  In  regard  to 
the  stipulation  proposed  as  the  condition  of  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty,  that  the  United  States 
shall  abandon  the  right  to  recognize  the  revolution- 
ary colonies  in  South  America,  or  to  form  other 
relations  with  them  when  in  their  judgment  it  may 
be  just  and  expedient  so  to  do,  it  is  manifestly  so 
repugnant  to  the  honor  and  even  to  the  independ- 
ence of  the  United  States,  that  it  has  been  impossi- 
ble to  discuss  it."  But,  considering  the  domestic 
troubles  of  Spain,  he  asked  Congress,  "  Is  this  the 
time  to  make  the  pressure?  If  the  United  States 
were  governed  by  views  of  ambition  and  aggrandize- 
ment, many  strong  reasons  might  be  given  in  its 
favor;  but  they  have  no  objects  of  that  kind  to 
accomplish,  none  which  are  not  founded  in  justice 
and  which  can  be  injured  by  forbearance."  In  con- 
clusion, he  urged  Congress  not  to  decide  the  ques- 
tion until  the  next  session. 

On  the  4th  of  April,  Clay  had  moved  that  it  was 
expedient  to  provide  outfit  and  salary  for  such  min- 
isters to  South  America  as  the  President  might  deem 


Policy  of  the  United  States  141 

it  expedient  to  send.'"  On  the  10th  of  May,  the  day 
after  the  reception  of  the  message,  he  brought  up  his 
motion  in  the  House.  Clay  disliked  the  Spanish 
treaty.  He  was  unwilling  to  compensate  Spain  for 
the  Floridas,  which  we  must  at  any  rate  ultimately 
obtain.  He  was  strongly  opposed  to  a  southwestern 
boundary  that  left  Texas  outside  the  United  States. 
I^Tow  he  seized  the  opportunity  at  once  to  frighten 
Spain  into  a  definite  refusal  to  ratify  the  obnoxious 
treaty,  and  to  attack  the  policy  of  the  administra- 
tion. The  speech  contained  little  that  was  new.  It 
was  a  defiance  of  Spain.  Forgetting  his  maxim  that 
recognition  was  no  violation  of  neutrality.  Clay  re- 
gretted that  the  United  States  had  not  recognized 
the  provinces  two  years  before,  when  they  really 
needed  assistance.  He  urged  the  creation  of  an 
American  system,  with  the  United  States  as  its 
center,  in  defiance  of  the  despotisms  of  the  Old 
World.  And  he  deprecated  the  deference  of  the 
administration  to  the  wishes  of  a  Castlereagh  and  a 
Nesselrode.  To  his  surprise,  perhaps,  and  certainly 
to  the  surprise  of  the  President,  his  motion  passed 
the  House.  The  next  day  Mr.  Adams  had  the  satis- 
faction of  telling  the  French  minister,  de  ISTeuville, 
that  if  Spain  was  vexed  she  had  only  herself  to 

"'"Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1781. 


142  South  American  Independence 

thank;  that  the  administration  contemplated  no 
change  of  policy." 

At  the  next  session,  second  and  last  of  the  six- 
teenth Congress,  Clay  brought  this  motion  up  once 
more.  The  message  of  Monroe,  as  it  referred  to 
South  America,  had  been  short,  friendly  and,  as 
usual,  non-committal.^^  This  was  Clay's  last  oppor- 
tunity, for  he  had  declined  a  re-election  that  he 
might  resume  the  practice  of  law  and  restore  his 
private  affairs  to  some  sort  of  order.  On  3d  Febru- 
ary, 1821,  he  moved  once  more  the  resolution  that 
had  passed  in  the  preceding  May,  and  asked  that  it 
be  referred  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.^^  Here, 
three  days  later,  he  called  it  up  to  speak  in  its  de- 
fence, a  speech  that  has  not  been  preserved.  His 
colleague,  Robertson,  replied. 

Robertson  discountenanced  this  method  of  forcing 
the  hand  of  the  President.  He  objected  to  the  use 
of  an  abstract  resolution  of  the  House  as  an  expres- 
sion of  an  overwhelming  popular  sentiment.  Foreign 
affairs  were  the  business  of  the  executive,  and  in 
his  conduct  of  these  he  should  not  be  embarrassed. 
"  I  voted  with  my  colleague  last  Winter,  .  .  ."  he  de- 
clared,^* "  because  I  was  aiding  him  in  that  which 

'^  The  vote  was  80  to  75.    Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2223- 
2229 ;  Adams,  Memoirs,Y :  108,  111.        "  Kichardson,  Messages,  II :  77. 
''^Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cong.,  2  Seas.,  1029. 
"<*  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1042-1053. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  143 

"  was  to  him  a  splendid  triumph,  and  one  which  was 
achieved  without  sacrifice  of  principle.  I  knew  that 
he  would  soon  leave  us  (which  I  regret),  and  I  was 
anxious  that  he  should  retire  with  honor  and 
applause;  and,  in  regard  to  that  retirement  (which  I 
hope  will  be  only  temporary),  I  thought  it  but  due 
to  his  distinguished  services  that  his  country  should 
say  to  him,  as  Jove  did  to  Hector: — 

"  'Yet  live,  I  give  thee  one  illustrious  day, 
One  blaze  of  glory,  ere  thou  fad'st  away.' 

"  Sir,  the  vote  of  last  Winter,  by  giving  success  to 
his  exertions  for  the  Patriots,  did  crown  him  with 
laurels.  I  would  not  wither  them,  or  pluck  one  leaf 
from  the  bright  wreath.  I  wish  they  may  flourish 
and  be  forever  green.  But  I  cannot  water  them  with 
the  vote  I  am  about  to  give.  I  hoped  that  the  sub- 
ject was  buried  last  Winter,  and  that  it  should  not 
be  resuscitated.  To  carry  the  motion  can  confer  no 
additional  honor  on  the  mover;  to  lose  it,  may  dimin- 
ish the  glory  of  the  triumph  he  has  won.  If  he 
would  be  content  with  an  abstract  expression  of  our 
feelings  towards  the  Patriots,  although  it  is  unneces- 
sary and  superfluous  (having  done  this  before),  I 
would  vote  for  it,  because  it  will  speak  only  what  I 
feel  in  common  with  my  constituents,  and  will  not 
be  liable  to  the  principal  objections  which  I  have 


144  South  American  Independence 

"  to  the  proposition  which  he  has  made.  And  why 
would  not  such  a  resolution  satisfy  all  his  wishes? 
Why  annoy  the  Executive,  session  after  session,  with 
our  opinion  and  advice,  when  we  know  that  he  does 
not  desire  them,  and  will  not  conform  to  them? 
And  why  do  this,  too,  when  every  legitimate  and 
desirable  object  has  been  already  achieved,  and  can 
be  again  effected  if  desired,  as  far  as  the  Patriots  are 
to  be  benef.ted,  in  the  manner  which  I  have  just 
suggested  ?  " 

This  motion  failed  in  the  Committee  of  the  Whole ; 
it  was  lost  again  when  brought  up  in  the  House  on 
February  9th.  But  Clay  saw  that  its  rejection  was 
due  to  form  rather  than  substance,  and  on  the  10th 
offered  a  new  resolution  to  the  effect  that  the  House 
joined  with  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  their 
sympathy  with  the  South  Americans;  that  it  was 
ready  to  support  the  President  whenever  he  should 
think  it  expedient  to  recognize  their  governments. 
The  question  was  divided  on  the  insistence  of  one  of 
the  members,  and  the  first  part  was  carried  by  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  134  to  12.  The  second 
followed  with  86  to  68.  In  the  words  of  his  eulogist, 
Mr.  Clay  "  had  fought  and  won,  before  the  country, 
before  the  world — a  pity  to  say,  against  his  own 
government — one  of  the  most  brilliant  battles  for 
humanity,  and  for  the  rights  of  man,  which  history 


Policy  of  the  United  States  145 

"  records."  ^'^  It  was  a  fitting  end  to  his  period  of 
factious  opposition  when  "  the  triumph  of  Mr.  Clay 
was  signalized  in  the  house  of  representatives  by 
adopting  the  unusual  course  of  appointing  a  special 
committee  to  wait  on  the  president  with  a  copy  of 
the  resolution,  as  a  mode  of  advising  him  [sic]  a 
result  of  their  action  in  the  case.  The  usual  mode 
was  to  transmit  a  certified  copy  of  the  journals  by 
the  hand  of  an  officer  of  the  house.  But  on  this 
occasion,  in  consideration  of  the  importance  of  the 
transaction  in  the  cause  of  freedom,  of  the  notoriety 
which  the  debates  on  the  subject  had  attained,  of 
the  growing  interest  of  the  public  mind,  which  had 
been  raised  to  an  excitement,  and,  inasmuch  as  the 
whole  transaction  was  avowedly  designed  for  moral 
effect — it  could  have  been  no  other — Mr.  Clay 
thought  proper  to  move  for  this  Committee,  which 
was  promptly  granted,  and  himself,  as  a  mover,  was 
of  course  placed  at  the  head  of  it."  For  years  he 
had  been  in  a  sort  of  "  quasi  opposition,"  which 
"  the  president  did  not  think  best  openly  to  oppose." 
Mr.  Monroe  and  his  friends  saw  in  the  committee 
a  studied  insult,  "  but,  of  course,  Mr.  Clay  per- 
formed his  part  with  the  greatest  delicacy  and 
courtesy   toward   the    executive,    though,    after   all 

''^Annals  of  Congress,   16  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  1055,  1071,  1081 ;    Colton 
Clay,  1 :   239. 


146  South  American  Independence 

"  that  had  passed,  it  could  hardly  have  been  very  de- 
sirable to  that  functionary."  '' 

With  this  session  Clay  retired  into  private  life. 
His  triumph  had  been  a  barren  one.  Save  for  em- 
phasizing his  position  and  crowning  his  opposition, 
it  stood  for  nothing.  The  executive,  unmoved  by  the 
resolution,  continued  calmly  on  the  course  it  had 
marked  out  for  itself.  Recognition  did  not  come  a 
day  earlier  because  of  the  advocacy  of  Henry  Clay. 

The  departure  of  the  South  American  commission- 
ers in  December,  1817,  marked  the  commencement 
at  once  of  Clay's  factious  opposition  and  of  a  more 
active  policy  on  the  part  of  the  administration.  The 
inclination  of  Monroe  to  yield  before  the  threats  of 
the  opposition  was  checked  by  John  Quincy  Adams. 
It  was  changed  into  a  determination  to  learn  the 
actual  condition  of  the  republics  and  to  ascertain  the 
attitude  which  the  European  powers  would  take 
towards  recognition  when  it  should  come.  For  the 
administration,  no  less  than  Clay,  sympathized  with 
the  struggle  and  contemplated  recognition  in  the 
near  future. 

The  sympathy  of  Mr.  Adams  was  tempered  with 
misgivings.  "  The  mention  of  Buenos  Ayres,"  he 
wrote  in  one  of  his  political  letters,''^  "  brings  to  my 

/T^-qolton,  Clap,  1 :   242,  243. 

i"  Jj Q.  Adams  to  Alexander H.  Everett,  December  29, 1817.  Letter* 
book-of  J.  Q.  Adams,  Private,  No.  2.  Adams  Mas. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  147 

"  mind  an  Article  that  I  have  lately  seen  in  the  Bos- 
ton Patriot,  and  which  I  concluded  was  from  your 
pen.  Its  tendency  was  to  show  the  inexpediency  and 
injustice  there  would  be  in  our  taking  side  with  the 
South  Americans  in  their  present  struggle  against 
Spain !  It  was  an  excellent  article,  and  I  should  be 
glad  to  see  the  same  train  of  thought  further  pur- 
sued. As  for  example  by  a  discussion,  ...  by  what 
right  we  could  take  side?  and  who  in  this  state  of 
civil  war  has  constituted  us  the  judges,  which  of  the 
parties  has  the  righteous  cause  ?  then  by  an  enquiry 
what  the  cause  of  the  South  Americans  is,  and 
whether  it  really  be  as  their  partisans  here  allege 
the  same  as  our  own  cause  in  the  War  of  our  Revo- 
lution? "Whether  for  instance  if  Buenos  Ayres  has 
formally  offered  to  accept  the  Infant  Don  Carlos  as 
the  absolute  Monarch  upon  condition  of  being  politi- 
cally Independent  of  Spain,  their  cause  is  the  same 
as  ours  was  ?  Whether  if  Bolivar,  being  at  the  head 
of  the  Republic  of  Venezuela,  has  solemnly  pro- 
claimed the  absolute  and  total  emancipation  of  the 
Slaves,  the  cause  of  Venezuela  is  precisely  the  same 
as  ours  was?  Whether  in  short  there  is  any  other 
feature  of  identity  between  their  cause  and  ours, 
than  that  they  are  as  we  were  Colonies  fighting  for 
Independence.  In  our  Revolution  there  were  two 
distinct  Stages.    In  the  first  of  which  we  contended 


148  South  American  Independence 

"  for  our  Civil  Rights  and  in  the  second  for  our 
Political  Independence.    The  second,  as  we  solemnly 
declared  to  the  "World  was  imposed  upon  us  as  a  means 
of  necessity  after  every  practicable  effort  had  been 
in  vain  to  secure  the  first. 
In  South  America,  Civil  Eights  if  not  entirely 
if  the  question  appear  to  have  been^equally  dis- 
jy  ■    regarded  and  trampled  upon  by  all  partiejj^  Buenos 
Ayres  has  no  constitution;   and  its  present  ruling 
|\     powers  are  establishing  only  by  the  entire  banish- 
K       ment  of  their  predecessors.     Venezuela  though  it 
y      has  emancipated  all  its  slaves  has  been  constantly 
y\      alternating  between   an  absolute   Military   Govern- 
ment,   a    Capitulation    to    Spanish    Authority,    and 
Guerillas,  Black  and  White,  of  which  every  petty 
chief  has  acted  for  purposasr^if  War  and  Rapine  as 
an  Independent  Sovereign.  VThere  is  finally  in  South 
America  neither  unity  of  cause  nor  unity  of  effort 
as  there  was  in  our  Revolution.  ' 

"  N^either  was  our  revoluffon  disgraced  by  that 
buccaneering  and  piratical  Spirit  which  has  lately 
appeared  among  the  South  Americans  not  of  their 
own  growth,  but  I  am  sorry  to  say  chiefly  from  the 
contamination  of  their  intercourse  with  us.  Their 
Privateers  have  been  for  the  most  part  fitted  out  and 
officered  in  our  Ports  and  manned  from  the  Sweep- 
ings of  our  Streets.  .  .  .  [yet]  such  is  the  propensity 


Policy  of  the  United  States  149 

"  of  our  people  to  sympathize  with  the  South  Ameri- 
cans, that  no  feeble  exertion  is  now  making  to  rouse 
a  party  in  this  Country  against  the  Government  of 
the  Union,  and  against  the  President  for  having 
issued  orders  to  put  down  this  host  of  free-booters 
at  our  doors." 

The  attitude  of  the  Powers  toward  South  America 
seemed  likely  to  undergo  a  change  during  1818.  Mr. 
Adams  watched  it  with  a  jealous  interest.  The 
earliest  despatches  of  the  commissioners  told  how  at 
Rio  de  Janeiro  "  the  Spanish  Minister,  Count  Casa- 
Flores,  appears  to  have  been  so  much  alarmed  by  the 
suspicion  that  the  object  of  the  mission  was  the 
formal  acknowledgment  of  the  government  of  la 
Plata,  that  he  thought  it  his  duty  to  make  to  Mr. 
Sumter  an  official  communication  that  he  had  re- 
ceived an  official  despatch  from  the  Duke  of  San 
Carlos,  the  Spanish  Ambassador  at  London,  dated 
the  7th  of  I^ovember  last,  informing  him,  that  the 
British  Government  had  acceeded  to  the  proposition 
made  by  the  Spanish  Government  of  a  general  media- 
tion of  the  powers  to  obtain  the  pacification  of  South 
America,  the  negotiation  of  which,  it  was  on  the 
point  of  being  decided,  whether  it  should  be  at  London 
or  Madrid"  '* 

On  the  receipt  of  this  news,  the  Secretary  of  State 

"Adams  to  Gallatin,  May  19, 1818.  S.  D.  Mss. 


150  South  American  Independence 

wrote  to  the  American  minister  in  Paris,  Albert  Gal- 
latin, complaining  of  the  reserve  with  which  the 
European  powers  treated  the  United  States.  He 
regretted  at  length  that  they  had  seen  fit  to  conceal 
this  proposed  mediation.  If  its  object  "  be  any  other 
than  to  promote  the  total  independence  political  and 
commercial  of  South  America,  we  are  neither  desir- 
ous of  being  iavited  to  take  a  part  in  it,  nor  dis- 
posed to  accept  the  invitation  if  given.  Our  policy 
in  the  contest  between  Spain  and  her  colonies  has 
been  impartial  neutrality.  Is  the  proposed  general 
mediation  to  be  a  departure  from  that  line  of  neu- 
trality? If  it  is,  which  side  of  the  contest  are  the 
allies  to  take?  the  side  of  Spain?  on  what  principle 
and  by  what  right  ?  As  contesting  parties  in  a  civil 
war,  the  South  Americans  have  rights,  which  the 
other  powers  are  bound  to  respect  as  much  as  the 
rights  of  Spain;  and  after  having  by  an  avowed  neu- 
trality, admitted  the  existence  of  those  rights,  upon 
what  principle  of  justice  can  the  allies  consider  them 
as  forfeited,  or  themselves  as  justifiable  in  taking 
sides  with  Spain  against  them  ? 

"  There  is  no  discernible  motive  of  justice  or  of 
interest  which  can  induce  the  allied  sovereigns  to 
interpose  for  the  restoration  of  the  Spanish  colonial 
dominion  in  South  America.  There  is  none  even  of 
policy;  for  if  all  the  organized  power  of  Europe  is 


Policy  of  the  United  States  151 

"  combined  to  maintain  the  authority  of  each  Sover- 
eign over  his  own  people,  it  is  hardly  supposed  that 
the  sober  senses  of  the  allied  cabinets  will  permit 
them  to  extend  the  application  of  this  principle  of 
union  to  the  maintenance  of  colonial  dominion  be- 
yond the  Atlantic  and  the  Equator. 

"  By  the  usual  principles  of  international  law,  the 
state  of  neutrality,  recognizes  the  cause  of  both  par- 
ties to  the  contest,  as  just — that  is,  it  avoids  all  con- 
sideration of  the  merits  of  the  contest.  But  when 
abandoning  that  neutrality,  a  nation  takes  one  side, 
in  a  war  of  other  parties,  the  first  question  to  be 
settled  is  the  justice  of  the  cause  to  be  assumed.  If 
the  European  allies  are  to  take  side  with  Spain,  to 
reduce  the  South  American  colonies  to  submission, 
we  trust  they  will  make  some  previous  enquiry  into 
the  justice  of  the  cause  they  are  to  undertake.  As 
neutrals  we  are  not  required  to  decide  the  question 
of  justice.  We  are  sure  we  should  not  find  it  on  the 
side  of  Spain." 

These  general  principles  Mr.  Gallatin  was  in- 
structed to  communicate  informally  to  the  French 
minister.  He  was  to  assure  him  "  That  it  is  our 
earnest  desire  to  pursue  a  line  of  policy,  at  once  just 
to  both  parties  in  that  contest,  and  harmonious  with 
that  of  the  European  allies.  That  we  must  know 
their  system,  in  order  to  shape  our  own  measures 


152  South  American  Independence 

accordingly;  but  that  we  do  not  want  to  join  them  in 
any  plan  of  interference  to  restore  any  part  of  the 
Spanish  supremacy,  in  any  of  the  South  American 
Provinces."  ^® 

In  the  same  frame  of  mind,  and  in  some  of  the 
same  paragraphs,  Adams  wrote  to  Richard  Rush  in 
London  the  following  day.***  He  conjectured  wisely, 
in  conclusion,  that  the  British  Cabinet  "will  soon 
discover  the  great  interest  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
total  Independence  of  South  America,  and  will  pro- 
mote that  event  just  as  far  as  cheir  obligations 
towards  Spain  will  permit.  The  time  is  probably  not 
far  remote,  when  the  acknowledgment  of  the  South 
American  Independence  will  be  an  act  of  friendship 
towards  Spain  herself — when  it  will  be  kindness  to 
her  to  put  an  end  to  that  self-delusion  under  which 
she  is  wasting  all  the  remnant  of  her  resources,  in  a 
war,  infamous  by  the  atrocities  with  which  it  is  car- 
ried on,  and  utterly  hopeless  of  success.  It  may  be 
an  interesting  object  of  your  attention  to  watch  the 
moment  when  this  idea  will  become  prevalent  in  the 
British  Councils,  and  to  encourage  any  disposition 
which  may  consequently  be  manifested  to  a  more 
perfect  concert  of  measures  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  towards  that  end;  the  total 

"Adams  to  Gallatin,  May  19,  1818.   S.  D.  Mss. 
w  Adams  to  Rush,  May  20,  1818.  8.  D.  Mss. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  153 

"  Independence   of   the    Spanish     South    American 
Provinces."  .  .  . 

Thus  in  the  spring  of  1818  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  was  outlined  in  the  instructions  to  Eush  and 
Gallatin,  and  later  to  George  W.  Campbell  at  St. 
Petersburg.*^  It  was  unmistakably  the  policy  of 
John  Quincy  Adams.  It  was  a  policy  distinctly 
friendly  to  South  America,  Mr.  Clay  to  the  contrary, 
notwithstanding.  It  watched  with  considerable 
apprehension  the  gathering  of  the  sovereigns  at  Aix- 
la-Chapelle;  but  had  a  well-founded  suspicion  that 
the  interests  of  these  same  sovereigns  would  confine 
their  activities  to  their  own  side  of  the  Atlantic.  It 
took  such  shape  that  the  Russian  minister  in  the 
autumn  could  express  satisfaction  "  to  see  a  navy 
growing  up  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  that 
might  one  day  act  as  a  hallance,  as  he  expressed  him- 
self to  that  on  this  side."  ^^  From  broad  principles 
of  policy  Mr.  Adams  now  had  to  turn  his  attention 
to  the  doings  of  agents.  North  and  South  American. 
The  embarrassments  caused  to  the  administration 
by  Henry  Clay  hardly  exceeded  those  for  which  the 
agents  of  the  patriots  in  the  United  States,  or  of  the 
United  States  in  the  southern  republics,  were  respon- 
se June  28, 1818.    S.  D.  Mss. 

«»  G.  "W.  Campbell  to  Adams,  from  St.  Peteriburg,  October  7,  1818. 
S.  D.  Mss. 


154  South  American  Independence 

sible.  These  of  the  agents  were  not  confined  to  ses- 
sions of  Congress,  like  the  former,  but  were  peren- 
nial. Don  Manuel  Hermenegildo  de  Aguirre  had 
arrived  from  Buenos  Ayres  in  1817,  bearing  a  com- 
mission from  the  Supreme  Director,  Pueyrredon, 
accrediting  him  as  "  Agent  of  this  Government  near 
that  of  the  United  States  of  IlTorth  America,"  and 
asking  for  him  "  all  the  protection  and  consideration 
required  by  his  diplomatic  rank  and  the  actual  state 
of  our  relations."  ®'  Once  in  the  United  States,  he 
engaged  in  the  patriotic  work  of  equipping  priva- 
teers. In  odd  moments  he  addressed  the  Secretary 
of  State,^*  to  demand  recognition  and  countenance, 
to  complain  of  the  injustice  done  his  country  by  the 
neutrality  acts,  to  explain  the  workings  and  describe 
the  situation  of  his  government,  to  emphasize  the 
moderation  of  his  demands,  and  to  threaten  the 
United  States  with  severance  of  commercial  rela- 
tions. Mr.  Adams  was  not  a  timid  man  to  be  fright- 
ened into  recognition  nor  was  he  a  weak  man  to  be 
driven  into  hostility  to  the  patriots  by  their  lack  of 
consideration.  He  continued  unmoved,  though  with 
some  irritation,  his  friendly,  conservative  course.  In 
the  summer  of  1818  he  was  forced  to  refuse  com- 

**  Annals  of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1879,  1880. 
«*  December  16,  24,  26  and  29,  1817  ;    January  6  and  16,  1818.    An- 
nals of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1877-1897. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  155 

pliance  with  the  demands  of  one  de  Forrest  to  be 
granted  an  exequatur  as  Consul  General  for  Buenos 
Ayres  in  the  United  States.  Here  he  laid  down  the 
doctrine  that  the  granting  of  an  exequatur  is  a  recog- 
nition. His  own  agents  caused  him  the  greatest 
trouble.  In  one  of  the  revolts  in  Buenos  Ajres, 
Devereux  guaranteed  a  loan  that  saved  the  life  of 
the  existing  government.  For  this  he  was  dismissed 
in  1817  by  the  predecessor  of  Mr.  Adams.  His 
successors,  Worthington  and  Ilalsey,  did  little  better. 
The  former,  "  swelling  upon  his  agency  "  until  he 
broke  out  "  into  a  self-accredited  Plenipotentiary," 
negotiated  a  commercial  treaty  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility. The  latter  entered  into  privateering  schemes 
and  sent  blank  commissions  to  the  United  States. 
He  was  summarily  removed.  On  the  whole,  the 
position  of  the  Secretary  of  State  was  not  a  happy 
one.  He  was  the  great  restraining  influence;  poli- 
ticians were  shouting  for  recognition;  agents  of  all 
sorts  were  embarrassing  the  government,  and  his 
own  colleagues  in  the  cabinet  were  discussing  the 
expediency  of  sending  a  naval  force  into  southern 
waters  to  encourage  the  insurgent  states. ^^ 

President  Monroe  was  ready  to  move  more  rapidly 
in  the  direction  of  recognition  than  was  Mr.  Adams. 

85  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV :  70,  88,  91, 158.  Rush  to  Halsey,  April 
21.1817:  AdamstoHalsey,  January  22,  1818.  S.  D.  Msa. 


156  South  ^  American  Independence 

In  July,  1818,  he  wanted  to  propose  to  England  a 
co-ojjeration  in  behalf  of  the  South  Americans.  If 
the  journal  of  Mr.  Adams,  which  is  the  only  authority 
on  the  point,  can  be  accepted,  the  President  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  eager  demands  of  the  Richmond  En- 
quirer, and  only  the  arguments  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  restrained  his  benevolence.^®  Evidently  these 
arguments  were  effective,  for  the  proposal  was  not 
made.  In  its  place  a  circular  was  directed  to  the 
American  ministers  at  London,  Paris  and  St.  Peters- 
burg in  August,  asking  what  part  these  governments 
"will  take  in  the  dispute  between  Spain  and  her 
colonies,  and  in  what  light  they  will  view  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  Independence  of  the  Colonies 
by  the  United  States?  Whether  they  will  view  it 
as  an  act  of  hostility  to  Spain,  and  in  case  Spain 
should  declare  war  against  us,  in  consequence, 
whether  .  .  .  [they]  will  take  part  with  her  in  it  ?  "  ®^ 
When  the  responses  to  this  circular  began  to  come 
in,  it  was  clear  that  Mr.  Adams  had  not  misjudged 
the  attitude  of  the  Powers.  From  London,  Rush 
wrote  in  October  that  a  recognition  would  certainly 
meet  with  popular  approval  in  England,  while  the 
ministry,  although  "  high-toned  in  its  aristocracy," 

**  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs  IV :    118. 

8'  Adams  to  Rush,  August  15,   1818 ;     to  Gallatin  and  Campbell, 
August  20, 1818.  ;S'.  D.  Mss. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  157 

would  not  be  likely  "  to  take  Spain  by  the  hand  in  a 
war  against  us."  France,  wrote  Gallatin,  would 
view  a  recognition  with  disfavor  because  of  the 
peculiar  nature  of  her  family  ties  with  Spain ;  but  she 
would  not  fight  over  this  cause.  Russia  would  not 
fight  alone,  was  Campbell's  estimate  of  the  situation 
at  his  court. ^^  She  might  uphold  the  rights  of  Spain 
in  concert  with  the  allies,  but  without  them  she 
would  not  move.  A  little  later  Rush  intimated  that 
the  vigorous  determination  of  the  President  to  have 
nothing  to  do  with  any  scheme  for  coercing  the  col- 
onies had  helped  to  decide  the  Court  of  St.  James  in 
the  matter. 

The  Congress  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  adjourned  with- 
out taking  action  acceptable  to  Spain.  It  recom- 
mended a  mediation  through  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton,^^ which  England  accepted  on  the  condition  that 
in  event  of  his  failure  to  reconcile  the  combatants 
there  should  be  no  resort  to  coercion. 

But  before  these  responses  reached  Washington 
Congress  had  convened,  and  the  President  once  more 
had  been  forced  to  decide  upon  a  policy.  By  this 
time    the    discordant   reports   of   the    three    South 

88  Rush  to  Adams,  October  12  and  November  20,  1818 ;  Gallatin  to 
Adams,  November  5,  1818 ;  Campbell  to  Adams,  December  22,  18181 
S.  D.  Mss. 

89  Campbell  to  Adams,  February  18,  1819.   S.  D.  Met. 


158  South  American  Independence 

American  Commissioners  were  at  hand.  With  the 
picture  of  political  disorder  revealed  hj  these  re- 
ports before  his  eyes,  and  with  his  mind  uncertain 
as  to  the  policy  of  the  allies,  Adams  could  have  no 
hesitation  in  counselling  delay. ''°  A  year  before 
Monroe  had  thought  seriously  of  an  immediate 
recognition;  now  he  seems  to  have  agreed  vdth  his 
Secretary.  "  From  the  view  taken  of  this  subject," 
he  announced,  "  founded  on  all  the  information  that 
we  have  been  able  to  obtain,  there  is  good  cause  to 
be  satisfied  with  the  course  heretofore  pursued  by 
the  United  States  in  regard  to  this  contest,  and  to 
conclude  that  it  is  proper  to  adhere  to  it,,  especially 
in  the  present  state  of  affairs."  ®^ 

The  session  which  began  in  November,  1818,  the 
second  of  the  fifteenth  Congress,  is  the  one  in  which 
Clay  built  up  his  opposition  on  Florida  rather  than 
on  South  America.  Attacking  the  conduct  of  Jack- 
son with  all  his  strength,  he  gave  the  administration 
opportunity  to  pursue  its  own  policy  unhampered. 
Mr.  Adams  was  obliged,  however,  to  develop  the 
domestic  portion  of  his  policy  to  meet  the  demands 
of  the  South  American  agents.  David  C.  De  Forest 
from  Buenos  Ayres,  and  Don  Lino  de  Clemente, 
from  Venezuela,  were  at  this  time  demanding  recog- 

*>  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV :  166.      *!  Richardson,  Messages,  II :  44. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  159 

nition  as  consuls  from  their  respective  republics.  The 
latter  was  not  given  even  a  hearing,  for  the  commis- 
sion of  a  privateer,  with  his  signature  annexed,  had 
come  to  the  hand  of  the  State  Department.  The 
former  was  heard  in  full,  but  his  solicitations  met 
with  no  success,  for  Adams  felt,  as  already  stated, 
that  granting  an  exequatur  is  tantamount  to  a  recog- 
nition. De  Forest  did  not  rest  easily  upon  his  re- 
fusal, but  protested  bitterly.  The  House  called  for 
papers  upon  the  applications,  and  received  from  the 
Secretary  a  careful  report  that  described  the  sins  of 
Clemente,  the  unauthorized  treaty  of  Worthington 
and  De  Forest's  petition  based  upon  it,  and  the  weak- 
ness ■  of  the  latter's  argument  that  granting  an 
exequatur  is  not  a  recognition.®^ 

Although  not  yet  ready  for  a  recognition  at  the 
end  of  1818,  Monroe  felt  that  the  time  for  it  was 
rapidly  approaching.  As  December  passed  away  the 
prospect  of  European  intervention  in  behalf  of  Spain 
grew  less  and  less.  At  the  beginning  of  January, 
1819,  the  Secretary  of  State  was  ordered  to  draft  a 
new  instruction  to  the  minister  in  London.  The 
document  bears  date  the   1st  of  January.     It  was 

"Adams  to  Clemente,  December  16,  1818;  De  Forest  to  Adams, 
January  8, 1819.  S.  D.  Mss. ;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV  :  223 ;  AnnaU 
of  Congress,  15  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  544,  1606,  1612. 


160  South  American  Independence 

not  despatched  until  the  month  was  several  days 
advanced.®^ 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  towards  the  rebel- 
lious provinces  of  Spain,  wrote  Adams,  in  substance, 
has  been  one  of  rigid  neutrality.  We  have  not  recog- 
nized them  as  independent,  nor  received  their  con- 
suls, which  were  an  equivalent  act.  But  we  have 
considered  it  an  obligation  of  our  neutrality  to  give 
the  parties  as  equal  rights  as  possible;  so  we  have 
always  listened  to  the  representations  of  their  agents. 
Thus  far  our  neutrality  operates  against  Spain,  as 
an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  nature  of  the 
struggle.  With  the  preponderating  success  of  one 
of  the  parties  to  the  civil  war,  this  condition  will 
cease,  as  it  has  done  in  Mexico  and  seems  likely  soon 
to  do  in  Buenos  Ayres.  Spain  has  solicited  the 
mediation  of  the  allies  to  prevent  this  separation,  but 
such  mediation,  as  Great  Britain  clearly  saw,  would 
be  a  departure  on  their  part  from  the  line  of  neu- 
trality. We  are  opposed  to  a  third-party  interven- 
tion of  any  sort.  We  believe  "  that  the  contest  can- 
not and  ought  not  to  terminate  otherwise  than  by 
the  total  Independence  of  South  America,"  but  we 
desire  to  do  our  duty  by  Spain  and  maintain  the 

9»  Adams  to  Rush,  January  1,  1819.  S.  D.  Msa.  The  copy  in  the 
Adams  Mss.  is  endorsed  as  being  sent  January  4  by  Mr.  Bagot's  mes- 
senger. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  161 

good-will  of  the  Powers,  and  so  have  taken  no  de- 
cisive step  as  yet.  Now  that  we  are  convinced  that 
the  power  of  Spain  cannot  be  restored,  we  desire 
Europe  to  consider  how  important  it  is  that  the  new 
States  should  be  recognized  and  held  in  their  re- 
sponsibilities as  independent  bodies.  We  have  it  in 
contemplation  ourselves  to  acknowledge  the  govern- 
ment of  Buenos  Ajres  at  no  remote  period  unless 
something  should  occur  to  justify  a  further  postpone- 
ment of  the  act.  It  would  be  gratifying  should 
England  see  fit  to  adopt  similar  measures  at  the  same 
time  and  in  concert  with  the  United  States.  "  When 
adopted  it  will  be  a  mere  acknowledgment  of  the  fact 
of  Independence,  and  without  deciding  upon  the  ex- 
tent of  their  Territory,  or  upon  their  claims  to  sov- 
ereignty, in  any  part  of  the  Provinces  of  La  Plata, 
where  it  is  not  established  and  uncontested." 

The  unforeseen  seems  to  have  happened  on  the 
3d  of  January,  1819,  when  it  was  learned  that  the 
success  of  the  Florida  negotiations  would  be  endan- 
gered by  a  recognition.  Eor  more  than  two  years, 
until  the  treaty  was  signed  and  safely  ratified,  recog- 
nition was  postponed.  Agitation  did  not  cease  during 
these  two  years;  factious  opposition  did  its  worst; 
Don  Manuel  Torres,  a  new  agent  from  Colombia, 
created  a  long  series  of  entries  in  Mr.  Adams's 
journal.     There  is  no  absolute  evidence  that  fear  of 


162  South  American  Independence 

Spain  was  the  inspiring  motive  of  the  administra- 
tion's conservatism.  But  Adams  ceased  to  worry 
over  the  attitude  of  Europe  during  these  years.  He 
announced  a  policy  of  forbearance  for  the  time  to 
the  Russian  minister.  There  is  abundant  proof  in 
the  correspondence  with  Spain  that  recognition  was 
a  determining  cause  in  the  delay  of  the  latter  to 
ratify  the  treaty.  And  it  is  certain  that  recognition 
did  not  come  until  the  winter  of  1822. 

The  message  of  1819,  expurgated  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  until  it  was  harmless,  made  some  slight 
advance  toward  recognition.  Mr.  Adamfe  felt  that 
the  less  said  about  South  America  at  this  time  the 
better  it  would  be.®*  Three  months  later  he  opposed 
in  the  Cabinet  a  tendency  to  grant  arms  to  the 
Colombians,  denouncing  the  scheme  as  dishonorable, 
unneutral,  unconstitutional,  and  an  act  of  war.  At 
the  same  time,  outside  the  Cabinet,  he  resisted  the 
efforts  of  an  "  ambidexter  personage,"  agent  of 
Venezuela  in  Washington,  to  get  himself  appointed 
as  agent  of  the  United  States  to  Venezuela.®^  The 
whole  burden  of  foreign  policy  seems  to  have  been 
laid  upon  the  broad  shoulders  of  John  Quincy 
Adams.  To  conciliate  Spain  and  induce  her  to  ratify 
a  treaty  forced  upon  him  by  the  administration,  he 

9*  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV :    209,  379,  461. 
*^  J.  Q.  Ad&ms,  Memoirs,  Y :   45-51. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  163 

had  to  fight  at  once  the  opposition  of  the  Speaker 
of  the  House,  the  pretensions  of  the  South  Ameri- 
cans and  the  unneutral  disposition  of  his  own 
cabinet.  When  the  President  transmitted  his  mes- 
sage of  9th  May,  1820,  with  its  hard  words  for  the 
demands  of  Spain,  the  first  storm  broke,  and  Clay, 
as  has  been  seen,  gained  his  first  triumph. 

The  summer  of  1820  saw  more  agents  sent  to 
South  America,  charged  to  protest  against  the  acts 
of  insurgent  privateers  and  to  acquire  news.  Charles 
S.  Todd  went  as  Agent  for  Seamen  and  Commerce 
to  Colombia.  "  With  regard  to  the  formal  recogni- 
tion by  the  Government  of  the  U.  S.  of  the 
Republic  of  Colombia,"  were  his  instructions, 
"  should  anything  be  said  to  you,  the  obvious  reply 
will  be  that  you  have  not  been  authorized  to  discuss 
the  subject.  As  a  reason  for  this  reserve  it  may  be 
alleged  that  besides  the  actual  War  still  waged  by 
Spain,  during  which  the  Independence  of  the  other 
party  could  not  be  acknowledged  without  a  depart- 
ure from  our  avowed  and  long-established  system  of 
neutrality,  the  changes  still  occurring  will  require 
some  lapse  of  time  to  give  to  the  Republic  that  char- 
acter of  permanency  which  would  justify  the  formal 
acknowledgment  of  it  by  foreign  powers."  ®* 

J.   B.   Prevost,   agent   at  Lima,   had  been  trans- 

«« Adams  to  Todd,  June  5,  1820.  S.  £>.  Mss. 


164  South  American  Independence 

f  erred  to  Buenos  Ay  res  in  1819  on  the  dismissal  of 
Halsej  and  Worthington;  but  his  sphere  of  activity 
covered  also  Chile  and  Peru.  Uncertain  as  to  his 
location,  Adams  commissioned  John  M.  Forbes  to 
Chile  or  Buenos  Ayres,  as  there  should  be  a  vacancy, 
in  June,  1820.  The  instructions  of  Forbes  are 
dated  5th  July,  1820.  Further  and  more  significant 
instructions  were  issued  to  him  after  the  arrival  of  a 
despatch  from  Prevost  a  week  later.^^  In  these  the 
Secretary  reviewed  recent  upheavals  in  Buenos 
Ayres,  warning  Forbes,  as  Todd  had  been  warned, 
not  to  discuss  a  recognition.  ISTow  that  the  old  cen- 
tral government  had  been  swept  away,  if  we  were 
"  to  recognize  the  single  province  of  Buenos  Ayres, 
the  recognition  upon  reaching  that  city  might  prob- 
ably find  it  no  longer  independent. 

"  You  will  take  occasion  to  remark  whenever  it 
may  be  proper  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  have  never  intended  to  secure  to  themselves 
any  advantage,  commercial  or  otherwise,  as  an  equiv- 
alent for  acknowledging  the  Independence  of  any 
part  of  South  America,  They  do  not  think  it  a 
proper  subject  for  equivalent;  and  they  have  entire 
confidence  that  no  exclusive  privilege  will  be  granted 

^  Adams  to  Prevost,  May  3,  1819 ;  Adams  to  Forbes,  Jnly  12,  1820. 
S.  D.  Mss.  Annals  of  Congress,  17  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2059;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :  .^70 


Policy  of  the  United  States  165 

"  to  any  other  nation  to  the  prejudice  of  the  U.  S. 
They  think  themselves  entitled  to  this,  and  con- 
sider it  as  essential  to  the  Independence  itself  to 
be  acknowledged — aware  that  no  such  privileges  can 
be  granted  but  by  a  sacrifice  of  the  interests  of  the 
nation  which  grants  them,  they  have  never  intended 
to  ask  them  to  the  detriment  of  others,  as  they  rely 
that  they  will  not  be  conceded  to  others  in  detriment 
to  them." 

The  early  despatches  of  Forbes  show  a  most  dis- 
tracted condition  prevailing  in  Buenos  Ayres  in 
1821.  The  news  from  Prevost,  dated  30th  April, 
1820,  was  of  a  successful  revolt  against  the  Congress 
and  the  Supreme  Director  Pueyrredon.  The  latter, 
with  his  faction,  had  been  engaged  in  secret  negotia- 
tions with  France  and  Spain,  having  in  view  the 
establishment  of  a  Bourbon  dynasty  in  South 
America.  A  revolt  overthrew  him  and  started  a 
prosecution  of  the  leaders  of  his  party  for  high 
treason,  thus  continuing  a  decade  of  turmoil.  "  Up 
to  1820  .  .  .  the  History  of  these  Provinces  com- 
prises little  but  a  Series  of  Military  Operations. 
.  .  .  The  Successes  of  their  Armies  have  been  splen- 
did and  extraordinary,  but  a  Review  of  their  inter- 
nal  Government   for   the   first   ten   years   presents 


166  South  American  Independence 

"  nothing  but  a  Picture  of  Anarchy  and  Confu- 
sion." ^^  This  was  the  time  when  General  San  Mar- 
tin, engaged  in  Chile  in  his  large  projects  against 
Peru,  disobeyed  the  orders  of  his  government  to  re- 
turn home  and  restore  peace.'*^ 

Pueyrredon  went  into  exile  in  the  early  part  of 
1820.  He  was  succeeded  in  quick  succession  of  dic- 
tatorship by  Aguirre,  known  in  ITorth  America; 
Sarratea  and  Balcarce,  until  the  affairs  of  the  prov- 
inces became  hopeless.  As  Forbes  reached  Pio  de 
Janeiro  on  the  way  to  his  post,  in  September,  1820, 
he  learned  that  "  a  kind  of  political  Auction  is  to 
take  place  at  which  the  rights  of  a  distracted  Coun- 
try are  to  be  struck  off  to  the  highest  bidder. — Eng- 
land will  offer  maritime  protection  and  Commercial 
abundance  and,  notwithstanding  that  the  most  im- 
penetrable mystery  covers  everything  here,  it  is 
inferred  from  the  gaiety  and  good  humor  of  the 
Spanish  mission  that  the  nature  of  the  proposals  they 
are  about  to  make  is  not  without  charms  and  hope." 

Preceded  by  rumors  that  he  bore  a  formal  recog- 
nition, Forbes  was  received  by  the  local  government 
at  Buenos  Ayres  with  distinguished  honors.  State 
coach  and  aide-de-camp  were  forced  upon  him;   a 

98  Report  of  Woodbine  Parish,  June  25,  1824.  F.  0.  Mss.  An 
Account .  .  .  of  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  (London, 
1825),  9,  20-24. 

99  Sketch  of  Occurrences  in  Buenos  Ayres,  1820.   S.  D.  Mss. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  167 

public  mansion  was  offered  for  his  residence;  while 
on  the  other  hand,  he  was  embarrassed  by  the  evil 
rumors  that  he  attributed  to  disgruntled  South 
American  agents  who  had  returned  from  Washing- 
ton to  justify  their  failure  by  attacking  the  United 
States.  But  Forbes  could  not  be  lured  into  partisan 
politics.  He  sat  outside,  watching  the  game  of  fac- 
tions, sometimes  hazarding  "  the  opinion  that  a  per- 
manent and  good  government  is  very  important." 

The  government  at  Buenos  Ayres,  by  the  end  of 
the  year,  had  become  a  "  mere  military  police,"  liv- 
ing a  precarious  existence  from  day  to  day,  and 
awaiting  the  action  of  a  Congress  of  the  provinces 
assembling  at  Cordova.  It  was  a  war  between  re- 
publicanism in  the  provinces  and  monarchical  ten- 
dency at  Buenos  Ayres.  The  Congress  gathered 
with  true  Castilian  deliberation,  to  perform  an  enor- 
mous task.  It  "  requires  little  short  of  Omnipo- 
tence," wrote  Forbes,  "  to  create  order  out  of  such 
utter  Chaos  as  now  exists."  By  the  1st  of  April, 
1821,  he  was  reduced  to  wish  for  a  popular  general 
and  a  victorious  republican  army,  for  the  country 
seemed  "  in  the  most  utter  darkness  of  despair  and 
without  one  ray  of  hope."  On  20th  April,  Good 
Friday,  Pueyrredon  landed,  having  returned  from 
exile  at  the  call  of  the  government.  In  two  weeks 
more  the  clouds  of  anarchy  had  broken. 


168  South  American  Independence 

About  1st  May,  1821,  there  appeared  in  Buenos 
Ayres  a  new  journal,  edited  by  two  patriots,  Ber- 
nardo Kivadavia  and  Manuel  Jose  Garcia,  of  whom 
the  former  had  once  been  at  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment, while  both  had  just  returned  from  an  extended 
diplomatic  mission  in  Europe.  Before  the  end  of  the 
month  it  appeared  to  the  American  agent  that  the 
party  of  Pueyrredon  was  falling  into  disrepute.  In 
July  the  administration  fell,  Eivadavia  came  in  as 
Minister  of  State,  while  Garcia  took  the  Treasury. 
This  was  the  beginning  of  an  orderly  government  in 
Buenos  Ayres.  Garcia  at  once  inaugurated  a  policy 
"  without  example  in  the  history  of  the  Revolution," 
by  paying  the  debts  of  the  government,  and  paying 
them  in  gold.  Eivadavia,  after  some  correspondence 
with  Forbes,  issued  a  decree  recalling  all  privateers 
sailing  under  the  flag  of  Buenos  Ayres  and  revoking 
their  commissions.  At  the  same  time  glad  tidings 
came  from  across  the  mountains.  "  At  the  moment 
I  am  writing,"  wrote  Forbes  on  2d  September,  "  a 
salvo  of  Artillery  and  the  most  extravagant  demon- 
strations of  joy  through  the  streets,  announce  the 
capture  of  Lima  by  San  Martin's  besieging  army.  If 
this  news  be  true,  it  puts  the  Seal  to  the  Independ- 
ence of  South  America.  The  Spanish  Royalty, 
driven  from  its  last  hope  in  these  Provinces,  and 
enlightened  by  a  Representative  Government,  will,  I 


Policy  of  the  United  States  169 

"  think,  within  six  months,  acknowledge  their  Inde- 
pendence." 

The  news  was  true.  Progress  during  the  past 
months  had  not  been  confined  to  the  limits  of  Buenos 
Ayres  or  to  the  leadership  of  Rivadavia  and  Garcia. 
We  have  already  traced  the  steps  of  the  armies  of 
liberation.  San  Martin,  in  July,  1821,  had  really 
marched  into  the  city  of  Lima,  after  a  year's  cam- 
paign of  education  in  its  vicinity.  Bolivar  had  ended 
the  truce  with  Morillo  to  defeat  the  royalists  at 
Carabobo  on  24th  June.  On  12th  July  his  Congress 
at  Cucuta  had  proclaimed  the  permanent  union  of 
Venezuela  and  ISTew  Granada ;  while  on  30th  August 
it  had  proclaimed  a  federative  constitution  for  the 
new  republic. 

The  year  1821  was  marked  by  successes  of  the  re- 
publican armies  and  by  the  erection  of  orderly  gov- 
ernments in  the  most  important  of  the  South  Ameri- 
can States,  while  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic 
it  seemed  probable  that  Spain  had  come  to  her 
senses.  The  successful  revolution  of  1820,  establish- 
ing Ferdinand  VII.  as  constitutional  monarch,  was 
followed  by  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  colonies  and 
the  mother  country.  It  could  not  be  foreseen  that 
an  armed  intervention  would  overthrow  the  con- 
stitution, while  the  Cortez  would  recall  its  pacific 
overtures. 


170  South  American  Independence 

In  Mexico,  on  24th  August,  1821,  the  Spanish 
General  O'Donoju  concluded  a  treaty  of  peace  on 
the  basis  of  independence.  Later  this  was  dis- 
avowed ;  "  yet  his  private  instructions  found  among 
his  papers,"  it  is  said,^°°  "  clearly  proved  beyond  a 
possibility  of  doubt,  that  he  was  fully  authorized  to 
act  as  he  did,  and  in  the  event  of  their  Independence 
being  declared,  to  make  the  most  eligible  terms  he 
possibly  could  in  favor  of  Old  Spain.  .  .  ."  Morillo, 
too,  had  made  a  truce  with  his  opponent,  though 
Bolivar  had  terminated  it  before  a  treaty  had  been 
arranged.  From  Spain  the  news  came  that  Mexican 
and  Colombian  commissioners  were  on  hand,  that 
they  were  demanding  complete  independence,  that 
the  Cortez  was  listening  to  their  demands  and 
petitioning  the  ministry  to  come  to  some  conclu- 
sion.'<>' 

In  other  words,  the  South  American  provinces  in 
1821  had  achieved  their  independence,  and  a  recog- 
nition had  become  fully  justifiable.  The  United 
States,  relieved  by  the  final  ratification  of  the  Span- 
ish treaty  in  February,  1821,  of  the  necessity  for 

100  His  authority  is  doubtful.  Mackie's  Report,  March  17,  1823. 
F.  0.  Mss. 

101  Thomas  L.  L.  Brent  to  Adams,   April  10,   1821.     S.  D.  Mm. 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :    394. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  171 

silence,  came  to  this  conclusion  as  the  fall  and  winter 
advanced. 

The  seventeenth  Congress  met  in  December, 
1821,  Clay  being  out  of  it.""  With  him  had  disap- 
peared the  ardent  desire  for  recognition.  "  It  has 
long  been  manifest,"  declared  Monroe  in  his  mess- 
age, "  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  Spain  to  re- 
duce these  colonies  by  force,  and  equally  so  that  no 
conditions  short  of  their  independence  would  be 
satisfactory  to  them.  It  may  therefore  be  pre- 
sumed, and  it  is  earnestly  hoped,  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Spain,  guided  by  enlightened  and  liberal 
councils,  will  find  it  to  comport  to  its  interests  and 
due  to  its  magnanimity  to  terminate  this  exhausting 
controversy  on  that  basis.  To  promote  this  result 
by  friendly  counsel  with  the  Government  of  Spain 
will  be  the  object  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States."  "' 

As  the  weeks  ran  on,  the  despatches  of  Forbes 
convinced  the  administration  that  the  time  had 
come.      In   January  Adams  replied  to   one   of  the 

102 W.  S.  Robertson,  "The  United  States  and  Spain  in  1822,"  in 
Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XX :  781,  adds  much  new  information  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  effect  of  recognition  upon  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  and  upon  those  of  Spain  and  the  European  allies: 
a  phase  of  recognition  not  considered  above.  He  has  made  extensive 
use  of  the  archives  at  Washington  and  Madrid. 

1"' Richardson,  J!/ca«asres,  II:   105. 


172  South  American  Independence 

frequent  demands  of  the  Colombian  agent  that  the 
President  had  the  matter  of  recognition  under  con- 
sideration. Ten  days  later  he  wrote  to  Todd,  who 
had  returned  from  Colombia,  "  It  is  probable  that 
the  formal  recognition  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia 
will  ensue  at  no  distant  day."  ^"*  Before  the  next 
month  was  over  the  chief  clerk  of  the  Department 
of  State  announced  to  Forbes  the  preparation  of  a 
report  and  documents  in  response  to  a  call  of  the 
House.  "  I  know  not  how  the  cat  jumps  in  relation 
to  this  great  question,"  he  wrote,  "  but  am  apt  to 
believe  that  a  discretionary  power  will  be  given  to 
the  President,  to  acknowledge,  or  not,  according  to 
his  views  of  circumstances,  the  sovereignty  and  Inde- 
pendence of  any  or  all  of  these  Governments.  That 
of  Buenos  Ayres  has  given  a  good  moral  Lesson  to 
older  and  long-established  States,  in  the  formal  sup- 
pression of  Privateering  under  its  flag."  ^°^ 

On  the  8th  of  March,  1822,  responding  to  a  call 
for  documents  of  30th  January,  President  Monroe 
recommended  that  the  independence  of  the  South 
American  republics  be  acknowledged.^"®  The  Presi- 
dent sketched  briefly  the  long  struggle  of  the  col- 

10*  Adams  to  Torres,  January  18,  1822;    Adams  to  Todd,  January 
28, 1822.  S.  D.  Mss. ;  Annals  of  Congress,  17  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  2099. 
i«  D.  Brent  to  Forbes,  February  19,  1822.  8.  D.  Mss. 
io«  Richardson,  i/essogres,  II:  116. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  173 

onies,  the  sympathy  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  and  the  policy  of  neutrality  that  had  checked 
that  sympathy.  Now  he  was  compelled  to  conclude, 
from  a  review  of  the  situation  in  South  America, 
"  that  its  fate  is  settled,  and  that  the  Provinces 
which  have  declared  their  independence  and  are  in 
the  enjoyment  of  it  ought  to  be  recognized."  He 
presumed  that  Spain  would  soon  become  reconciled 
to  the  separation,  though  he  admitted  that  he  had 
received  no  recent  information  on  the  subject  from 
Spain  or  from  the  other  Powers.  Some  time  since, 
it  had  been  understood  that  these  latter  were  not 
yet  prepared  for  recognition.  "  The  immense  space 
between  those  powers,  even  those  which  border  on 
the  Atlantic,  and  these  Provinces  makes  the  move- 
ment an  affair  of  less  interest  and  excitement  to 
them  than  to  us.  .  .  . 

"  In  proposing  this  measure  it  is  not  contemplated 
to  change  thereby  in  the  slightest  manner  our 
friendly  relations  with  either  of  the  parties,  but  to 
observe,  in  all  respects,  as  heretofore,  should  the 
war  be  continued,  the  most  perfect  neutrality  be- 
tween them.  Of  this  friendly  disposition  an  assur- 
ance will  be  given  to  the  Government  of  Spain,  to 
whom  it  is  presumed  it  will  be,  as  it  ought  to  be, 
satisfactory.  The  measure  is  proposed  imder  a 
thorough  conviction  that  it  is  in  strict  accord  with 


174  South  American  Independence 

"  the  law  of  nations,  that  it  is  just  and  right  as  to 
the  parties,  and  that  the  United  States  owe  it  to  their 
station  and  character  in  the  world,  as  well  as  to  their 
essential  interests,  to  adopt  it.  Should  Congress  con- 
cur in  the  view  herein  presented,  they  will  doubt- 
less see  the  propriety  of  making  the  necessary  appro- 
priations for  carrying  it  into  effect." 

With  the  departure  of  Henry  Clay  from  the 
House  of  Representatives  the  question  of  recogni- 
tion had  fallen  back  to  its  proper  place,  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  In  his  absence  there  was  no  one 
whose  interests  impelled  him  to  make  use  of  a  gener- 
ous popular  sentiment  to  drag  the  foreign  policy  of 
the  government  into  Congress.  The  sentiment  con- 
tinued to  exist,  strong  as  ever,  fed  by  the  frequent 
columns  of  South  American  news  in  the  papers. 
But  the  emotion  was  humanitarian  rather  than  poli- 
tical. It  was  felt  by  Adams  and  Monroe  as  keenly 
as  by  Congress  and  the  people.  The  purely  factious 
nature  of  Clay's  advocacy  of  recognition  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  the  seventeenth  Congress  felt  no  neces- 
sity to  take  the  matter  from  the  hands  of  the  Presi- 
dent. Even  after  the  call  for  documents  in  January, 
1822,  the  papers  paid  no  attention  to  the  subject. 
The  message  of  8th  March  was  received  with  calm- 
ness, though  with  general  satisfaction.  It  does  small 
credit  to  Clay's  political  wisdom  that  he  spent  four 


Policy  of  the  United  States  175 

years  In  advocacy  of  an  assured  cause,  and  that  for 
all  his  efforts  he  could  not  hasten  by  a  day  the  ad- 
vance of  the  government  in  the  direction  whither  he 
was  urging  it. 

The  rest  of  the  story  can  be  quickly  told :  how  the 
message  was  received  at  home;  how  it  was  received 
abroad;  the  actual  steps  in  formal  recognition. 

During  the  weeks  following  the  8th  of  March, 
1822,  the  message,  with  its  accompanying  docu- 
ments, was  reprinted  generally  throughout  the 
country.  The  information  transmitted  at  this  time 
was  not  new,  and  was  received  without  general 
enthusiasm.  The  Aurora  and  the  Enquirer,  long 
the  advocates  of  recognition,  did  their  best  by  it, 
now  it  had  come.  The  former  expressed  its  satis- 
faction that  the  President  had  at  last  done  justice 
to  the  South  Americans  and  hailed  him  as  a  bene- 
factor of  the  republics."^  The  Baltimore  Patriot 
worked  itself  up  to  declare  the  message  the  most 
intrinsically  important  state  paper  it  had  seen.  But 
South  America  had  already  gained  its  independence, 
so  that  recognition  was  an  acknowledgment  of  a 
fact  rather  than  a  prop  to  a  wavering  cause.  It 
came  too  late  to  be  considered  as  an  emotional 
appeal. 

The  Spanish  minister  in  Washington,  Don  Joaquin 

"Mrtrom,  March  11,  March  12,  March  15, 1822. 


176  South  American  Independence 

de  Anduaga,  fired  his  "  diplomatic  blunderbuss  "  at 
the  Secretary  of  State  as  soon  as  the  message  of 
Monroe  reached  him."^  His  note  was  of  the  char- 
acter that  was  to  be  expected.  Where  is  "  the  right 
of  The  United  States,"  he  demanded,  "  to  sanction 
and  declare  legitimate  a  rebellion,  without  cause, 
and  the  event  of  which  is  not  even  decided  ?  "  He 
denied  the  fact  of  independence,  and  in  the  lan- 
guage of  injured,  surprised  innocence,  registered  a 
formal  protest  against  the  act  of  recognition,  re- 
serving to  Spain  all  her  rights  in  the  provinces  de- 
spite the  act.  In  his  reply  of  a  month  later,  Adams 
justified  the  action  of  the  executive,  admitted  the 
reservation  of  Spain's  rights,  for  recognition  has  no 
effect  upon  existing  rights,  and  closed  the  contro- 
versy. !N^o  other  European  power  expressed  formal 
disapprobation  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States. 

JSTews  of  the  message  reached  Paris  at  a  time  when 
Europe  was  excited  over  a  threat  of  commercial  dis- 
crimination by  Colombia.  "  The  United  States,  as 
we  write,"  said  the  Journal  des  Dehats,^^^  "  have 
probably  recognized  the  independence  of  the  Span- 
ish American  governments.  This  resolution  is  not 
surprising  from  a  government  which  has  established 

108  Anduaga  to  Adaras,  March  9,  1822 ;  Adams  to  Anduaga,  April 
9,  1822.   British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX  :   752,  754. 

^0^  Journal  des  Debats,  April  17,  1822. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  177 

"  as  a  maxim  of  public  law  *  that  when  a  province 
maintains  itself  victoriously  in  independence  against 
the  mother  country  it  has  a  right  to  demand  recog- 
nition as  a  sovereign  state.'  The  president  of  the 
United  States  would  have  been  wise  not  to  talk  of 
principle,  eight  and  law  of  nations:  for  suppose 
Boston  with  the  five  New  England  States  should 
one  day  separate  from  the  American  Union.  .  .  . 
Then  England  with  his  message  in  her  hand  could 
say  amicably  to  Congress,  '  We  do  not  wish  to 
change  any  of  our  relations  with  the  Union,  but  the 
five  states  east  of  the  Hudson  demand  our  recogni- 
tion, they  have  beaten  your  armies  and  you  are  abso- 
lutely incapable  of  subduing  them;  so  according  to 
the  law  of  nations  established  by  yourselves,  they 
have  a  right  to  be  recognized.  So  we  shall  recog- 
nize them  without  injuring  you.  Our  ambassador 
at  Washington  is  instructed  to  assure  you  of  our 
sympathy  and  that  we  act  from  no  motive  of 
interest.'  .  .  . 

"  The  preliminary  measures  regarding  the  new 
governments  have  been  skilfully  conducted  by  the 
president  of  the  United  States.  He  sent  agents  or 
commissioners  who  after  coasting  slowly  along 
South  America  submitted  somewhat  contradictory 
oificial  reports.  Thus  the  United  States  showed  their 
regard  for  the  new  governments  without  injuring 


178  South  American  Independence 

"  Spain,  and  after  three  years  of  negotiation  and  pre- 
liminary measures  came  to  a  point  where  the  Euro- 
pean situation  is  such  that  they  can  safely  establish 
with  their  neighbors  what  relations  they  please.  .  .  . 

"  Is  it  possible  that  the  old  governments  of 
Europe  cannot  keep  up  with  the  march  of  the  pru- 
dent young  republic?  We  hope  our  statesmen  will 
find  means  to  conciliate  the  interests  affected  by 
this  important  question." 

The  formal  steps  in  recognition  occupied  three 
months  in  the  spring  of  1822.  The  message  of  the 
President  was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  which  on  19th  March  reported  resolutions 
vigorously  sustaining  the  policy  of  the  administra- 
tion and  instructing  the  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  to  report  a  bill  for  the  salaries  of  ministers  to 
South  America.  Nine  days  later,  after  slight  de- 
bate, the  resolutions  were  adopted  with  but  one  dis- 
senting vote.  On  10th  April  the  debate  on  the  bill 
for  the  missions  was  commenced  ;^^°  it  was  signed  by 
the  President  some  three  weeks  later,  in  spite  of 
the  impleasant  news  that  the  Cortez  had  disavowed 
the  concessions  to  the  provinces  and  declared  that 
the  recognition  of  their  independence  by  other 
powers  would  be  considered  as  a  violation  of  their 
treaties  with  Spain.     On  the  19th  of  June,  1822, 

^^°  Annals  of  Congress,  17  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  1314,  1382,  1518. 


Policy  of  the  United  States  179 

John  Quincy  Adams  "  presented  Mr.  Manuel  Torres 
as  Charge  d' Affaires  from  the  republic  of  Colombia 
to  the  President,  This  incident  was  chiefly  interest- 
ing as  being  the  first  formal  act  of  recognition  of  an 
independent  South  American  Government."  The 
next  day  the  Secretary  proposed  to  the  President  to 
offer  the  Colombian  mission  to  Henry  Clay.^" 


1"  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  V  :  489,    VI :  23,  26. 


CHAPTER  III 

BRITISH   RELATIONS   WITH   SOUTH  AMERICA 

There  seems  to  have  been  no  connection  between 
the  interests  that  inspired  Pitt  to  keep  in  touch  with 
Francisco  de  Miranda  in  the  last  years  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  and  the  early  ones  of  the  nineteenth, 
that  impelled  Sir  Home  Riggs  Popham  to  attack  the 
Viceroyalty  of  Buenos  Ayres  on  the  broad  grounds 
of  commercial  advantage  and  injury  to  Spain,  and 
those  later  interests  that  developed  a  mercantile 
opposition  in  England  to  embarrass  the  ministry  as 
Henry  Clay's  political  opposition  embarrassed  the 
American  administration  of  John  Quincy  Adams  and 
his  president,  James  Monroe.  In  England  there  is  a 
distinct  break  between  these  periods.  Erom  an  atti- 
tude of  hostility  to  Spain  in  the  earlier  years.  Great 
Britain  passed  through  a  stage  of  friendly  protection 
that  drove  the  French  out  of  the  peninsula,  into  an- 
other period  of  semi-hostility  to  the  restored  Ferdi- 
nand. During  this  last  period,  beginning  roughly  in 
1815,  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  were  divided. 
On  the  one  hand  an  enormous  trade  with  Latin 
America  was  threatened  with  destruction,  should 
Spain's  colonial  policy  come  back  with  Spain's  king. 


England  and  South  America  181 

On  the  other,  were  the  political  interests  of  England 
in  Europe,  the  body  of  treaties  concluded  during  the 
wars  against  N^apoleon,  the  newly-developed  policy 
of  joint  action  by  the  Powers.  With  the  United 
S]t;ates_j;ecognition  was  a  question  of^  American 
policy  f  with  England  it  was  merely  one  of  the  rami- 
fications  of  European  politics.  At  no  time  was  the 
British  ministry  m  a  position  to  treat  it  on  its  merits; 
instead  it  struggled  for  a  decade  to  avert  action, 
to  cherish  at  once  the  commerce  with  the  colonies 
and  the  friendly  relations  with  Spain.  It  was  not 
until  thT  clamorings  of  the  merchants  drowned  the 
protests  of  the  Bourbons  that  England  recognized 
_the^  South  American  republics. 

Once  an  ally  of  Spain,  the  disposition  of  Eng- 
land to  respect  the  rights  of  the  former  in  her 
provinces  became  pronounced.  In  1811  one  Robert 
Staples  was  commissioned  as  consul  to  Buenos 
Ayres,  but  when  the  Regency  of  Cadiz  replied  to 
Sir  Henry  Wellesley's  request  for  an  exequatur  ^ 
that  the  "  Laws  of  the  Indias  "  were  still  in  force, 
Perceval  dropped  the  matter  and  the  ministries 
thereafter  disavowed  the  actions  of  Staples  in  South 
America.^    In  1814  a  treaty  was  entered  into  with 

1  Memorandum  of  June  26,  1823.    F.  O.  Mss. 

'  The  archives  of  the  British  Foreign  Office  contain  materials  upon 
the  South  American  wars  of  liberation,  and  on  recognition,  surpassing 
in  interest  those  of  the  State  Department.    They  are,  so  far  as  the 


182  South  American  Independence 

Spain  binding  England  to  prevent  her  subjects  from 
furnishing  "  arms,  ammunition,  or  any  other  warlike 
article  to  the  revolted  in  South  America."  For  his 
Britannic  Majesty  was  "  anxious  that  the  troubles 
and  disturbances  which  unfortunately  prevail  in  the 
Dominions  of  His  Catholic  Majesty  in  America 
should  entirely  cease,  and  the  Subjects  of  those 
Provinces  should  return  to  their  obedience  to  their 
lawful  sovereign."  ^ 

I  The  attitude  of  the  Liverpool  ministry  was  by  no 
means  favorable  to  colonies  struggling  for  independ- 
ence. I  The  regent  was  narrow  and  aristocratic  to  the 
last  degree;  later,  as  George  IV.,  he  followed  the 
course  that  could  have  been  expected  of  him.  He 
remembered  with  bitterness  the  day  that  marked  the 
separation   of   her   American   colonies   from   Great 

period  here  in  question  is  concerned,  preserved  in  the  Public  Records 
Office  ;  and  are  described  in  detail  in  C.  O.  Paullin  and  F.  L.  Paxson, 
Guide  to  the  Materials  in  London  Archives  for  the  History  of  the 
United  States  since  1783  (Carnegie  Institution,  1914).  In  the  preparation 
of  this  Guide  all  of  the  Foreign  Office  volumes  relating  to  the  United 
States  and  many  others  relating  to  South  America  were  handled.  The 
search  brought  to  light  many  new  documents  relating  to  recognition 
in  addition  to  those  referred  to  in  the  pages  of  the  above  chapter. 

'  Hansard.  Pari.  Debates,  XXXV :  1200 ;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  I :  pt.  1,  292 ;  Treaty  of  Madrid,  July  5,  1814,  and  addi- 
tional  articles,  August  28,  1814.  In  return  for  this  pledge,  England 
was  to  receive  a  full  share  of  the  colonial  trade  if  Spain  should  throw 
it  open  to  any  power.  C.  K.  Webster,  "  Castlereagh  and  the  Spanish 
Colonies,  1815-1818,"  in  English  Hist.  Rev.,  XXVII:  78. 


England  and  South  America  183 

Britain,  and  with  such  antecedents  could  with  diffi- 
culty bring  himself  to  countenance  the  separation  of 
her  own  from  Spain.  The  force  that  drove  him  to 
the  final  recognition  was  commercial,  with  George 
Canning  as  its  prophet.  That  the  latter  "  called  a 
'New  World  into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of 
the  old  "  *  may  well  be  doubted,  for  before  he  moved, 
another  and  a  not  uncertain  voice  had  sounded  from 
America.  He  guided  his  influence  by  the  side  of 
John  Quincy  Adams  to  maintain  the  new  republics, 
less  for  their  effect  on  old  world  politics  or  for  the 
sake  of  the  republics  themselves,  than  that  the  com- 
merce of  the  British  merchants  might  be  protected 
and  increased.^ 

Recognition  became  a  subject  of  agitation  in 
Great  Britain  as  early  as  in  the  United  States,  but 

*Thi8  assertion  was  made  near  the  end  of  the  debate  upon  France, 
Spain  and  Portugal,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  December  12,  1826. 
Pari.  Debates,  New  Series,  XVI :  396. 

5H.  W.  V.  Temperley,  "The  Later  American  Policy  of  George 
Canning,"  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XI :  779,  attempts  "  to  show  that  the 
later  American  policy  of  George  Canning  was  intended  to  defeat  certain 
claims  and  pretensions  of  the  Monroe  doctrine."  He  presents  various 
documents,  some  of  them  not  used  in  the  above  chapter,  to  defend  the 
substantial  truth  of  Canning's  rhetorical  boast,  but  seems  to  give  too 
little  weight  to  the  obvious  fact  that  the  new  world  was  already  clearly 
in  existence  before  he  acted.  Ibid,  781.  Doubtless  a  fear  of  United 
States  hegemony  in  America  was  among  his  motives,  but  so  far  as  this 
was  the  case  it  was  the  balance  in  the  new  world  that  he  was  attempting 
to  redress.  Compare  with  this  E.  M.  Lloyd,  "Canning  and  Spanish 
America,"  in  Transactions  of  theBoyal  Hist.  Soc,  new  Series,  XVIII : 


184  South  American  Independence 

there  is  in  the  former  country  no  trace  of  a  purely 
factious  opposition  using  a  widespread  popular  emo- 
tion to  embarrass  an  administration.  The  United 
States  had  little  commerce  with  South  American 
ports  J  its  sympathies  were  almost  entirely  senti- 
mental. Great  Britain  also  had  a  feeling  for  what 
it  considered  a  struggle  for  liberty,  but  the  feeling 
was  buttressed  up  by  considerations  of  a  commerce 
that  fed  and  clothed  the  southern  patriots.  Feel- 
ing the  depredations  of  Spanish  and  insurgent 
privateers,  Mackintosh  and  Brougham  could  with 
better  grace  than  Henry  Clay  demand  governmental 
intervention  in  their  behalf. 

Eleven  years  after  their  conclusion  the  treaties  of 
1814  rose  to  plague  the  Foreign  Secretary,  but  in 
1817  they  constituted  the  foundation  of  his  strength. 
Sir  Henry  Brougham,  professionally  a  member  of 
the  opposition,  and  in  all  things  liberal,  interrogated 
the  members  of  the  ministerial  bench  on  their  South 
American  program  almost  a  year  before  the  spec- 
tacular oratory  of  Henry  Clay  began.  "  The  con- 
duct which  this  country  followed  with  respect  to 
these  disputes,"  replied  Lord  Castlereagh,  "  was, 
that  of  adhering  to  a  strict  neutrality,  and  not  that 
which  the  hon.  and  learned  gentleman  seemed 
to  recommend — to  assist  the  colonies  against  the 
native  country,  which  would  be  in  direct  contraven- 


England  and  South  America  185 

"  tion  to  the  treaties  between  Great  Britain  and 
Spain.  .  .  .  [The]  events  in  the  river  Plate.  .  .  . 
must  be  considered  not  as  a  mere  South  American 
question,  but  as  an  European  question."  * 

The  war  thus  opened  was  continued  with  increas- 
ing energy  as  the  English  South  American  com- 
merce increased  in  volume.  The  ministry  fought  off 
recognition  until  of  possible  evils  it  was  the  least; 
until  nothing  was  to  be  gained  by  further  concilia- 
tion of  Spain;  until  it  was  convinced  that  the  prov- 
inces were  independent  and  possessed  of  responsible 
governments.  As  it  was  hostile  to  the  new  republics, 
this  conviction  came  with  deliberate  steps.  At  last 
the  ministry  yielded  to  the  commercial  influence, 
intensified  by  popular  sympathy,  and  by  its  recogni- 
tion incurred  the  disapprobation  of  all  of  Europe. 

The  weapons  of  the  opposition  in  England  were 
much  the  same  as  in  the  United  States.  Speeches  in 
House  of  Commons,  demands  of  South  American 
agents,  equipment  of  South  American  armaments 
were  all  brought  into  use.  Brougham,  who  had 
stirred  up  the  ministry  in  March,  1817,  returned  to 
the  attack  in  July  in  his  speech  on  the  State  of  the 
N'ation.  On  the  very  day  when  Secretary  Rush  was 
pushing  the  preparations  for  the  South  American 

8  In  House  of  Commons.March  19,  1817.  Pari.  Debates,  XXXV: 
1196. 


186  South  American  Independence 

Commission,  Brougham  complained  to  the  House  of 
Commons  that  Great  Britain  had  no  system  respect- 
ing that  portion  of  the  globe.'^  In  later  months  Don 
Bernardino  Rivadavia,  who  was  at  a  future  time  to 
play  such  a  significant  part  in  the  development  of 
Buenos  Ayres,  was  passing  through  Europe,  from 
capital  to  capital,  making  his  representations  and 
upholding  the  interests  of  his  country.  When  Spain 
asked  the  mediation  of  the  powers,  he  assured  Lord 
Castlereagh  that  Buenos  Ayres  respected  the  other 
nations  of  the  world  and  wanted  peace,  but  that  no 
peace  would  be  admissible  save  on  the  basis  of  abso- 
lute separation  from  the  mother  country.  Six 
months  later  he  announced  that  the  mediation  of 
Great  Britain  would  be  welcome  if  founded  on  no 
other  motive  than  humanity.  It  was  too  late  for 
Spain  to  seek  to  preserve  her  supremacy.^ 

The  part  played  by  British  ofiicers  and  men  in  the 
war  of  South  American  liberation  has  already  been 
described.  Lord  Cochrane  and  General  Miller  are 
only  the  most  notable  names  among  those  who 
fought  with  the  armies  of  the  south.  Whole  regi- 
ments are  found  with  the  armies  of  the  north.  The 
end  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  coinciding  as  it  did  with 

T  July  11,  1817.     Pari.  Debates,  XXXVI  :    1384. 

8 Rivadavia  to  Castlereagh,  October  29,  1817,  April  10,  1818,  en- 
closed in  Gallatin's  Nof.  70  and  73,  S.  D.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  187 

the  beginning  of  the  second  period  of  the  South 
American  war,  made  it  possible  for  the  patriots  to 
sectire  the  services  of  many  trained  soldiers  for 
their  cause.  Whole  battalions  are  said  to  have 
listened  to  the  glowing  promises  of  Don  Luis  Lopez 
Mendez  the  agent  of  Bolivar  in  England,  and  been 
mustered  out  of  the  British  army  only  to  enlist 
immediately  for  South  American  service.  Others 
flocked  to  the  support  of  adventurers  armed  with 
stacks  of  blank  commissions,  and  sailed  for  Mar- 
garita on  the  assurance  that  there  they  would  re- 
ceive rank,  expenses  and  increased  remuneration. 
Only  too  often  their  hopes  went  the  way  of  the 
funds  of  investors  in  high-rated  South  American 
stocks. 

It  was  not  without  reason  that  the  Prince  Regent 
issued  his  proclamation  in  the  fall  of  1817  warning 
his  subjects  against  participation  in  the  war  and 
holding  before  their  eyes  the  penalties  of  felony  pre- 
scribed by  the  old  statutes  of  George  II.  Six  ex- 
peditions are  said  to  have  been  sent  from  London  by 
Mendez  before  the  year  came  to  an  end.  Further 
proclamations  in  the  summer  of  1818  were  equally 
necessary  and  unavailing.  An  instruction  was  issued 
by  the  Admiralty  for  the  seizure  of  South  American 
armed  vessels  guilty  of  aggressions  on  British  com- 
merce,— pirates  they  were  designated;  and  customs 


188  South  American  Independence 

officials  were  ordered  to  check  illegal  preparations 
for  South  American  service  in  their  ports.^  But  all 
these  efforts  could  not  prevent  an  Irish  and  English 
brigade  of  two  thousand,  under  one  Colonel  English, 
from  sailing  in  June  to  reach  the  insurgent  ports 
before  the  end  of  August."  And  other  expeditions 
sailed  for  South  America  at  will. 

As  in  the  United  States,  these  expeditions  re- 
vealed the  inadequacy  of  the  laws  of  neutrality. 
Strictly  speaking.  Great  Britain  had  no  law  express- 
ing her  duties  as  a  neutral  upon  her  statute  books. 
The  provisions  of  international  law  upon  the  subject 
were  admittedly  a  part  of  her  common  law,  but  she 
had  let  the  United  States  remain  the  first  and  only 
nation  to  embody  these  duties  in  a  statute  and  pro- 
vide means  and  measures  for  their  enforcement. 
When  the  latter,  in  1818  and  1819,  went  further, 
and  modified  her  laws  to  meet  the  situation  created 
by  the  South  American  revolt,  the  British  ministry 
was  shamed  into  doing  its  duty  by  Spain  and  offered 
in  the  House  of  Commons  a  Foreign  Enlistment  Act. 
Thus  they  established  a  principle,  later  to  vex  them 
greatly,    that    neutrality    demands    more    than    an 

'November  27,  1817;  June  8  and  July  9,  1818.  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  IV :  488,  V :  963,  1224 ;  Present  State  of 
Colombia,  87. 

'^^ Pecollections  of  a  Service,  I:  6-19;  Chesterton,  Proceeding'*  tn 
Venezuela. 


England  and  South  America  189 

observance  of  existing  laws;  it  demands  that  ade- 
quate laws  shall  exist. 

The  law  which  the  Attorney-General  asked  leave 
to  introduce  on  13th  May,  1819,"  was  avowedly 
based  on  the  recent  neutrality  act  of  the  United 
States,  but  went  beyond  the  requirements  of  inter- 
national law.  It  made  it  an  offence  not  only  to  en- 
list in  England  for  foreign  service,  but  to  enter  the 
foreign  service  at  all.  As  was  to  be  expected,  the 
opposition  seized  upon  the  measure  as  of  political 
intent,  and  charged  that  it  was  an  unneutral  service 
in  behalf  of  Spain  itself.  Sir  James  Mackintosh  at 
once,  amid  loud  cheers  from  his  followers,  attacked 
the  bill,  "  which  he  considered  in  no  other  light  than 
as  an  enactment  to  repress  the  rising  liberty  of  the 
South  Americans,  and  to  enable  Spain  to  reimpose 
that  yoke  of  tyranny  which  they  were  unable  to 
bear,  which  they  had  nobly  shaken  off,  and  from 
which,  he  trusted  God  they  would  finally  be  enabled 
to  free  themselves,  whatever  attempts  were  made  by 
the  ministers  of  this  or  any  other  country,  to 
countenance  or  assist  their  oppressors."  ^^ 

The  debate  on  the  act  ranged  over  the  whole  of 
foreign  and  commercial  policy.  "  Independent  of 
the  sympathy  which  Great  Britain,  as  a  free  country, 
must  feel  in  every  contest  for  liberty,"  complained 

"  Pari.  Debates,  XL :    362.  i»  Pari.  Debatet,  XL :    367,  368. 


190  South  American  Independence 

George  Tierney,  member  from  Knaresborough  and 
acknowledged  leader  of  the  opposition,  "  independ- 
ent of  the  ardor  with  which  she  would  be  inclined 
to  aid  the  oppressed,  it  would  not  have  been  extra- 
ordinary if  ministers,  merely  upon  mercantile  con- 
siderations, had  looked  towards  South  America  as  a 
vent  for  our  trade.  Yet  they  had  not  only  done  noth- 
ing, but  they  had  done  worse  than  nothing.  They  had 
done  their  utmost  to  prevent  the  success  of  those  by 
whose  triumph  we  might  be  benefited;  for  a  bill 
was  now  depending,  calculated  to  exasperate  the 
whole  mass  of  South  Americans,  and  to  destroy 
every  hope  of  commercial  advantage."  "  In  answer 
to  this  complaint  Canning  sustained  the  policy  of 
the  ministry,  characterizing  an  open  interference  on 
behalf  of  South  America  as  mad  as  well  as  criminal. 
"  No,"  he  continued,  "  the  British  government  had 
but  one  wise,  as  but  one  honest  course  to  pursue  in 
this  contest.  They  have  not  interfered  to  assist 
either  party;  but  have  repeatedly  offered  their  good 
offices  with  a  view  to  reconcilement  through  an  im- 
partial mediation.  .  .  .  Amicable  intercourse  has 
been  kept  up  with  every  part  of  South  America,  to 
which  our  flag  has  access.  .  .  . 

"  In  one  respect,  his  majesty's  ministers  are  cer- 
tainly guilty  of  the  charges  brought  against  them. 

"  Pari.  Debates,  XL  :    482. 


England  and  South  America  191 

"  In  their  transactions  with  South  America,  they 
have  abstained  from  endeavoring,  bj  a  commercial 
treaty,  to  turn  the  troubles  and  distresses  of  a  strug- 
gling people  to  the  advantage  of  this  country.  The 
assistance  which  they  did  not  think.it  right  to  grant, 
they  would  not  be  tempted  to  sell."  ^* 

It  was  a  more  difficult  task  to  put  the  Foreign  En- 
listment Act  through  Parliament  than  it  had  been  to 
put  its  prototype  through  Congress,  for  it  had  in 
the  former  body  to  meet  an  opposition  of  longer 
standing,  of  more  close  amalgamation,  and  based 
upon  a  more  sincere  cause.  The  petitions  from  Brit- 
ish merchants  that  were  offered  in  opposition  of  the 
act  show  how  seriously  it  threatened  to  affect  their 
commerce.  One  of  them  bore  the  signatures  of 
seventeen  hundred  tradesmen  from  London  alone. 
"  We  could  not  forget,"  cried  one  of  the  opposition, 
taking  another  line  of  attack,  "  that  we  first  invited 
them  to  throw  off  the  yoke  which  our  government 
was  now  trying  to  reimpose,  and  that  the  birth  of 
their  independence  took  place  under  the  protection 
of  England."  It  is  vain,  declared  another,  to  say 
that  the  act  is  only  now  introduced  because  the  pro- 
posed mediation  has  failed  and  the  struggle  will 
proceed  indefinitely.  The  conclusion  of  the  Ameri- 
can negotiations  with  Spain  by  the  cession  of  the 

^* Pari.  Debates,  XL:    534. 


192  South  American  Independence 

Floridas  is  the  true  cause.  And,  "  Although  a  sop 
has,"  added  still  another,  "  for  the  present,  been 
given  to  Cerberus,  by  the  cession  of  the  Floridas 
to  the  United  States,  the  policy  of  the  government 
will  not  long  be  able  to  restrain  the  wishes  of  the 
people,  but  be  compelled  to  join  this  popular  and 
patriotic  cause;  an  event  which  will  at  once  con- 
summate the  independence  of  South  America."  ^* 

The  passage  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  seems 
to  have  had  little  effect  upon  the  promotion  of  ex- 
peditions, for  within  a  month  General  d'  Evereux, 
after  an  elaborate  public  banquet  in  Dublin,  took 
another  expedition  to  South  America.^® 

It  was  indeed  too  late  for  Tory  ministers  to  check 
the  progress  of  the  revolt,  or  to  restore  the  suprem- 
acy of  Ferdinand  in  his  colonial  dominions.  Even 
if  it  had  been  desired  or  possible  to  enforce  the  new 
law  of  neutrality  in  all  its  strictness,  the  flickering 
light  of  Spain  would  have  continued  only  to  flicker 
vainly  until  its  ultimate  extinction.  The  events  of 
the  past  year  in  Europe  had  shown  that  Spain  must 
stand  alone  in  her  struggle  against  the  insurgent 
powers;  in  the  peninsula  they  had  shown  that  even 
her  own  power  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  any  great 
extent.  At  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  law  there 
was  impending  an  explosion  that  was  within  the  next 

»5  Pari.  Debates,  XL :  373, 858, 888, 894.     is  jyri/e^  Register,  XVII :  53. 


England  and  South  America  193 

five  years  to  make  Spain  herself,  rather  than  Ultra- 
mar, a  subject  for  the  armed  intervention  of  the 
allied  powers  of  Europe. 

In  the  spring  of  1818,  while  Henry  Clay  was 
bringing  up  his  motion  for  the  recognition  of  her 
provinces,  Spain,  terrified  at  the  possibility  of  Amer- 
ican intervention,  was  entreating  the  powers  to  take 
action  in  her  behalf.  Her  petition  was  not  received 
with  enthusiasm,  although  nearly  every  court  in  Eu- 
rope was  at  heart  in  sympathy  with  his  Catholic 
Majesty.  France  and,  to  a  greater  degree,  Russia 
might  have  been  induced  to  enter  an  armed  suppres- 
sion, euphoniously  named  mediation,  of  insurgents 
boasting  of  democratic  principles.  Eor  they  were 
Tn  a  position  to  take  a  theoretical  attitude  respecting 
Spain's  American  colonies.  Neither  possessed  any 
South  American  commerce,  while  the  rotten  ships 
that  the  founder  of  the  Holy  Allies  sold  to  Ferdi- 
nand gave  the  only  profit  that  came  to  either  from 
the  revolution.  But  their  philanthropic  readiness  to 
check  the  career  of  Ferdinand's  subjects  was  itself 
held  back,  not  by  the  real  tendency  of  the  British 
ministry,  but  by  a  feeling  "  out  of  doors "  that 
warned  Castlereagh  to  be  careful  of  his  commerce. 
The  avowed  disposition  of  the  United  States  to  dis- 
countenance armed  intervention  may  also  have  had 
some  weight  in  the  mind  of  the  British  minister.    It 


194  South  American  Independence 

is  my  opinion,  wrote  Richard  Rush,  "  that  the  cause 
of  the  South  Americans  gains  upon  the  esteem  of 
this  country,  and  that  should  our  government  see  fit 
to  acknowledge  their  independence  the  measure 
would  receive  support  in  the  approbation  and  popu- 
larity of  extensive  and  powerful  classes."  " 

No  definite  conclusion  upon  the  application  of 
Spain  was  reached  for  some  months  and  when 
reached  it  was  distasteful  to  the  applicant.  The 
gathering  of  the  sovereigns  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  in 
the  fall  of  1818,  had  been  watched  with  anxiety 
from  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  But  at  the  confer- 
ence there  was  shown,  as  Rush  had  anticipated,  "  no 
serious  intention  on  the  part  of  any  of  the  great 
sovereigns  to  take  the  cause  of  Ferdinand  effectively 
in  hand."  Vague  generalizations  in  behalf  of  peace, 
and  a  suggestion  of  a  Wellington  mediation  that 
should  have  no  ultimate  resort  to  force  failed  to 
meet  the  situation.^^  It  was  clear  that  Spain  could 
at  this  time  hope  for  little  support  from  without." 

Early  in  the  next  year  the  decay  of  the  Spanish 
empire  began  with  the  cession,  practically  forced 
upon  her,  of  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States.   This 

"  Rush  to  Adams,  October  12,  1818.    S.  D.  Msa. 

18  Rush  to  Adams,  November  20, 1818 ;  Campbell  to  Adams,  Febru- 
ary 18,  1819.    S.  D.  Mss. 

"  C.  K.Webster, ' '  Castlereagh  and  the  Spanish  Colonies,  1815-1818," 
in  English.  Hist.  Rev.,  XXVII :    89. 


England  and  South  America  195 

"  sop  to  Cerberus,"  as  a  jealous  statesman  called  it, 
seems  to  have  deferred  recognition  by  the  United 
States  for  more  than  two  years.  Direct  testimony  is 
wanting,  but  inference  is  powerful  that  Adams  and 
Monroe  feared  to  acknowledge  the  new  republics  lest 
Spain  should  decline  to  ratify  her  treaty.  Certain 
it  is  that  Spain  herself,  and  France  and  Russia  in  her 
behalf,  tried  to  persuade  the  United  States  to  pur- 
chase Florida  by  a  renunciation  of  the  right  of 
recognition. 

Throwing  over  the  cargo  failed  to  save  the  sinking 
ship  of  Spain's  colonial  system,  for  a  mutiny  of  the 
crew  made  it  impossible  to  navigate  the  vessel  on  its 
charted  course.  A  great  expedition  had  been  sent  to 
New  Granada  upon  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand,  in 
1815.  In  large  measure  it  had  been  dissipated,  and 
another  extensive  armament  was  preparing  to  take 
its  place  as  Spain  sought  the  aid  of  the  allies  in  1818. 
By  the  following  year  this  was  ready  to  sail.  But 
the  months  that  were  required  to  make  the  Holy 
Ally's  fleet  of  death-traps  less  unseaworthy  weak- 
ened the  discipline  of  the  army  until  mutiny  broke 
forth.  Three  thousand  troops  that  were  started  for 
America  promptly  went  over  to  the  service  of  the 
insurgents   at   Buenos   Ayres,     Yellow   fever   de- 


196  South  American  Independencb 

stroyed  the  remainder  at  Cadiz.  This  was  the  last 
serious  attempt  of  Spain  to  quell  the  insurrection."* 

After  the  mutiny  of  the  troops  at  Cadiz  came  the 
Spanish  revolution,  with  its  liberal  constitution  and 
its  reconstructed  Ferdinand.  On  top  of  this  the 
doctrine  of  intervention  received  new  elaboration  as 
the  congress  of  the  powers  met  in  session  after  ses- 
sion to  deal  with  these  manifestations  of  popular 
activities.  The  culmination  of  the  concert  is 
reached  when  a  French  army  marches  into  Spain 
and  restores  for  a  second  time  Ferdinand  and  his 
absolute  regime. 

The  attitude  of  the  British  ministry  has  already 
been  described.  At  heart  it  distrusted  and  feared  the 
popular  movements  in  South  America,  but  it  was 
constrained  by  a  generous  popular  sympathy  and  a 
vivid  popular  realization  of  the  necessities  of  South 
American  trade,  to  refuse  its  sanction  to  any  scheme 
for  restoring  the  old  order  of  affairs  by  force.  It 
permitted  a  free  trade  with  the  colonies  and  allowed 
their  flags  to  enter  British  ports,  but  it  went  no 
further.  In  Parliament  it  preached  the  duty  of 
neutrality  in  much  the  same  language  as  Forsyth 
preached  it  in  the  American  Congress. 

^Niles  Register, 'KNll:  143;  Annual  RegiaUr,\9,l9,  178;  Spencer 
Walpole,  A  History  of  England  from  the  Conclusion  of  the  Oreat  War 
in  1815,  II :   299. 


England  and  South  America  197 

The  triumphant  advance  of  the  French  army  into 
Spain  made  a  further  step  in  development  of 
British  policy  essential.  It  was  well  enough  to  let 
the  contest  between  Ferdinand  and  his  trans- 
Atlantic  subjects  run  its  course,  for  it  had  become 
evident  that  the  former  could  never  restore  his 
authority.  But,  with  the  power  of  France  behind 
his  throne,  and  with  the  combined  forces  of  the  Holy 
Allies  at  the  back  of  France,  it  was  time  once  more 
to  look  to  the  interests  of  English  commerce. 

There  is  a  distinct  difference  between  the  policy 
of  the  British  ministry  at  the  congresses  of  Trappau 
and  Laybach,  and  that  which  was  manifested  to  the 
mystification  of  Prince  Mettemich  at  the  congress 
of  Verona  in  1822.  At  the  former  meetings  the 
attitude  of  the  British  envoy  was  one  of  non-partici- 
pation, it  is  true,  but  the  private  assurances  of  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  were  that  his  ministry  was  not 
averse  to  the  suppression  of  the  revolt  in  Italy  by 
the  troops  of  Austria.  Before  Wellington  set  out 
for  Vienna  for  the  last  of  the  meetings,  for  the 
Verona  meeting  commenced  its  sessions  in  Vienna, 
a  change  had  taken  place  in  the  British  cabinet  that 
affected  the  whole  European  situation.  Lord  Castle- 
reagh,  who  had  intended  to  take  Wellington's  place 
at  the  congress,  had  become  insane,  and  killed  him- 
self.   In  his  stead,  in  September,  1822,  George  Can- 


198  South  American  Independence 

ning  had  been  made  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
One  of  the  last  acts  of  Castlereagh  had  been  to 
instruct  himself  to  fight  to  the  end  any  movement 
for  a  combined  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Spain. 

George  Canning  had  no  great  love  for  the  insur- 
gent republics  of  South  America,  but  he  failed  to 
share  the  fear  of  their  principles  that  animated  the 
king  and  a  portion  of  the  cabinet.  For  years  he  had 
been  opposing  the  South  American  agitators  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  While  denouncing  recognition 
as  an  unneutral  and  impolitic  act,  he  had  come  to 
see  that  the  restoration  of  Spain's  colonial  system 
must  be  prevented  and  to  believe  that  the  surest  way 
to  accomplish  this  was  to  leave  Spain  and  her  sub- 
jects to  themselves.  So  long  as  Spain  remained 
without  assistance  nothing  was  to  be  feared  from 
her." 

The  commercial  opposition  that  had  made  the  en- 
actment of  the  law  on  foreign  enlistments  so  difficult 
in  1819  was  a  constant  quantity,  though  never  vio- 
lent or  unreasonable.  In  the  summer  of  1820  Dr. 
Lushington  brought  up  the  question  once  more  by 
jailing  upon  the  ministry  for  documents  respecting 

*i  There  is  a  good  general  account  of  Canning's  influence  upon  the 
Liverpool  Ministry  in  H.  W.  V.  Temperley,  Life  of  Canning  (London, 
1905),  127-191.  With  this  should  be  compared  the  more  recent  George 
Canning  and  His  Friends,  containing  hitherto  unpublished  Letters, 
Jeux  D^ Esprit,  etc.  (London,  1909),  edited  by  Captain  Josceline  Bagot. 


England  and  South  America  199 

the  proposition  to  seat  the  Prince  of  Lucca  on  the 
throne  of  Buenos  Ayres — the  proposition  which  had 
already  driven  Pueyrredon  into  a  temporary  exile. 
He  asked  the  opinion  of  the  ministers  "  as  to  the 
obligations  of  other  governments  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  those  South  American  provinces 
which  had  emancipated  themselves  from  the  yoke 
of  the  mother  country.  His  own  opinion  on  the  sub- 
ject was,  that  when  colonies  had  once  acquired 
independence  for  themselves,  it  was  at  the  option  of 
other  governments  either  to  acknowledge  their  inde- 
pendence or  not,  according  to  the  views  of  policy 
which  they  might  entertain.  It  was  indeed  a  matter 
of  pure  necessity  to  make  such  an  acknowledgment, 
on  account  of  the  great  inconvenience  and  injustice 
that  would  otherwise  attend  the  existence  of  an  un- 
settled and  unrecognized  state."  ^^  One  cause  for 
the  presenting  of  this  motion  at  this  time  was  the 
attitude  of  the  United  States.  The  reports  of  the 
South  American  Commissioners  had  been  reprinted 
and  edited  as  soon  as  they  reached  London  in  1819.^^ 

^^Parl.  Debates,  N.  S.,  II :  393 ;  Annual  Register,  1820,  113. 

2J  Rush  to  Adams,  March  16,  1819.  -S^.  D.  Mss.  Messrs.  Baldwin, 
Cradock,  and  Joy,  who  printed  much  other  South  American  literature, 
brought  out  those  discordant  reports  as  The  Reports  on  the  present 
State  of  the  United  Provinces  of  South  America ;  drawn  up  by  Messrs. 
Rodney  and  Graham,  Commissioners  sent  to  Buenos  Ayres  by  the  Gov- 
ernment of  North  America,  and  laid  before  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  ;  with  their  accompanying  Docwments  ;  occasional  Notes  by  the 


200  South  American  Independence 

They  had  been  eagerly  received  by  the  commercial 
classes.  The  news  that  came  in  the  spring  of  1820 
that  Clay's  resolution  had  at  last  passed  the  House 
inspired  the  opposition  to  keep  pace  with  their 
American  rivals.  The  moderate  nature  of  the  oppo- 
sition is  shown  by  the  withdrawal  of  this  motion 
when  Castlereagh  stated  that  it  would  embarrass  the 
ministry. 

The  year  1822  was  a  busy  period  in  matters  per- 
taining to  South  America.  In  Spain  the  constitu- 
tional government  was  considering  the  basis  of  inde- 
pendence. Monroe  recommended  recognitionbythe 
United  States  in  March  and  consummated  the  act  in 
June.  The  Colombian  agent,  in  April,  issued  a 
threatening  manifesto  to  such  nations  as  should  not 
acknowledge  his  country.  British  merchants  took 
alarm  and  filled  the  mail  of  the  foreign  office  with 
their  petitions.  Castlereagh  died;  there  was  an  in- 
terregnum for  a  month,  then  Canning  took  his 
place. 

"  Great  Britain  of  course  likes  it,"  wrote  Gallatin 
from  Paris,  when  he  heard  of  the  message  of  8th 
March,  "  and  will  be  glad  of  a  pretence  to  do  the 
same   thing  substantially,   though  probably  not  in 

Editor;  and  an  introductory  Biscov/rse,  intended  to  present,  with  the 
Reports  and  Documents,  a  View  of  the  present  State  of  the  Cormtry,  and 
of  the  Progress  of  the  Independents.     With  a  map. 


England  and  South  America  201 

"  the  same  fair  and  decisive  way.  The  other  lesser 
maritime  powers  have  the  same  feelings.  Russia 
has  now  other  objects  to  engross  her  attention.  The 
continental  powers  are  indifferent  about  it."  ^*  In- 
deed the  continental  powers  were  too  much  occupied 
to  take  American  action  seriously  to  heart.  Affairs 
in  the  peninsula  and  the  Balkans  were  nearer  home 
and  engrossed  their  attention.  "  It  seems  that  the 
cannibals  of  Europe,"  wrote  one  American  ex-presi- 
dent to  another,  "  are  going  to  eating  one  another 
again.  A  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey  is  like 
the  battle  of  the  kite  and  the  snake;  whichever  de- 
stroys the  other,  leaves  a  destroyer  the  less  for  the 
world." '" 

But  in  the  British  foreign  office  the  importance 
of  the  South  American  question  could  not  be  hidden 
or  suppressed.  "  Every  day  convinces  me  more  and 
more,"  declared  Canning,  "  that  in  the  present  state 
of  the  world,  in  the  present  state  of  the  Peninsula, 
and  in  the  present  state  of  this  country,  the  Ameri- 
can questions  are  out  of  all  proportion  more  im- 
portant to  us  than  the  European,  and  that  if  we  do 
not  seize  and  turn  them  to  our  advantage  in  time, 
we  shall  rue  the  loss  of  an  opportunity  never  to  be 

"(lallatin  to  Adams,  April  26,  1822.   S.  D.  Msa. 

'5  Jefferson  to  John  Adams.    Niles  Rtgister,  XXIII :  247. 


202  South  American  Independence 

"recovered.""®  The  conditions- upon  which  the 
Foreign  Secretary  based  this  opinion  are  patent.  On 
8th  April,  1822,  the  Colombian  agent  in  Paris,  Zea 
by  name,  Minister  Plenipotentiary  by  title,  had 
issued  a  circular  to  the  powers  of  Europe  and  asked 
for  it  a  quick  response.^''  Stating  the  general  and 
well-known  incidents  of  the  revolution,  Zea  declared 
that  Colombia  was  an  independent  State,  with  a 
right  as  such  to  be  recognized;  that  she  desired  to 
establish  reciprocal  relations  of  trade  with  all  the 
world;  that  she  was  prepared  to  treat  with  any 
government  regardless  of  the  legitimacy  of  its 
origin;  but,  and  here  was  the  threat  that  disquieted 
the  British  merchants,  that  these  other  governments, 
as  the  condition  of  the  establishment  of  commerce, 
must  recognize  the  independence  of  Colombia.  The 
news  that  the  United  States  had  determined  to  grant 
this  recognition,  coming  close  upon  the  publication 
of  the  Zea  circular,  increased  the  agitation  and 
swelled  the  number  of  petitions.  Later,  the  news 
that  the  Colombian  government  had  disavowed  a 
loan  negotiated  by  Zea  on  13th  March,  1822,  gave 
a  new  impetus  to  the  movement,  which  the  news  that 

2« Canning  to  Wellington,  November  8,  1822.  Walpole,  ffist.  Eng- 
land, II :  356. 

'^''British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  IX:  851;  Niles  Register, 
XXII :  247. 


England  and  South  America  203 

his   threatening   circular   also    had   been   disavowed 
could  not  entirely  check.^^ 

As  early  as  23d  April,  1822,  meetings  were  held 
by  London  merchants  with  a  view  to  maintaining 
commercial  intercourse  with  the  colonies  "  formerly 
under  the  dominion  of  Spain,  a  mode  of  expression 
which  .  .  .  has  sprung  into  use  since  the  President's 
message  on  the  recognition,  and  seems  already  to 
have  become  as  universal,  as  it  was  before  un- 
known." ^®  Similar  meetings  were  held  in  the  other 
commercial  centers  of  Great  Britain,  and  their  reso- 
lutions fill  the  files  of  the  foreign  ofiice.  On  the  9th 
of  May  the  Liverpool  Ship  Owners'  Association  pre- 
sented its  memorial;  in  June  the  Liverpool  mer- 
chants followed  suit  in  a  petition  to  the  Privy  Coun- 
cil; in  July  sixty-one  firms  of  Glasgow  petitioned 
Canning  for  the  recognition  of  the  republics;  and  in 
the  same  month  the  merchants  and  shipowners  of 
Liverpool  begged  the  House  of  Commons  for  action 
in  their  behalf.  Commons  could  not  fail  to  notice 
the  pressure  thus  brought,  and  Lord  Liverpool  had 
to  defend  the  ministry  on  more  than  one  occasion. 

*8  Memorandum  on  loan  of  March  13,  1822,  dated  January  9,  1823, 
with  a  copy  of  contract  and  an  original  bond.  F.  0.  3fss.  Colombia, 
vol.  III.  Gazette  of  July  7,  1822,  with  decree  of  June  1,  1822,  by 
Santaudar,  Vice-President  of  Colombia  ;  report  of  Pedro  Gual,  Sec- 
retary for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Colombia,  April  17,  1823,  saying  that  he 
had  disavowed  the  circular.  F.  O.  Mss. ;  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  X :   740.  «»Ru8h  to  Adams,  May  6,  1822.   S.  D.  Mst. 


204  South  American  Independence 

"  Every  right  of  real  value,  as  regarded  their  ships 
and  their  commerce  especially,  had  been  conceded  to 
them,"  he  declared  on  23d  July,  when  opposing  a 
motion  for  the  Zea  correspondence.^"  The  question 
of  recognition,  he  maintained,  was  purely  a  British 
question,  unfettered  by  any  treaties  made  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  resting  only  on  the  law  of  nations  and  the 
generosity  and  prudence  of  Great  Britain.  His 
ministerial  majority  rejected  the  call  for  papers  by 
an  overwhelming  vote.  But  the  public  din  was  in- 
creasing. "  This  voice  will  grow  louder  and  louder, 
nor  can  it,  I  believe,  be  ultimately  resisted  by  the 
government."  The  ministry  could  not  permanently 
ward  off  the  effect  of  the  American  precedent  by 
pleading  that  it  "  stood  upon  a  ground  by  itself,  the 
United  States  having  no  European  connections  to 
look  to  when  determining  upon  such  a  policy."  ^^ 

With  these  facts  in  mind,  George  Canning  turned 
in  the  fall  of  1822  to  American  affairs  as  more 
interesting  than  those  of  Europe,  instructed  Lord 
Wellington,  as  his  predecessor  had  done^  at  Verona 
to  oppose  a  general  intervention  in  the  affairs  of 
Spain,  and  in  Parliament  himself  expressed  disap- 
proval of  the  invasion  of  the  peninsula  by  the  army 
of  the  Due  d'Angouleme  in  ithe  spring  of  1823.    At 

^oparl.  Debates,  N.  S.,  VII :   1731-1736. 
»i  Rush  to  Adams,  July  24,  1822.  S.  D.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  205 

the  same  time,  while  protecting  Spain  at  Verona, 
he  took  another  step  in  the  development  of  com- 
merce. Up  to  this  time  the  colonial  system  of  Spain 
was  still  theoretically  in  force,  and  from  the  few 
remaining  ports  held  by  Ferdinand  in  the  Americas 
issued  fleets  of  Spanish  privateers  to  prey  upon  the 
commerce  with  the  insurgent  states.  The  constant 
seizures  of  British  vessels  by  these  cruisers  had  been 
borne  with  by  the  ministry  for  years,  but  in  1822 
they  became  too  great.  In  June  of  this  year  Parlia- 
ment passed  a  new  navigation  act  to  regulate  the 
trade  with  South  America,  while  in  October  Can- 
ning despatched  Sir  Thomas  Hardy  with  a  fleet  to 
southern  waters  and  announced  to  Spain  that  these 
seizures  must  stop.^^  An  indemnity,  with  a  decree 
permitting  commerce  with  South  American  ports 
resulted  from  this  protest.  With  this  Canning  was 
temporarily  content.  He  took  no  further  action 
until  the  result  of  the  war  between  France  and 
Spain  had  been  reached. 

When  the  triumphant  march  of  d'Angouleme  to 
Cadiz  revealed  that  France  was  to  dominate  in  the 
affairs  of  Spain,  Canning  determined  that  that 
domination  should  not  extend  to  Spanish  America. 
He  seems  in  vain  to  have  tried  to  get  a  self-denying 

^^Walpole,  Hist.  JEngland,  II:  356. 


206  South  American  Independence 

pledge  from  France.^^  He  sounded  the  American 
minister  on  the  question  of  a  joint  defiance,  and  be- 
gan to  collect  in  more  systematic  form  than  hereto- 
fore information  on  the  conditions  prevailing  in  the 
republics.  Great  Britain  had  not,  like  the  United 
States,  filled  South  America  with  consuls  from  the 
very  beginning  of  the  revolt.  In  December  Canning 
had  accepted  the  offer  of  one  Patrick  Mackie  to  go 
out  to  Mexico,  on  the  public  service,  at  his  own  ex' 
pense;  had  addressed  the  Lords  Commissioners  for 
Trade  as  to  proper  locations  for  consuls  in  South 
America,  and  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury  for  funds  to 
pay  them;  and  had  asked  the  Colombian  agent  to 
prepare  a  report  upon  the  condition  of  his  country.^* 
The  conditions  that  were  decisive  in  determining 
the  policy  of  both  the  United  States  and  Great  Brit- 
ain were  those  prevailing  in  Buenos  Ayres  and 
Colombia.  Mexico  seems  to  have  had  no  weight  in 
bringing  either  cabinet  to  a  decision. ^°  But  the 
instructions  prepared  for  Dr.  Mackie  are  significant, 

»»W.  C.  Ford  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  VII :   679. 

**  Mackie  to  Canning,  November  28,  1822 ;  Planta  to  Lack,  Secret, 
December  7,  1822  ;  Lack  to  Planta,  Secret,  December  13,  1822;  Can- 
ning to  Mackie,  December  21,  1822  ;  Planta  to  Geo.  Harrison,  Secret, 
December  21, 1822;   Revenga  to  Canning,  January  22,  1823.  F.  O.Mas. 

»H.  E.  Bolton,  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XVII :  640,  has  called  atten- 
tion to  the  valuable  and  recent  Documentos  Historicos  dfexicanos: 
Obra  Commemorativa  del  Primer  Centenario  de  la  Independencia  de 
Mexico  (6  vols.,  Mexico,  1912),  edited  by  Genaro  Garcia. 


England  and  South  America  207 

in  spite  of  his  destination,  as  showing  the  attitude 
of  the  foreign  office  at  the  end  of  1822.  They  were 
simply  instructions  to  acquire  information:  as  to  the 
probable  stability  of  the  government;  as  to  the  dis- 
position of  the  ruling  class  towards  British  com- 
merce; as  to  their  disposition  towards  Spain  and  a 
return  to  a  condition  of  dependence,  and  towards  a 
mediation  by  Great  Britain;  as  to  the  treatment  they 
would  accord  commercial  agents  in  their  ports.  You 
"  will  state  on  all  occasions,"  concluded  the  instruc- 
tions, "  with  the  utmost  confidence  your  persuasion 
of  the  friendly  disposition  of  this  Govt.;  of  its 
determination  to  maintain,  so  long  as  Spain  and  her 
late  colonies  are  at  variance,  a  perfect  &  scrupu- 
lous neutrality,  between  the  contending  Parties,  and 
of  its  desire  to  see  the  Contest  brought  to  a  Con- 
clusion on  terms  consistent  with  the  Interests  and 
Happiness  of  Both." '« 

On  3d  October,  1823,  French  intervention  in 
Spain  was  crowned  by  the  capitulation  of  Cadiz;  on 
the  same  day  Canning  instructed  Sir  William  a 
Court,  the  British  minister  to  Spain,  to  enter  into 
no  discussions  on  the  subject  of  Spanish  America 
whatever.*^  He  had  decided  that  the  time  was  come 
to  act.     The  petitions  that  indicated  the  disposition 

»«  December  21,  1822,  F.  O.  Mss. 
•     "  Canning  to  a  Court,  October  3,  1822,  F.  O.  Mss. 


208  South  American  Independence 

of  the  merchants  in  1822  had  continued  to  be  pre- 
sented in  1823  to  confirm  the  Foreign  Secretary  in 
his  opinion  that  their  interests  must  be  paramount 
in  his  policy.  Sir  William  Adams  had  presented  a 
memorial  to  the  foreign  office  on  the  29th  of 
June;  ^*  three  weeks  later  "  sundry  British  mer- 
chants "  petitioned  Mr.  Canning;  the  Manchester 
Chamber  of  Commerce  acted  in  August,  as  did  a 
body  of  British  merchants  trading  with  Mexico; 
other  petitions  were  presented  in  great  numbers. 
Among  the  commercial  class  there  seemed  to  be 
but  one  opinion  upon  the  subject  of  recognition.  "Pl^^" 

On  the  9th  of  October,  1823,  Mr.  Canning  had  a 
conference  with  the  French  minister,  Polignac,  that 
has  become  famous  among  the  historians  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  In  a  way  the  memorandum  that  was 
prepared  on  this  day  is  a  British  Monroe  Doctrine, 
for  the  Foreign  Secretary  declared  in  explicit  terms 
that  Great  Britain  wanted  none  of  the  colonies  of 
Spain,  nor  any  special  preference  in  their  commerce ; 
that  she  would,  however,  make  no  special  stipulation 
on  the  subject  of  recognition,  for  she  could  not  agree 
to  postpone  it  indefinitely;  and  that  foreign  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  the  colonies  would  be  the 

•* This,  and  other  memorials,  are  in  F.  O.  Mss.,  Mexico,  vol.  8, 
and  Spanish  America,  vol.  283. 


England  and  South  America  209 

signal  for  an  immediate  acknowledgment/"  With 
jthis  declaration  before  their  eyes,  fortified  by  a 
veiled  threat  of  war  from  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  eight  weeks  later,  the  allies  were  con- 
tent to  take  no  effective  action  upon  the  appeal  of 
the  newly-liberated  Ferdinand  that  they  carry  their 
intervention  across  the  Atlantic  to  the  territories 
of  the  revolted  in  America.  The  day  after  the  con- 
ference with  Polignac,  Canning  instructed  consuls 
for  service  in  the  ports  of  South  America  and  com- 
missions of  investigation  to  Colombia  and  Mexico. 

The  instructions  to  the  Colombian  Commissioners, 
drawn  up  before  the  conference  with  Polignac  and 
the  disclaimer  of  American  ambitions  which  that 
minister  had  then  made,  are  extremely  significant. 
"The  growing  importance  of  the  States  of  Spanish 
America,"  wrote  Canning  to  Colonel  Hamilton,  the 
head  of  the  mission,^*'  "  and  the  unsatisfactory 
nature  of  the  accounts,  which  are  to  be  derived  from 
accidental  sources  of  intelligence,  with  respect  to 
events  that  are  passing  on  in  that  part  of  the  world, 
have  determined  His  Majesty's  Government  to  send 

^^ British  and.  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI :   49. 

*o  October  10,  1823.  F.  0.  Mss.  The  Commission  consisted  of  Col. 
Hamilton,  Lieut.-Col.  Campbell  and  a  Mr.  Henderson  who  was  to  be 
Consul-General.  The  same  instructions,  mutatis  mutandis,  were  given 
to  the  Mexican  Commissioners  and  to  Parish  at  Buenos  Ayres. 


210  South  American  Independence 

"  out  a  Special  Commission,  for  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining the  actual  state  of  affairs  in  Colombia. 

"  The  apparent  hopelessness  of  the  recovery  by 
Spain  of  her  dominion  over  her  late  South  American 
Provinces:  the  purpose  of  France  (notorious  to  all 
the  world)  to  support  with  arms  every  attempt  of 
the  Spanish  Crown,  to  recover  that  dominion;  and 
on  the  other  hand,  the  public  Acts  of  the  Legislature 
of  the  United  States  of  North  America,  empowering 
their  President  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
whatever  Government  the  Spanish  Colonies  respec- 
tively may  have  erected,  or  may  erect,  for  them- 
selves, present  additional  motives  for  sending  out 
such  a  Commission.  .  .  . 

"  Notice  *^  has  long  ago  been  given  to  Spain  of 
the  intention  of  His  Majesty  to  recognize  whenever 
His  Majesty  shall  think  fit,  the  independence  of  such 
of  the  late  Spanish  Colonies  as  shall  have  formed  to 
themselves  a  de  facto  Government,  with  a  reasonable 
prospect  of  stability; — and  the  appointment  of  Con- 
sular Agents  has  been  announced  to  Spain  as  a 
measure  actually  resolved  upon,  and  one  of  which 
the  execution  could  not  long  be  delayed. 

"  If  upon  your  arrival  at  [blank]  you  shall  find 
that  Events  have  induced  the  Government  to  direct 

*i  From  this  point  the  extract  from  the  instructions  given  to  Parish 
has  been  followed. 


England  and  South  America  211 

"  their  thoughts  towards  a  Union  with  Spain,  you 
will  bear  in .  mind  that  there  is  no  desire  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  to  interpose  obstacles  to  the  restora- 
tion of  a  bona  fide  understanding  between  the 
Colonies  and  the  Mother  Country: — But  it  must  be 
with  the  Mother  Country  really  independent;  not 
in  any  shape  subjected  ■  or  subservient  to  [FrancBy 
struck  out  in  the  original  draft]  any  Foreign  Power, 
nor  employing  the  intervention  of  {^French,  struck 
out]  Foreign  arms  to  re-establish  its  supremacy  in 
the  Colonies.  So  far  from  interposing  Obstacles  to 
a  beneficial  arrangement  between  [blank]  and  old 
Spain  on  the  principle  of  reconciliation  and  mutual 
advantage,  you  are  authorized  to  receive  and  to 
transmit  for  the  consideration  of  your  Government 
any  proposal  to  that  effect  which  the  ruling  party  in 
[blank]  may  be  desirous  of  having  communicated 
to  Spain. 

"  Should  their  Government  be  established  as  inde- 
pendent, whether  as  a  single  State  or  as  a  federal 
System  of  States,  but  purely  national  and  neither 
connected  with  Spain  by  subordination  nor  with  any 
other  Country  by  incorporation  or  federal  union, — 
the  decision  of  your  Government  as  to  the  mode  of 
dealing  with  such  State  or  States  would  depend 
mainly  on  the  following  considerations;  with  respect 


212  South  American  Independence 

"to  which  you  will  therefore  employ  your  best  en- 
deavors to  collect  the  most  accurate  information. — 

"  Ist.  Has  the  Government  so  constituted,  already 
notified,  by  a  publick  act,  its  determination  to  re- 
main independent  of  Spain,  and  to  admit  no  terms  of 
accommodation  with  the  Mother  Country? 

"  2dly.  Is  it  in  military  possession  of  the  Country; 
and  also  in  a  respectable  condition  of  military  de- 
fence against  any  probable  attack  from  Europe  ? 

"  3rdly.  Does  it  appear  to  have  acquired  a  reason- 
able degree  of  consistency,  and  to  enjoy  the  confi- 
dence and  good  will  of  the  several  orders  of  the 
people  ? 

"  4thly.  Has  it  abjured  and  abolished  the  Slave 
Trade?  '    '■'^' 

"  Should  these  enquiries  all  be  answered  in  the 
affirmative;  and  should  it  appear  to  your  satisfac- 
tion, that  there  is  a  fair  probability  of  things  going 
on  in  the  train  in  which,  you  find  them,  You  are  to 
address  yourself  to  the  person  exercising  the  Office 
of  Secretary  to  the  Government,  and  are  to  suggest 
the  expediency  of  sending  to  England  some  individ- 
ual in  the  confidence  of  the  [blank]  Government, 
upon  communication  with  whom  as  well  as  upon  re- 
ceipt of  your  Reports,  We  may  be  enabled  to  de- 
termine whether  the  time  is  ripe  for  the  Establish- 


England  and  South  America  213 

"  ment  of  an  ostensible  political  relation  with 
[blank]  by  the  interchange  of  diplomatic  Missions. . . . 

"  It  may  perhaps  be  unnecessary  to  state  to  you, 
but  it  is  very  material,  that  it  should  be  understood 
by  the  persons  with  whom  you  communicate  in 
[blank]  that  so  far  is  Great  Britain  from  looking  to 
any  more  intimate  connection  with  any  of  the  late 
Spanish  Provinces,  than  that  of  friendly  political 
and  commercial  Intercourse,  that  His  Majesty  could 
not  be  induced,  by  any  consideration  to  enter  any 
engagement  which  might  be  considered  as  bringing 
them  under  His  Dominion. 

"  Neither,  on  the  other  hand,  would  his  Majesty 
consent  to  see  them  (in  the  event  of  their  final 
separation  from  Spain)  brought  under  the  Dominion 
of  any  other  Power." 

So  far  the  instructions  to  the  two  sets  of  Commis- 
sioners were  the  same  even  in  wording.  Beyond  this 
point  the  peculiar  monarchical  tendencies  which  had 
been  developed  in  Mexico  demanded  special  treat- 
ment.*^ "  Among  the  possible  Arrangements  of  the 
affairs  of  Mexico,  which  are  contemplated  in  the 
Instructions  already  given  to  you  for  your  guidance, 

"  Further  instructions  to  Mexican  commissioneri,  October  10,  1828. 
F.  0.  Mss.  This  commission  consisted  of  Measrs.  Hervey,  O'Gorman 
and  Ward ;  the  first  to  be  minister  upon  a  recognition,  the  second 
charg^,  and  the  last  consul-general.  Dr.  Mackie'f  commission  waa 
reyoked. 


214  South  American  Independence 

"  one  is  not  specified,  of  "which  nevertheless  there 
has  been  much  question  at  former  periods,  and  of 
which  recent  events  may  not  improbably  revive  the 
consideration. 

"I  mean  the  settlement  of  that  great  Country 
under  a  monarchical  form  of  Government,  practi- 
cally independent  of  Spain,  but  with  a  Spanish 
Infante  upon  the  Throne. 

"  This  case  was  not  included  among  those  specified 
in  your  Instructions,  because  the  condition  of  Spain 
at  the  time  when  those  Instructions  were  dravm, 
while  the  duration  and  issue  of  the  War  were  still 
uncertain,  afforded  no  immediate  probability  that  a 
Spanish  Prince  would  be  available  for  such  destina- 
tion, otherwise  than  through  the  contrivance,  and 
with  the  aid,  and  under  the  superintendence  of 
France. 

"  The  conclusion  of  the  war  brings  back  the  possi- 
bility of  such  an  arrangement  with  Spain,  if  there 
shall  exist  a  disposition  to  it  in  Mexico. 

"  The  constitution  of  Mexican  society  favors  the 
notion  of  the  existence  of  such  a  disposition.  The 
great  number  of  large  Proprietors,  the  wealth  and 
influence  of  the  Clergy,  and  the  long  experience  of 
a  Vice-Regal  Establishment,  invested  with  all 
Monarchical  forms,  afford  many  probabilities  of  a 
predilection  for  that  mode  of  Government. 


England  and  South  America  215 

"  The  experience  of  Iturbide's  Reign  will  (as 
stated  in  your  former  Instructions)  have  shewn  to 
the  Mexican  People  the  instability  of  an  elective 
Monarchy,  and  will  have  taught  any  new  General, 
who  may  find  himself  in  possession  of  the  confidence 
of  the  Army,  that  he  would  better  entitle  himself 
to  the  gratitude  of  his  Country,  by  exerting  his  in- 
fluence for  the  purposes  of  a  solid  pacification,  than 
for  that  of  his  own  temporary  and  precarious 
aggrandizement. 

"  In  this  state  of  things,  and  in  the  present  ex- 
haustion of  the  Mother  Country,  which,  while  it 
diminishes  on  one  side  the  apprehension  of  forcible 
conquest,  may  perhaps  create,  on  the  other,  a  willing- 
ness for  amicable  compromise,  it  does  not  seem 
unlikely,  that  the  views  of  the  Mexicans  should  be 
turned,  with  pretty  general  concurrence,  to  the 
restoration  of  a  Monarchy,  in  the  person  of  one  of 
the  Princes  of  the  Spanish  race,  but  on  the  basis  of 
Mexican  Independence. 

"  To  any  proposal  for  your  co-operation  to  bring 
about  such  a  settlement,  you  will  not  hesitate  to 
avow  yourself  ready  to  accede,  with  the  certainty  of 
obtaining  the  cordial  approbation  of  your  Govern- 
ment. 

"  I  need  not  add,  that,  while  you  are  to  accept 
such  a  proposal,  if  submitted  to  you,  you  are  not 


216  South  American  Independence 

"  to  attempt  to  prescribe  to  the  Mexican  Authorities 
this,  or  any  particular  course  of  action.  Nor  need  I 
repeat,  that,  to  your  acceptance  of  the  proposal,  it  is 
an  essential  and  indispensable  condition,  that  the 
^Negotiation  is  to  be  carried  on  with  Spain  alone,  and 
that  no  foreign  force  should  be  employed  to  conduct 
the  Spanish  Prince  to  Mexico." 

The  policy  of  George  Canning,  as  indicated  in 
these  instructions  to  his  Commissioners  in  the  fall 
of  1823,  is  political  only  so  far  as  his  determination 
to  maintain  the  commerce  that  had  been  developed 
with  Latin-America  during  the  years  of  turmoil 
forced  him  to  use  political  means.  The  facts  do  not 
justify  his  famous  boast.  If  it  be  true  that  he  really 
did  "  call  the  new  world  into  existence,"  which  may 
well  be  controverted,  it  is  still  manifest  that  his 
motive,  as  has  been  said  before,  was  not  to  "  redress 
the  balance  of  the  old."  Nor  had  regard  for  the 
rights  of  the  belligerent  communities  any  consider- 
able share  in  determining  the  steps  of  his  policy. 
He  took  at  this  time  the  irrevocable  step  of  sending 
consuls  to  South  American  ports  to  emphasize  before 
the  world  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  would  be  no 
party  to  a  forcible  rehabilitation  of  Spain's  colonial 
system.  In  taking  the  step  it  was  the  interests  of 
the  Liverpool  and  Belfast  and  London  merchants 
that  he  had  at  heart. 


England  and  8outh  America  217 

The  declaration  to  Polignac,  coupled  with  the 
sending  of  consuls,  which  was  made  public  on  17th 
October,  had  the  desired  effect  of  driving  the  Holy 
Allies  into  cover.  Legitimist  sympathies  must  have 
been  powerful  indeed  to  have  moved  in  opposition 
to  the  wishes  of  Great  Britain  in  a  matter  of  mari- 
time significance.  "  With  respect  to  the  question  of 
Spanish  America,"  Canning  was  able  to  write  to  Sir 
William  k  Court  at  the  end  of  the  year,*^  "  I  am 
happy  to  inform  you  that  there  appears  now  to  be 
little  prospect  of  any  practical  divergence  between 
this  Country  and  the  Powers  of  the  Continent.  Of 
the  opinions  of  Russia,  indeed,  I  am  not  yet  enabled 
to  speak  positively :  There  has  not  yet  been  time  to 
hear  from  Petersburgh  since  the  communication  of 
the  Memorandum  of  my  conversation  with  The 
Prince  de  Polignac.  You  will  probably  have  col- 
lected from  General  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  all  that  could 
be  known  of  those  opinions  up  to  the  period  at  which 
that  communication  was  made;  but  Russia  can 
hardly  act  alone  for  the  re-establishment  of  Spanish 
Supremacy  in  the  Colonies.  France  has  repeatedly 
and  distinctly  disclaimed  any  intention  of  engag- 
ing in  such  an  enterprize: 

"  Austria  and  Pnissia  have  severally  declared 
their  opinion  that  a  Congress  upon  South  American 

«  December  29, 1843.   F.  O.  Mss. 


218  South  American  Independence 

"Affairs  would,  in  any  case,  have  been  a  matter  of 
very  doubtful  policy;  and  that  is  one  which  it  would 
be  idle  to  think  of,  when  Great  Britain  declines  being 
a  party  to  it. 

"  It  is  not  immaterial  to  add,  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  has  declared  Its  Senti- 
ments upon  this  subject  in  a  manner  wholly  con- 
sonant with  the  declarations  previously  made  by  this 
Country;  going  indeed  beyond  us,  in  as  much  as,  It 
has  actually  acknowledged  the  Independence  of  the 
Spanish  American  Provinces. 

"  A  frank  communication  was  made  to  the  Ameri- 
can Minister  some  months  ago  of  the  course  which 
Great  Britain  intended  to  pursue,  which  was  no 
doubt  reported  by  that  Minister  to  his  Govt,  before 
the  opening  of  the  Session  of  Congress." 

The  sending  of  consuls  to  South  American  ports 
was  in  contemplation  of  a  recognition  at  no  distant 
date.  The  various  Commissioners  were  instructed  to 
gather  information  upon  which  to  justify  the  same; 
for  Great  Britain  was  now  definitely  committed  to 
the  policy  which  Canning  had  anticipated  in  1822, 
when  he  saw  in  America  matters  of  more  interest  to 
his  country  than  in  Europe. 

"  As  to  any  further  Measures,"  announced  the 
Speech  from  the  Throne  at  the  next  session  of  Par- 
liament, "  His  Majesty  has  reserved  to  Himself  an 


England  and  South  America  219 

"  unfettered  Discretion,  to  be  exercised  as  the  Cir- 
cumstances of  tliose  Countries,  and  the  Interests  of 
His  own  People  may  appear  to  His  majesty  to  re- 
quire. 

The  collection  of  information  upon  South  Ameri- 
can conditions  was  attended  with  embarrassing  com- 
plications in  Great  Britain,  as  it  had  been  six  years 
before  in  the  United  States.  In  the  case  of  the  lat- 
ter, the  files  of  consular  despatches  were  rich  mines 
of  information:  the  official  reports  of  the  special 
Commissioners  adding  no  new  facts  of  consequence. 
But  the  Foreign  Office  had  not  this  regular  source 
of  knowledge.  Previous  to  the  consular  despatches 
that  began  to  arrive  in  the  end  of  1823,  the  Foreign 
Secretary  seems  to  have  derived  his  information 
through  a  number  of  channels,  none  of  which  were 
official.  The  correspondence  in  the  newspapers  gave 
him  all  that  was  printed  in  America.  Despatches  of 
naval  officers  on  duty  in  South  American  waters 
were  turned  over  to  him  by  the  Admiralty  in  con- 
siderable numbers.  South  American  agents  in  Lon- 
don wrote  to  him  profusely,  British  commercial 
houses  possessing  branches  in  the  republics  fre- 
quently sent  copies  of  letters  from  their  agents  for 
his  edification.  In  all,  little  of  importance  that  oc- 
curred in  those  regions  could  have  failed  to  reach 

"February  3,  1824.  From  an  original  pamphlet  edition  in  F.  O. 
Mas. 


220  South  American  Independence 

the  Foreign  Office;  but  in  the  establishment  of  con- 
suls in  October,  1823,  is  found  the  beginning  of 
official  channels  of  information. 

The  difficulties  of  South  American  diplomacy  have 
been  seen  in  a  previous  chapter.  With  an  agent 
leading  a  division  of  the  insurgent  army,  with 
another  guaranteeing  an  insurgent  loan,  with  a  third 
engaging  in  the  tempting  game  of  privateers,  the 
neutral  course  of  Mr.  Adams  had  been  embarrassed. 
Canning  did  not  fail  to  encounter  similar  distrac- 
tions. 

The  agents  in  Mexico  were  particularly  hard  to 
handle.  Dr.  Mackie,  who  had  gone  out  on  an  in- 
formal mission,  in  1822,  had  exceeded  his  instruc- 
tions from  the  first.  On  arriving  at  Vera  Cruz  he 
learned  that  the  Mexicans  were  at  the  point  of  con- 
cluding a  commercial  treaty  with  Spain,  giving 
marked  advantages  to  the  latter.  "  It  therefore 
required,"  he  reported  to  Canning  with  compla- 
cency,*^ "  no  little  Address  and  Management  to  do 
away  the  proceedings  which  had  taken  place;  but 
upon  my  assuring  him  [General  Vittoria,  the  suc- 
cessor of  Iturbide]  of  the  friendly  disposition  of 
Great  Britain  I  had  the  satisfaction,  before  I  left 
him  to  annull  a  Treaty  so  inimical  to  the  Policy  & 
Commerce  of  the  British  Empire."     The  successors 

«  Mackie  to  Canning,  July  14,  1823.    F.  O.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  221 

of  Mackie, — Hervey,  O'Gorman  and  Ward, — ^were 
of  course  instructed  to  disavow  this  interposition  of 
their  predecessor  and  apologize  to  the  government. 
But  they  themselves  were  no  more  willing  than  he 
to  obey  their  orders.  Arriving  at  the  city  of  Mex- 
ico on  the  last  day  of  the  year,  they  were  able,  in 
eighteen  days,  to  prepare  an  enthusiastic  report  upon 
the  condition  of  the  country,  and  were  willing  to  send 
it  home  in  the  care  of  Mr.  Ward  just  as  a  dangerous 
insurrection,  known  by  the  name  of  Lobato,  was  in 
progress.  To  this  superficiality  of  investigation  was 
added  a  more  positive  offence  when  the  head  of  the 
Commission,  Mr.  Lionel  Hervey,  repeated  Dev- 
ereux's  action,  and  guaranteed  a  loan  to  sustain  the 
existing  government  in  a  crisis.  The  reproaches  of 
the  Foreign  Secretary,  that  the  report  was  based  on 
a  "  fortnight's,  or  three  week's,  experience,"  and 
despatched,  not  only  "  before  you  had  allowed  your- 
selves time  to  form  a  mature  judgment,"  but  at  "  a 
moment  of  publick  disturbance,"  were  followed,  as 
news  of  the  loan  reached  London,  by  the  imperative 
recall  of  Hervey:  the  vessel  bringing  out  his  suc- 
cessor would  wait  to  take  him  back.*'  James 
Morier,  the  new  Commissioner,  went  out  ordered 
"  That  you  are  sent  to  ascertain  the  Fact  of  Mexican 

♦•Hervey  to  Canning,  January  1,  February  18  and  20,  1824;   Can- 
ning to  Hervey,  April  23,  July  20,  1824.   F.  0.  Mss. 


222  South  American  Independence 

"  Independence,  not  actively  to  promote  it ;  .  and  to 
form  and  report  an  Opinion  of  the  Stability  of  the 
Government,  not  to  prescribe  its  form  or  attempt 
to  influence  its  Councils."  But  even  Morier  and 
Ward,  the  latter  as  a  subordinate  having  retained  the 
confidence  of  the  Ministry,  were  not  impervious  to 
Mexican  influence.  At  the  beginning  of  the  next 
year  they  v^^ere  instructed  to  conclude  a  treaty  of 
commerce  v^'ith  Mexico :  in  the  negotiations  they  al- 
lowed themselves  to  admit  into  the  treaty  clauses 
radically  at  variance  with  their  instructions.  It  is 
not  to  be  expected,  wrote  Canning  with  exasperation 
as  he  rejected  the  whole  treaty  and  ordered  the  nego- 
tiation of  a  new  one,  that  we  will  abandon  "  for 
the  sake  of  this  new  connexion,  principles  which  we 
never  have  conceded,  in  our  intercourse  with  other 
States,  whether  of  the  Old  World  or  the  New,  either 
to  considerations  of  friendship,  or  to  menaces  of  hos- 
tility." *' 

This  investigation  of  the  character  of  South 
American  agents  has  carried  the  account  somewhat 
beyond  the  limits  of  recognition.  It  reveals  a  ten- 
dency that  prevailed  in  most  of  the  negotiations.  As 
in  the  ease  of  Adams's  envoys,  many  of  Canning's 


*'  Canning  to  Morier,  July  30,  1824;  to  Ward  and  Morier,  January 
3,  1825 ;  to  Ward,  September  9,  1825  ;  Ward  and  Morier  to  Canning, 
No.  I,  April  10,  1825.  F.  O.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  223 

were  little  more  than  mere  enthusiasts;  if  they 
were  not  often  "  fanatics  in  the  cause  of  emancipa- 
tion," **  they  were  almost  always  devotees  of  a  more 
selfish  interest — that  of  British  commerce.  The 
Colombian  experiences  of  Canning  hardly  rival  those 
of  his  Mexican  negotiations. 

The  British  Commissioners  to  Colombia  reached 
Jamaica,  on  their  way  out,  before  the  end  of  1823, 
and  on  the  8th  of  the  following  March  they  were 
graciously  received  by  the  Vice-President,  Sant- 
andar,  at  Bogota.  Their  reception,  however,  was  in 
an  unofficial  capacity  as  Don  Pedro  Gual,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  found  himself  unable  to  grant 
exequaturs  to  consuls  who  were  commissioned  to 
"  provinces  and  dependencies  "  rather  than  to  inde- 
pendent States.  Four  months  after  their  arrival. 
Colonel  Hamilton,  the  head  of  the  mission,  wrote  a 
report  in  answer  to  the  questions  of  his  instructions, 
and  announced  that  it  expressed  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  the  Commissioners.**  That  he  had  never 
shown  his  instructions  to  his  colleagues,  and  that  he 
had  not  hesitated  publicly  to  pledge  the  support  of 
Great  Britain  in  case  of  a  forcible  intervention  in 
South  America,  seemed  to  him  no  deviation  from 

*8Reddaway,  Monroe  Doctrine,  26. 

"Hamilton  to  Canning,  December  19,  1823,  March  19,  1824,  July 
5,  1824 ;  Gual  to  Hamilton,  April  14,  1824.  F.  O.  Mss.  Annual  Regit- 
ter,  1824  [223]. 


224  South  American  Independence 

the  line  of  duty.  He  was  typical  of  his  class  of 
agents.  Here,  as  in  the  Mexican  business,  Canning 
was  angry  and  made  little  attempt  to  conceal  his  ir- 
ritation. He  had  already  received  a  report  on 
Colombian  conditions  from  Hurtado,  the  London 
agent.  Now  he  was  forced  to  take  other  reports 
from  Campbell,  who  had  brought  home  that  of  Ham- 
ilton, and  whose  "  unanimous  opinion "  had  been 
pledged  by  his  chief  without  his  knowledge.^"  Al- 
ready the  Foreign  Secretary  had  had  Joseph  Planta, 
his  chief  subordinate,  write  to  Hamilton,  that^^  "  Mr. 
Canning  desires  that  you  will  take  the  trouble  to 
reperuse  your  Instructions;  and  to  compare  them 
with  the  letters  which  you  have  written  since  your 
arrival  at  your  place  of  destination;  and  with  the 
language  which  you  are  represented  by  the  Colom- 
bian Newspapers  to  have  held  at  your  presentation 
and  other  Publick  Meetings. 

"  The  unsatisfactory  meagreness  of  your  written 
communications  to  this  office,  falls  as  far  below  what 
was  prescribed  to  you  on  the  one  hand,  as  the  vague 
and  unmeasured  terms  in  which  you  have  publickly 
pledged  the  opinions  and  intentions  of  your  Govt,  go 
beyond  it  on  the  other. 

50  Hurtado  to  Canning,  July  16,  1824;  Campbell  to  Canning, 
November  6  and  December  10,  1824.   F.  0.  3fss. 

51  Planta  to  Hamilton,  August  19,  1824.  F.  0.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  '2i'2,6 

"  Both  have  exposed  your  Govt,  to  the  greatest 
possible  inconvenience." 

Upon  the  arrival  of  Campbell,  with  his  verbal 
accounts  of  the  Chief  Commissioner's  policy,  the  lat- 
ter was  censured  for  a  second  time,  and  by  Canning 
himself.  In  words  that  were  no  less  emphatic  be- 
cause they  were  veiled  in  diplomatic  phrases,  he  was 
ordered  during  the  rest  of  his  stay  in  Colombia  to 
carry  out  the  objects  of  his  mission.^^  From  this 
point,  so  far  as  the  Foreign  Office  was  concerned,  the 
Colombian  negotiations  progressed  smoothly.  It  did 
not  become  necessary  there,  as  in  Mexico,  actually  to 
disavow  any  of  the  agents. 

In  Buenos  Ayres  alone,  the  most  important  of  the 
three  storm-centres  of  Spanish  America,  did  the 
agents  of  Great  Britain  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the 
Ministry  in  thoroughly  satisfactory  manner.  Here 
the  revolution  had  advanced  to  the  furthest  point, 
here  the  interests  of  English  merchants  were  the 
greatest,  and  so  upon  the  course  of  events  here 
British  policy  depended.  As  the  most  important 
post  in  the  republics,  it  received  the  ablest  of  the 
agents  in  the  person  of  Woodbine  Parish,  later  in 
life  to  become  vice-president  of  the  Royal  Geograph- 
ical Society,  and  a  knight,  who  went  out  as  Consul- 
General  at  the  beginning  of  1824. 

52  Canning  to  Hamilton,  November  8,  1824.  F.  0.  Mss. 


226  South  American  Independence 

Before  Woodbine  Parish  had  had  time  to  send 
home  many  despatches  upon  the  condition  of  Buenos 
Ayres,  there  occurred  in  Parliament  the  last  and 
most  exhaustive  debate  that  the  subject  of  recogni- 
tion had  jet  received.  To  this  day  the  speech  of  Sir 
James  Mackintosh  is  the  best  statement  of  the  theory 
and  nature  of  recognition  that  has  been  made. 

The  announcement  made  in  the  speech  from  the 
Throne,  on  3d  February,  1824,  that  Great  Britain 
would  follow  her  own  interests  regarding  South 
America,  did  not  satisfy  the  representatives  of  the 
commercial  classes,  who  had  been  preparing  petitions 
for  two  years,  and  were  now  more  anxious  than. ever 
for  a  formal  recognition.  Debate  on  the  speech,  be- 
ginning the  night  it  was  presented,  was  continued  in 
Commons  for  two  days,  bringing  Canning  to  his  feet 
more  than  once  to  defend  the  Ministry  against  the 
attacks  of  Brougham,  and  to  announce  again  the 
policy  guiding  it;  that  Spain  might  recover  her  colo- 
nies if  she  could,  but  that  she  must  do  it  unaided." 
In  both  Houses  notice  was  given  within  the  next  two 
weeks  of  general  motions  on  South  America  in  case 
the  Ministry  should  so  long  hesitate  to  act.  On  4th 
March,  Canning  proved  his  statements  as  to  policy 
by  laying  before  Parliament  the  Polignac  memoran- 
dum of  9th  October,   1823,  and  a  correspondence 

^Parl.  Debater,  N.  S.,  X:  90. 


England  and  South  America  227 

with  Sir  William  a  Court,  British  Minister  to  Spain, 
on  the  subject  of  the  South  American  conference, 
invited  by  Ferdinand  on  his  second  restoration  in  the 
fall  of  that  year." 

In  the  House  of  Lords,  Lansdowne,  who  had,  a 
week  before,  shown  interest  in  the  action  of  Spain 
on  Canning's  last  proposal  of  mediation,  made  an 
elaborate  speech  in  behalf  of  a  motion  for  an  ad- 
dress to  the  King  on  the  expediency  of  a  recogni- 
tion.^** He  thanked  the  Ministry  for  the  papers  of 
4th  March,  begging  at  the  same  time  for  further 
steps  and  speedy  ones.  He  proved  to  his  complete 
satisfaction  that  the  States  of  South  America  were 
de  facto  independent;  that  they  could  maintain  their 
independence,  so  that  Spain  had  no  prospect  of  re- 
covering them;  that  their  commerce  with  Britain 
was  of  exceeding  great  importance.  In  the  year 
1821,  he  declared,  they  bought  from  British  mer- 
chants goods  to  the  value  of  £3,227,560;  in  1822 
they  increased  their  purchases;  and  now  they  con- 
sumed half  as  much  as  their  neighboring  republic  in 
Worth  America.  By  comparison  with  the  United 
States,  he  showed  that  once  independent  their  pur- 
chasing capacity  would  be  much  enhanced.    To  him 

"PaW.  Defeases,  N.  S.,X:  105,  157,  708;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XI :  49. 

^^Parl.  Debates,  N.  S.,  X :  777,  970-992. 


228  South  American  Independence 

replied  the  Earl  of  Liverpool,  in  words  that  brought 
out  a  ministerial  majority  of  95  to  34  to  veto  the 
motion,  saying  "  that  what  had  been  done  was  all 
that  could  have  been  done,  embracing  every  practical 
advantage  consistent  with  honor  and  good  faith.  A 
formal  acknowledgment  of  independence  could  prop- 
erly be  made  only  by  the  power  who  claimed  do- 
minion over  another;  and,  in  a  strict  sense  of  the 
word,  we  had  no  right  either  to  acknowledge  or  dis- 
pute their  independence."  °^ 

The  Earl  of  Liverpool  touched  lightly  upon  a 
theory  of  recognition  in  his  reply  to  Lansdowne :  the 
subject  received  an  exhaustive  examination  at  the 
hands  of  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  on  15th  June,  1824.  With  a  petition 
from  117  commercial  houses  of  London  in  his  hand 
as  a  text,  he  cleared  away  much  of  the  confusion 
existing  in  the  minds  of  both  parties  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  recognition. 

"  I  must  go  back  for  a  moment,"  he  explained,^' 
"  to  those  elementary  principles  which  are  so  grossly 
misunderstood.  And  first  with  respect  to  the  term 
*  Recognition,'  the  introduction  of  which  into  these 

^^  Annual  Register,  1824  [23]  ;  Pari.  Debates,  N.  S.,  X. :     992-1010. 

^''Substance  of  a  Speech  of  Sir  James  Mackintosh  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  June  15,  1824,  on  presenting  a  Petition  from  the  Merchants 
of  London  for  the  Recognition  of  the  Independent  States  established  in 
the   Countries  of  America  formerly  subject  to  Spain  (London,  1824),  5. 


England  and  South  America  229 

"  discussions  has  proved  the  principal  occasion  of 
darkness  and  error.  It  is  a  term  which  is  used  in  two 
senses  so  different  from  each  other  as  to  have  nothing 
very  important  in  common.  The  first,  which  is  the 
true  and  legitimate  sense  of  the  word  '  Recognition/ 
as  a  technical  term  of  international  law,  is  that  in 
which  it  denotes  the  explicit  acknowledgment  of  the 
independence  of  a  country  by  a  State  which  formerly 
exercised  sovereignty  over  it.  Spain  has  been 
doomed  to  exhibit  more  examples  of  this  species  of 
recognition  than  any  other  European  State,  of  which 
the  most  memorable  cases  are  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  independence  of  Portugal  and  Holland.  This 
country  also  paid  the  penalty  of  evil  councils  in  that 
hour  of  folly  and  infatuation  which  led  to  a  hostile 
separation  between  the  American  colonies  and  their 
mother  country.  Such  recognitions  are  renuncia- 
tions of  sovereignty.  They  are  a  surrender  of  the 
power  or  of  the  claim  to  govern.  They  are  of  the 
utmost  importance,  as  quieting  possession  and  ex- 
tinguishing a  foreign  pretension  to  authority;  they 
free  a  nation  from  the  evils  of  a  disputed  sov- 
ereignty; they  remove  the  only  competitor  who  can 
with  any  colour  of  right  contend  against  the  actual 
Government,  and  they  secure  to  a  country  the  ad- 
vantage of  an  undisputed  independence. 

"  But  we,  who  are  as  foreign  to  the  Spanish  States 


230  South  American  Independence 

"  in  America  as  we  are  to  Spain  herself,  who  never 
had  any  more  authority  over  them  than  over  her, 
have  in  this  case  no  claims  to  renounce,  no  power 
to  abdicate,  no  sovereignty  to  resign,  no  legal  rights 
to  confer.  They  are  as  independent  without  our 
acknowledgment  of  their  independence  as  with  it. 
No  act  of  ours  can  ever  remove  an  obstacle  which 
stands  in  the  way  of  their  independence,  or  with- 
draw any  force  which  disturbs  its  exercise.  What 
we  have  to  do,  is  therefore  not  recognition  in  its  first 
and  most  strictly  proper  sense.  It  is  not  by  formal 
stipulations  or  solemn  declarations  that  we  are  to 
recognize  the  American  States;  but  by  measures  of 
practical  policy,  which  imply  that  we  acknowledge 
their  independence.  Our  recognition  is  virtual.  We 
are  called  upon  to  treat  them  as  independent;  to 
establish  with  them  the  same  relations  and  the  same 
intercourse  which  we  are  accustomed  to  maintain 
with  other  Governments;  to  deal  with  them  in  every 
respect  as  commonwealths  entitled  to  admission  into 
the  great  society  of  civilized  States." 

Here,  for  the  first  time,  Mackintosh  defined  recog- 
nition in  clear  and  precise  terms.  He  went  on  to 
show,  as  John  Quincy  Adams  had  shown  six  years 
before,  that  it  was  no  violation  of  neutrality.  "  It 
implies  no  guarantee,"  he  declared,  "  no  alliance,  no 
aid,  no  approbation  of  the  successful  revolt;   no  in- 


England  and  South  America  231 

"  timation  of  an  opinion  concerning  the  justice  or  in- 
justice of  the  means  by  which  it  has  been  accom- 
plished. .  .  .  As  a  State,  we  can  neither  condemn 
nor  justify  revolutions  which  do  not  affect  our  safety 
and  are  not  amenable  to  our  laws.  .  .  .  The  prin- 
ciple which  requires  such  an  intercourse  is  the  same, 
whether  the  governments  be  old  or  new.  Antiquity 
affords  a  presumption  of  stability,  which,  like  all 
other  presumptions,  may  and  does  fail  in  particular 
instances.  But  in  itself  it  is  nothing;  and  when  it 
ceases  to  indicate  stability,  it  ought  to  be  regarded 
by  a  foreign  country  as  of  no  account.  . 
[When]  Great  Britain  (I  hope  very  soon)  recog- 
nizes the  States  of  Spanish  America,  it  will  not  be 
as  a  concession  to  them,  for  they  need  no  such  recog- 
nition; but  it  will  be  for  her  own  sake,  to  promote 
her  own  interest;  to  protect  the  trade  and  naviga- 
tion of  her  subjects;  to  acquire  the  best  means  of 
cultivating  friendly  relations  with  important  coun- 
tries, and  of  composing  by  immediate  negotiation 
those  differences  which  might  otherwise  terminate 
in  war." 

From  this  legal  analysis  of  the  doctrine  of  recog- 
nition, Mackintosh  returned  to  the  customary  trend 
of  South  American  speeches.  Once  more  he  told  the 
history  of  the  revolt,  and  described  the  needs  of  his 


232  South  American  Indej^endence 

commercial  constituents.  On  subsequent  days  he 
presented  more  petitions  to  the  House. 

At  the  last  sitting  of  the  House  of  Lords,  for  Par- 
liament was  prorogued  on  the  25th  of  June,  1824, 
the  Earl  of  Liverpool  replied  to  an  interrogation 
from  the  Marquis  of  Lansdo^vne  that  every  attempt 
to  bring  Spain  to  a  recognition  on  her  own  account 
had  failed;  that  the  government  held  itself  ready  to 
recognize  when  it  should  become  expedient.®*  Dur- 
ing the  ensuing  recess  the  Ministry  had  time  to 
meditate  upon  the  attitude  of  Parliament  and  the 
reports  of  its  South  American  Commissioners. 

Woodbine  Parish,  Consul-General  for  Buenos 
Ayres,  embarked  on  the  ship  Cambridge  on  3d 
January,  1824.  With  him  were  the  consuls  for  the 
region  under  his  supervision,  and  in  his  despatch  bag 
were  the  instructions  of  10th  October,  1823,  that 
have  already  been  examined,  a  copy  of  the  Polignac 
memorandum,  and  three  gold  snuff  boxes,  bearing 
the  portrait  of  his  Majesty,  George  IV.  The  spirit 
of  friendly  conciliation  that  is  implied  by  the  pres- 
ence of  the  snuff  boxes  has  been  borne  out  by  the 
examination  of  the  more  formal  impedimenta  of  his 
mission.  After  a  voyage  of  nearly  three  months. 
Parish  landed  in  the  city  of  Buenos  Ayres.  A  month 
later,  on  17th  April,  arrived  The  Countess  of  Chi- 

68ParZ.2)e6o<es,  N.  S.,  XI:  1479. 


England  and  South  America  233 

Chester,  the  first  of  the  line  of  British  packets  that 
the  Admiralty  had  established  at  this  time."^ 

The  reception  of  the  new  agent  was  cordial,  as  was 
to  be  expected.  Rivadavia,  on  the  verge  of  retire- 
ment from  the  all-important  post  he  had  held  for 
three  years,  was  ready  to  enter  into  the  negotiations 
proposed,  with  freedom.  On  the  terms  of  a  "  pre- 
vious Recognition  of  the  Independence  of  this  State 
(which  he  said  was  a  sine  qua  non)  "  wrote  Parish, 
a  few  days  after  his  arrival,^"  "  and,  of  Spain  being 
placed  with  respect  to  her  Commerce,  upon  the  same 
footing  with  the  Natives  of  the  Country,  they  were 
sincerely  disposed  to  enter  into  any  arrangement 
with  His  Catholic  Majesty's  Government  upon  such 
terms  as  Great  Britain  would  say  were  fair  and  rea- 
sonable." 

In  the  performance  of  his  duty,  in  the  collection 
of  information.  Parish  was  in  strong  contrast  to  the 
agents  in  Colombia  and  Mexico.  At  his  request  a 
native  of  the  country  wrote  an  elaborate  monograph 
on  its  conditions  and  resources;®^  his  despatches  are 
full  of  details  upon  the  subjects  of  British  interest 
and  local  politics;  and  not  a  few  South  American 
gazettes,  bulletins  and  pamphlets  were  enclosed  in 

59  Forbes  to  Adams,  March  31, 1824.  S.  D.  Mss. 

60  April  15, 1824.  F.  0.  Mss. 

61  Ygnacio  Nunez,  An  account,  historical,  political  and  statistical, 
of  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  (London,  1825). 


234  South  American  Independence 

his  mail  to  the  Foreign  Office.  So  assiduous  was  he 
in  the  work  of  conciliation  that  in  two  months  he 
wrote  to  Planta  for  more  snuff  boxes,  and  intimated 
that  a  few  framed  portraits  of  the  king  would  be 
highly  useful.*'^ 

The  report  that  was  sent  to  England  on  25th  June, 
1824,  was  highly  favorable  to  the  government  exist- 
ing at  Buenos  Ayres.  The  value  of  the  labors  of 
Rivadavia  and  Garcia  was  as  apparent  to  Parish  now 
as  it  had  been  to  Forbes,  the  American,  three  years 
before.  There  was  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  new 
government  of  Las  Heras,  just  come  into  existence, 
would  prove  less  stable  than  its  predecessor.  The 
general  congress,  whose  time  of  meeting  was  in  sight, 
would  probably  complete  the  union  of  the  provinces, 
for  as  yet  Buenos  Ayres  conducted  the  foreign  rela- 
tions only  by  tacit  consent.  There  was  no  funda- 
mental law  of  union.  "  It  is  of  importance  to  ob- 
serve," wrote  General  Alvear,  their  minister  to  the 
United  States,  then  in  London  en  route  to  his  post, 
"  that  all  the  Provinces  about  to  meet  in  Congress, 
have  enjoyed  for  the  last  fourteen  years,  and  up- 
wards, without  interruption,  their  full  Independence, 
that  is  to  say,  ever  since  the  25th  of  May,  1810."  ^' 

Before  the  exhaustive  report  of  Parish  reached 

6*  Parish  to  Planta,  June  4, 1824.  F.  0.  Mss. 
"Alvear  to  Canning,  July  24,  1824.   F.  O.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  235 

London,  Canning  was  ready  for  the  final  step  towards 
recognition,  and  had  convinced  his  reluctant  Min- 
istry of  its  necessity.  The  debates  of  June  had 
brought  out  as  never  before  the  importance  of  South 
American  trade;  and  reports  of  the  London  agents, 
of  Alvear,  and  of  Parish  himself,  showed  in  good 
light  the  character  of  the  new  republic.  On  23d 
August,  he  instructed  Parish  once  more. 

"  Before  His  Majesty's  Government,"  read  the 
instruction,  after  commending  Parish  for  his  satis- 
factory despatches,  "  can  take  any  decisive  step  for 
drawing  closer  to  their  relations  with  any  of  the  new 
States  of  America,  it  is  obviously  necessary  to  ascer- 
tain, 

"  1st.  That  any  such  State  has  renounced  finally 
and  irrevocably  all  political  connection  with  Spain. 
2ndly,  That  it  has  the  power  as  well  as  the  will  to 
maintain  the  independence  which  it  has  established; 
and  3rdly,  That  the  frame  of  its  Government  is 
such  as  to  afford  a  reasonable  security  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  its  internal  Peace,  and  for  the  good  faith 
with  which  it  would  be  enabled  to  maintain  what- 
ever relations  it  might  contract  with  other  Powers. 

"  It  is  neither  the  right  nor  the  intention  of  Great 
Britain  to  do  anything  to  promote  the  separation  of 
any  one  of  the  Spanish  Colonies  from  Spain:  But 
the  fact  of  that  Separation  is  an  indispensable  pre- 


236  South  American  Independence 

"  liminary  to  any  further  proceedings  or  inquiries; 
and  it  is  not  till  after  that  fact  has  been  decisively 
ascertained,  that  a  question  can  arise  as  to  the  ex- 
pediency of  entering  into  arrangements  founded 
upon  a  recognition  of  it. 

"  The  fact  of  Separation  seems  to  be  clearly  estab- 
lished with  respect  to  Buenos  Ayres,  by  the  length  of 
time  which  has  elapsed  since  its  original  Declaration 
of  independence,  and  since  a  Spanish  force  has 
existed  in  its  territory;  and  by  the  absence  of  any- 
thing like  a  Spanish  party  in  the  State. 

"  The  competency  of  that  State  to  enter  into 
arrangements  with  other  Countries  does  not  appear 
liable  to  question.  But  there  is  one  point  upon  which 
Your  Report  is  not  so  clear  as  might  be  desired — I 
mean  as  to  the  power  of  the  Government  of  Buenos 
Ayres  to  bind  by  its  Stipulations  with  a  Foreign 
State,  all  the  Members  of  the  Confederacy  constitut- 
ing the  United  States  of  Rio  de  la  Plata.  .   .  . 

"  As  however  the  General  Congress  was  about  to 
assemble  when  Your  last  Despatches  came  away,  it 
is  to  be  presumed  that  if  the  requisite  Authority 
was  not  already  formally  acknowledged  it  will  have 
been  clearly  and  definitely  established  long  before 
these  Instructions,  and  the  Full  Power,  which  ac- 
companies them,  can  reach  you. 


JSngland  and  South  America  237 

"  The  Full  Power  is  drawn  in  that  presumption ; 
and  would  be  inapplicable  to  any  other  case. 

"  Supposing  then  that  case  to  exist,  and  supposing 
the  general  situation  of  affairs  at  Buenos  Ayres  to 
continue  as  favorable,  as  your  last  Despatches  de- 
scribe it.  You  will,  upon  receipt  of  this  Despatch, 
declare  to  the  Minister  with  whom  you  are  in  the 
habit  of  communicating,  that  His  Majesty  has  been 
graciously  pleased  to  direct  to  be  prepared,  and  trans- 
mitted to  you,  an  Instrument  of  Full  Power,  author- 
izing you  to  treat  with  such  Persons,  as  may  be 
duly  appointed  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  of  La 
Plata,  for  the  negotiation  of  a  Treaty  which  shall 
place  on  a  regular  and  permanent  footing  the  com- 
mercial intercourse  that  has  so  long  subsisted  be- 
tween His  Majesty's  Subjects  and  these  States." 

Upon  the  receipt  of  these  instructions.  Parish 
acted  with  self-restraint  unparalleled  in  South 
American  agents.  Although  in  close  sympathy  with 
the  patriots,  and  confident  that  their  government  was 
permanent,  he  obeyed  his  orders  in  the  fullness  of 
their  spirit. 

"  From  my  preceding  despatches,"  he  replied  to 
Canning,  on  24th  October,  "  you  will  have  learnt 
that  the  General  Congress  of  the  Provinces  of  La 
Plata  has  not  yet  met,  and  that  however  united  these 
Provinces   are   nominally,    and   to   all   appearances 


238  South  American  Independence 

"  upon  all  General  Points,  they  are  as  yet  uncon- 
nected by  any  .precisely  defined  National  Govern- 
ment. 

"  The  Administration  of  Buenos  Ayres  has  in- 
deed taken  the  lead  upon  all  those  National  Points 
which  under  other  Circumstances  would  have  de- 
volved upon  a  General  Government;  a  Course  in 
which  the  rest  of  the  Provinces  have  unanimously 
acquiesced,  more  especially  in  matters  connected 
with  their  Foreign  Relations; — but,  the  Authority 
so  assumed,  and  so  acquiesced  in,  does  not  appear 
to  me  to  be  sufiiciently  formal  to  justify  me,  under 
your  Instructions,  in  entering  with  the  Government 
of  Buenos  Ayres  upon  the  very  important  matter  en- 
trusted to  me.  Under  such  Circumstances  I  have 
considered  that  I  should  more  properly  fulfil  the 
Spirit  of  those  Instructions,  by  withholding  any 
formal  Communication  of  my  being  authorized  to 
enter  into  a  Negotiation  with  the  United  Provinces 
of  La  Plata,  till  such  time  as  those  Provinces  shall 
have  re-installed  their  National  Government. 

"  I  have  had  the  less  hesitation  in  coming  to  this 
determination,  as  the  Meeting  of  the  Congress, 
though  frequently  delayed,  is  now  upon  the  point  of 
taking  place;  and  on  the  very  morning  I  had  the 
honor  to  receive  your  despatches,  the  first  prelimi- 
nary meeting  of  the  Deputies  was  held  at  the  Resi- 
dence of  the  Governor  of  Buenos  Ayres,  when  it  was 


England  and  South  America  239 

generally  determmed  that  they  should  commence 
their  Public  Proceedings  on  the  1st  of  January  next 
at  latest,  or  sooner,  if  possible. 

"  Under  such  circumstances  I  trust  that  I  shall  not 
have  erred  in  the  Course  I  have  adopted." 

Although  not  presenting  his  new  credentials  in  an 
open  manner,  a  course  which  Canning  thoroughly 
approved,®*  Parish  informed  Garcia  that  he  pos- 
sessed them,  and  that  the  erection  of  a  national  gov- 
ernment was  the  one  thing  necessary  to  secure  a 
recognition.  With  this  condition  in  mind,  the  gov- 
ernment of  Buenos  Ayres  presented  its  report  on 
foreign  relations  to  the  General  Congress  in  the 
middle  of  the  month  of  December.®^  While  not  re- 
miss in  expressing  its  acknowledgments  to  the 
United  States,  who  had  "  constituted  Itself  Guar- 
dian of  the  Field  of  Battle,  in  order  to  prevent 
any  foreign  assistance  from  being  introduced  in  the 
aid  of  our  Rival,"  the  Government  dwelt  most  at 
length  upon  the  conditions  of  Europe.  "  The  vac- 
illation of  some  of  the  great  Powers  of  the  Conti- 
nent of  Europe,  and  the  malevolence  which  they 
shew  towards  the  new  Republics  of  this  part  of  the 
World  proceed  from  the  forced  Position  to  which 
they  are  reduced  by  a  Policy  inconsistent  with  the 

«*  Canning  to  Parish,  December  28,  1824.  F.  O.  ITss. 
^Enclosed  in  Parish's  N.  70,  December  22, 1824.  F.  0.  Mss. 


240  South  American  Independence 

"  true  state  of  things.  Kings  can  have  no  force  or 
Power  but  by  those  means  which  perfect  social  order 
affords.  They  are  well  aware  of  the  extent  and  ad- 
vantage of  those  means;  but  alarmed  by  the  move- 
ments they  perceive  around  their  thrones,  they  are 
endeavouring  to  recover  their  former  passive  state 
and  to  preserve  the  fruitful  activity  of  human  rea- 
son. They  would  wish  that  truth  and  error  could 
be  united  in  order  to  strengthen  their  Authority. 
From  hence  has  arisen  that  inexplicable  Dogma  of 
Legitimacy  which  now  disturbs  the  Nations  of 
ancient  Europe,  and  for  the  propagation  of  which 
the  Holy  Alliance  has  created  itself.  It  is  indeed  a 
matter  of  difficulty  for  this  Alliance  to  acknowledge 
as  legitimate,  Governments  whose  Origin  is  not  ob- 
scure and  whose  authority  is  not  supported  by 
miracles,  but  merely  by  the  simple  and  natural 
Rights  of  Nations.  Nevertheless  it  can  never  be 
feared  that  the  Soldiers  of  the  Holy  Alliance  will 
come  over  to  re-establish  on  this  side  of  the  Ocean 
the  Odious  Legitimacy  of  the  Catholic  King.  Great 
Britain  unfettered  by  the  engagements  of  the  Allies 
has  adopted  with  respect  to  the  States  of  America 
a  Conduct  noble  and  truly  worthy  of  a  Nation  the 
most  civilized,  the  most  independent,  and  certainly 
the  most  powerful  of  Europe.  The  Solemn  Recog- 
nition of  the  Lidependence  of  the  new  Republics 

5  6  ,      i\i^.  {Hf  <-^  A  f}.  S.  f  £  »•*!        ^  •:»»l.*       ■'■  «^\9  <■      '^>  [JOV 


England  and  South  America  241 

"must  be  the  Result  of  those  Principles  . which  she 
has  proclaimed;  and  you  may  believe  Gentlemen, 
that  this  important  Event  with  respect  to  the  Prov- 
inces of  Rio  de  la  Plata  principally  depends  on  their 
appearing  as  a  National  Body,  and  capable  of  main- 
taining the  excellent  Institutions  they  already  pos- 
sess." 

The  inspired  hint  contained  in  the  last  sentence  of 
the  message  was  soon  acted  upon  by  the  General 
Congress.  From  day  to  day,  in  expectation  of  what 
should  occur.  Parish  held  the  January  packet  at 
Buenos  Ayres,  Then  on  the  24th  of  January,  1825, 
he  let  her  sail,  bearing  with  her  to  England  a  copy 
of  a  fundamental  law  of  the  Congress,  placing  in  a 
formal  manner  in  the  hands  of  Buenos  Ayres  those 
powers  which  she  had  already  exercised  for  so  many 
years.  Nine  days  later  he  concluded,  in  the  terms 
of  his  instructions,  a  treaty  of  amity,  commerce  and 
navigation  with  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la 
Plata.^^ 

Before  the  Buenos  Ayrean  treaty  was  concluded. 
Canning  had  announced  the  final  step  in  recognition 
from  the  Foreign  Ofiice.  Fearful  of  a  domination 
of  France  in  Spanish  policy,  and  determined  to  main- 
tain British  trade,  even  at  the  cost  of  European  hos- 

«  Parish  to  Canning,  No.  6,  January  24,  1825.  F.  O.  Mss.  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII :   29. 


242  South  American  Independence 

tility,  Canning  had  persuaded  his  reluctant  govern- 
ment to  send  consuls  to  South  American  ports  in 
October,  1823.  Thus  pledged  to  the  ultimate  recog- 
nition of  the  provinces,  the  final  act  had  become 
only  a  matter  of  time  and  means.  But  even  Can- 
ning shared  with  his  colleagues  a  reluctance  to  enter 
upon  the  establishment  of  formal  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. Once  more,  as  the  proposed  conference  on 
South  America  was  under  consideration,  he  gave 
Spain  the  opportunity  to  come  to  his  rescue  by  recog- 
nizing her  rebellious  provinces  herself.  And  once 
again  he  offered  British  mediation  for  the  further- 
ance of  that  end.  "  The  British  government,"  he 
instructed  Sir  William  a  Court,  at  Madrid,^'  "  have 
no  desire  to  anticipate  Spain  in  that  recognition. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  on  every  account  their  wish, 
that  his  Catholic  majesty  should  have  the  grace  and 
advantage  of  leading  the  way,  in  that  recognition, 
among  the  Powers  of  Europe.  But  the  Court  of 
Madrid  must  be  aware,  that  the  discretion  of  his 
majesty  in  this  respect  cannot  be  indefinitely  bound 
up  in  that  of  his  Catholic  majesty;  and  that  even 
before  many  months  elapse,  the  desire  now  sincerely 
felt  by  the  British  government,  to  leave  this  prece- 
dency to  Spain,  may  be  overborne  by  considerations 
of   a   more   comprehensive    nature, — considerations 

•'January  30, 1824.  Pari.  Debates,  N.  S.,  X :   717. 


England  and  South  America  243 

"  regarding  not  only  the  essential  interests  of  his 
majesty's  subjects,  but  the  relations  of  the  old 
world  with  the  new." 

It  has  been  seen  that  the  cry  for  recognition  was 
loud  in  Parliament  in  the  spring  of  1824,  and  that 
the  Ministry  was  induced  to  justify  its  inaction  in 
March  by  making  public  the  Polignac  memorandum 
and  the  a  Court  correspondence  as  showing  a  deter- 
mination to  admit  no  European  interference  in  the 
Spanish  question.  As  the  months  advanced  the  op- 
position became  more  insistent  in  its  demands  for 
a  formal  recognition.  Spain,  at  the  same  time,  was 
content  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Canning's 
offer  of  another  mediation:  but  she  took  no  action. 
The  reports  of  Parish  meanwhile,  and  of  the  other 
Commissioners,  were  beginning  to  come  in  with 
their  accounts  of  a  reasonable  stability  in  some  of 
the  South  American  governments.  There  were  two 
things  which,  in  Canning's  mind,  were  indispensable 
preliminaries  to  a  recognition.  The  former  was  a 
promise  of  permanent  independence.  The  latter  was 
a  less  reasonable  condition,  and  one  which  interna- 
tional law  withdraws  from  the  cognizance  of  out- 
side powers,  but  which  could  be  insisted  upon  in  this 
case  with  impunity.  He  was  not  content  that  a  gov- 
ernment should  exist  capable  of  maintaining  its  in- 
ternational duties,  but  insisted  that  it  should  have 


244  South  American  Independence 

the  rare  Latin-American  quality  of  permanence. 
The  reports  of  Parish  led  the  Foreign  Secretary  to 
believe  by  August  that  these  had  been  attained  in 
Buenos  Ayres. 

And  so,  convinced  that  it  was  hopeless  to  await 
the  co-operation  of  Spain,  Canning  conquered  the 
prejudices  of  his  colleagues  and  his  king,  risking 
thereby  the  resignation  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
from  the  cabinet,  and  authorized  Parish  to  conclude 
a  commercial  treaty  in  August.^^ 

We  do  not  expect  Spain  to  be  reconciled  to  this 
step,  wrote  Canning  to  George  Bosanquet,  at  Mad- 
rid, on  the  last  day  of  the  year,  but  she  must  long 
have  expected  it,  for  our  declarations  have  left  no 
doubt  that  we  should  ultimately  be  called  upon  to 
take  it.  We  have  consistently  informed  her,  and  so 
late  as  30th  January  last,  that  we  should  be  guided 
by  the  reports  of  our  agents  and  the  interests  of  our 
subjects.  Since  then  the  consolidation  and  capacity 
of  the  republics  have  been  advancing,  commerce  has 
increased  in  proportion,  and  Spain  has  once  more 
refused  to  listen  to  our  offers  of  mediation.  We  are 
convinced  that  her  struggle  is  hopeless.  Such  ex- 
tensive portions  of  the  world  should  not  continue 
longer  without  a  recognized  existence,  so  we  have 

®*Walpole,  Hist.  England,  II:  367;  Report  of  Gren.  Alvear,  June 
29, 1824,  enclosed  in  Parish  to  Canning,  November  6,  1824.   F.  O.  3fss. 


England  and  South  America  245 

sent  instructions  for  a  treaty  to  Buenos  Ayres,  and 
are  preparing  them  for  Colombia  and  Mexico.  The 
effect  of  the  treaties  when  ratified  "  will  be  a  Diplo- 
matick  Recognition  of  the  De  facto  Governments  of 
those  three  countries." 

On  3d  January,  1825,  the  instructions  for  the 
Colombian  and  Mexican  treaties  were  signed,  and 
the  determination  of  Great  Britain  was  announced 
to  the  diplomatic  corps  in  London.®" 

The  reply  of  Francisco  de  Zea  Bermudez,  the 
Spanish  Minister,  to  George  Bosanquet,  was  filled 
with  bitter  complaint  that  Great  Britain  should  take 
such  action  at  a  moment  when — with  Castilian  hope- 
fulness— everything  was  favorable  for  a  reconquest 
of  the  "  rebellious  subjects,  who,  after  having  per- 
fidiously seized  upon  the  Government  in  various 
parts  of  his  [Catholic  majesty's]  American  Do- 
minions, now  affect  to  consider  themselves  the  arbi- 
ters of  the  destinies  &  to  defend  the  political  In- 
terests of  those  very  people  whom  they  oppress  and 
destroy."  In  language  of  surprise  and  grief  he  cited 
the  old  treaties  between  England  and  Spain,  alluded 
to  their  joint  resistance  to  "  the  Usurper  of  the 
Throne  of  France,"  and  the  opposition  of  Great 
Britain    to    "  the    recognition    of    the    momentary 

*'  F  0.  Mss. ;  the  report  of  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Bela- 
tions  for  1826  is  in  British  and  Foreign  Slate  Papers,  XIV :    1106. 


t 


246  South  American  Independence 

"  triumph  of  violence  over  justice."  Was  this  the 
time  for  her  to  cast  aside  her  treaties  and  contradict 
these  principles  to  "  sanction  the  existence  of  some 
Governments  de  facto  the  offspring  of  Rebellion. — 
Infants  in  strength,  but  old  in  crime,  supported  by 
Ambition,  and  defended  by  blood  and  Anarchy?" 
The  Minister  made  the  most  of  the  turbulence  of 
South  American  republicanism,  and  of  the  factious 
services  of  the  very  British  Commissioners  on  whose 
evidence  recognition  was  to  be  accorded.  He  would 
not  attempt,  he  said,  to  enumerate  the  times  British 
subjects  had  provided  the  insurgents  with  arms  in 
defiance  of  treaty  stipulations.  He  complained  that 
Britain's  professed  desire  for  mediation  had  always 
been  based  upon  the  inadmissible  condition  of  in- 
dependence— a  charge  which  some  one  at  the  For- 
eign Office  saw  fit  to  deny  on  the  margin  of  the 
despatch:  "  this  is  not  true  of  any  offer  from  1812 
to  1818."  He  cited  brilliant,  but  imaginary,  vic- 
tories of  the  Royalist  armies  in  Upper  Peru,  main- 
tained the  unswerving  loyalty  of  the  majority  of  the 
South  Americans,  and  insisted,  in  conclusion,  that 
Spain  would  never  abandon  in  those  provinces  her 
legitimate  rights.'** 

To  this  tirade  replied  Canning  toward  the  end  of 
March,  in  a  note  to  M.  de  los  Rios,  his  Catholic  maj- 

'"Zea  to  Bosanquet,  January  21, 1825.   F.  0.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  247 

esty's  minister  in  London.  He  declined  to  enter 
into  any  controversy  upon  the  facts  in  the  case, 
Spain's  weakest  point,  for  de  Zea  Bermudez  had  sys- 
tematically and  blindly  denied  every  essential  fact 
upon  which  British  opinion  was  based.  Upon  the 
theory  of  recognition  he  replied  at  some  length  in 
the  language  that  Mackintosh  had  thrust  upon  him 
for  eight  years.  He  saw  in  the  determination  of 
Spain  never  to  recognize  the  independence  a  com- 
plete justification  for  British  action.  "  We  admit," 
he  stated  in  conclusion,  "  that  no  question  of  right 
is  decided  by  our  recognition  of  the  new  states  of 
America."  Four  days  later  he  enclosed  a  copy  of 
his  note  to  Bosanquet,  and  hoped  sincerely  that 
Spain  would  let  the  discussion  drop.'^* 

In  1822,  nearly  two  years  before  the  enunciation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  United  States  saw  fit  to 
recognize  the  independent  existence  of  the  South 
American  republics.  Although  the  action  was  in 
direct  opposition  to  the  avowed  policy  of  Europe,  no 
Power  took  occasion  in  a  formal  manner  to  reproach 
the  United  States  for  this  deviation  from  their 
course.  Instead,  the  European  statesmen  admitted 
at  this  early  date  the  principle  of  isolation  as  applied 
to   American   policy,   while   European   journals  ex- 

■Ji  Canning  to  de  los  Eios,  March  25, 1825 ;  to  Bosanquet,  March  29, 
1825.  F.  0.  Mss.  Anrmal  Register,  1825,  51*. 


248  South  American  Independence 

pressed  jealous  regrets  that  their  governments  could 
not  act  in  similar  manner.  In  striking  contrast  to 
this  treatment  of  recognition  bj  the  United  States  is 
the  procession  of  dijDlomats  to  the  Foreign  Office  in 
the  early  days  of  March,  1825,  lq  protest  against 
recognition  by  Great  Britain. 

Canning  had  entered  deliberately  into  the  course 
which  led  him  to  recognition.  The  fight  he  had 
fought  in  his  own  cabinet  against  an  aristocratic  hos- 
tility to  the  provinces  must  have  prepared  him  for 
the  treatment  which  his  policy  received  when  pub- 
licly announced.  Evidently  by  concert,  the  min- 
isters of  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia  called  upon 
him,  on  the  second  and  fourth  of  March,  to  protest 
in  a  formal  manner  against  his  action. 

Prince  Esterhazy^^  announced  to  the  Eoreign  Sec- 
retary : 

"  1.  That  the  Court  of  Vienna  views  with  regret 
and  disapprobation  the  Course  adopted  towards  the 
Countries  of  Spanish  America,  as  being  a  deviation 
from  the  Principles  of  Legitimacy,  which  guide  the 
Politicks  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe. 

"  2nd.  That  the  Court  of  Vienna  does  not  pre- 
tend to  erect  itself  into  a  Judge  of  the  Interests  of 
Great  Britain,  nor  to  decide  how  far  those  Interests 

'"  Substance  of  a  communication  from  Prince  Eaterhazy,  March  2, 
1825.     F.  O.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  249 

"  might,  or  might  not  be  sufficiently  urgent  to  neces- 
sitate a  step  which,  It  could  not  but  consider  precipi- 
tate, even  in  that  point  of  view. 

"  3d.  But  that  it  could  not  admit  the  validity  of 
such  a  Plea,  because,  affecting  as  it  does,  in  this  in- 
stance, the  rights  of  Spain,  it  might,  if  once  admit- 
ted affect  equally  in  some  instances  the  right  of 
some  other  Power. 

"  4th.  That  the  court  of  Vienna  faithful  to  its 
principles  would  not  acknowledge  any  of  the  Coun- 
tries of  Spanish  America,  until  the  Mother  Country 
shall  have  set  the  example.'' 

In  place  of  the  fourth  article  of  the  memorandum, 
Prince  Esterhazy  desired  to  substitute,  "  4th.  That 
the  Court  of  Vienna,  faithful  to  its  principles,  would 
not  deviate  from  those  which  guided  the  Politicks  of 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  for  these  last  ten 
years." 

The  communications  from  the  ministers  of  Rus- 
sia and  Prussia  were  identical  in  substance  with  that 
of  Austria.  Count  Lieven  added  ''^  that  "  History 
will  not  forget  to  record  that,  if  in  Spain  and  in 
France  the  Cause  of  legitimate  authority  obtained 
an  advantageous  Triumph,  if  Monarchs  long  unfor- 
tunate, recovered  their  Crowns  and  the  Dominions 

'*  Substance  of  a  communication  from  Count  Lieven,  March  2, 1825. 
F.  0.  Mss. 


250  South  American  Independence 

"  of  Their  Ancestors,  it  was  more  especially  to  the 
British  Govt  that  was  to  be  attributed  this  mem- 
orable Reparation  of  the  Evils  caused  by  Revolu- 
tionary Violence. 

"  That,  applying  the  Maxims  of  a  Policy  so  gen- 
erous, to  the  Situation  of  the  Peninsula  and  of  her 
insurgent  Colonies  reciprocally,  Russia  could  not 
forbear  to  follow  the  Example  which  had  been  given 
by  England,  in  those  past  transactions." 

By  the  time  that  Baron  Maltzahn  ''*  bore  to  him 
a  third  message  of  this  character,  the  serenity  of  the 
Foreign  Secretary  seems  to  have  been  disturbed. 
"  Upon  Mr.  Canning's  taking  the  liberty  of  asking," 
runs  the  memorandum,  "  how  it  was  possible  to 
reconcile  with  the  strictness  of  those  principles 
which  Baron  Maltzahn  described  as  constituting  the 
rule  of  the  conduct  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe, 
the  willingness  which  had  been  manifested  by  some 
of  those  Great  Powers,  after  the  successes  of  1814, 
not  only  to  make  peace  with  Buonaparte  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  Bourbons,  but,  even  after  Buonaparte 
was  out  of  the  question,  to  place  some  other  than 
the  Bourbons  on  the  Throne  of  France,  and  with  the 
unqualified  acknowledgment  of  the  present  King  of 
Sweden,  while  the  legitimate  King  of  Sweden,  who 

'*  Substance  of  a  communication  from  Baron  Maltzahn  (undated, 
but  corrected  on  March  5,  1825).    F.  O.  Mss. 


England  and  South  America  251 

has  certainly  not  abdicated  his  rights,  was  wandering 
an  exile  over  Europe. 

"  Baron  Maltzahn  declared  that  he  was  not  in- 
structed to  enter  into  discussion  upon  these  points; 
but  simply  to  express  the  dissatisfaction  of  His 
Court  at  the  steps  taken  by  His  Majesty  towards  the 
States  of  Spanish  America." 

The  South  American  policy  of  the  British  Minis- 
try has  now  been  traced  to  its  conclusion,  the  recog- 
nition of  the  independence  of  the  South  American 
republics.  It  has  been  seen  how  the  Ministry  was  in 
the  beginning  legitimist  in  its  actions,  and  the  cen- 
ter of  the  opposition  to  revolutionary  tendencies  in 
Europe;  how  it  was  legitimist  in  its  real  sympathies 
to  the  end.^^  The  progress  of  European  wars,  throw- 
ing the  South  Americans  upon  their  own  resources, 
enabled  them  to  establish  a  freedom  of  commerce, 
meaning  English  commerce,  that  had  been  unknown. 
The  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  in  Spain,  unenlight- 
ened by  gleams  of  intelligence  in  the  policy  of  Fer- 
dinand, forced  the  issue  of  liberation  upon  them. 
And  in  this  issue  the  interests  of  an  enormous  British 
trade,   amounting  to  more  than   three   millions   in 

'5  H.  W.  v.  Temperley,  in  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XI :  783n.,  seems  to 
have  misunderstood  this  last  clause,  and  to  have  interpreted  it  as 
applying  to  England's  policy,  rather  than  to  the  sympathies  of  the 
Liverpool  Ministry.  Cf.  ante,  and  Temperley,  Life  of  Canning  (1905), 
149, 159,  179,  186. 


252  South  American  Independence 

1821,  were  involved.  Reinforced  by  a  popular  sym- 
pathy, as  in  the  United  States,  the  conimercial  inter- 
ests made  themselves  felt  in  the  Parliamentary  oppo- 
sition to  the  Ministry,  convincing  Canning  at  length 
that  they,  rather  than  legitimist  principles  in  Eu- 
rope, should  be  the  object  of  his  solicitude.  To  pro- 
tect them,  he  was  forced  by  the  threatening  action 
of  France  in  Spain  to  take  steps  towards  recog- 
nition, which  the  logic  of  events  forced  him  as  soon 
as  might  be,  to  follow  to  the  end.  He  "  called  "  his 
new  world  into  existence  because  he  must. 

Upon  the  details  in  connection  with  the  opening 
of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  new  States,  but  little 
time  need  be  spent.  The  first  treaty  was  concluded, 
with  Buenos  Ayres,  on  2d  February.  In  approba- 
tion of  his  conduct,  Parish  was  commissioned  as  the 
first  Charge  to  the  Provinces,  and  was  accorded  his 
formal  recognition  in  that  capacity  on  the  26th  of 
July,  1825.  The  Commissioners  to  Colombia,  forc- 
ing their  project  upon  that  government  as  the  price 
of  any  treaty,  signed  their  treaty  on  the  18th  of 
April, '^®  and  ten  days  later  Patrick  Campbell  was 
received  as  Charge.     The  Mexican  treaty,  later  to 


''^  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII :  661 ;  Canning  to  Parish, 
May  24,  1825.    F.  O.  Mss. 


England  and  South  .America  253 

be  rejected  by  Canning,  was  signed  on  6th  April  by 
Morier  and  Ward,  the  latter  being  given  his  audi- 
ence as  Charg6  on  the  21st  of  May." 


"  Campbell  to  Canning,  April  28,  1825  ;  Ward  to  Canning,  No.  1, 
May  21,  1825.  F.  0.  Mss.;  J.  H.  Smith,  "  The  Mexican  Recognition 
of  Texas,"  in  Amer.  Hist.  liev.,  XVI:  36,  is  interesting  as  a  basis 
for  comparing  the  attitude  of  Spain  and  Mexico  in  similar  situations. 


8  8  8  7         J 


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